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FOREWORD 
This report is submitted in accordance with paragraph (a)(l) 
(v)(F ) of Article 1 and paragraph (b)(6) of Article 2 of JPL Con -
tract 951709 . This is Part I of two parts . 
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I . INTRODUCTION 
This is the pr ogram final report s ubmitted in a cc orda nc e with 
JPL Contract 951709 . The report covers the period from October 5 , 
1966 thru March 31, 1968 . 
The program involved the exposur e of an assembled and fueled 
b i propellant l iquid propuls ion s yst em to the ethylene oxide (ETO) 
and hea t steri l ization r equirements specified by JPL Specification 
VOL - 50503 - ETS . After exposur e the system was fired for 280 sec . 
The program plan included a design and component se~ection 
phase dur ing which the propulsion s ys t em design was evolved . A 
second phase i nvolved the pr ocur ement of component s f or both a 
component t est series and fo r assembly into the complet e system . 
The third phase of the program, carri ed on i n parallel with the 
design phase, was a materials inves tigat ion. The fourth phase 
of the program i nvolved the assembly and test of the comple t e 
propulsion system . 
The components underwent 12 heat sterilization cycles along 
with funct i onal tests to measure degradation . Corrections or 
mod i f ications were made as r equ i red to allow s ystem t es ting . 
The module was assembled and exposed to six hea t ster iliza -
tion cycles wi th propellants loaded . After a poststerilization 
checkout of some of the critical components , the system wa s suc -
cessfully fired for 280 se~. 
This report was prepared by the Denver Division of the Martin 
Marietta Corporat i on under Jet Propulsion Laborator y Subcontract 
951709 , dated October 5 , 1966 . The JPL techn ical monitor for the 
contract was Mr . Merle E. Guenther . The Program Manager at Martin 
Mari.etta was Mr. Samuel C. Lukens . 
The following personnel at Martin Marietta were major con -
tributors to the program effort : 
H. F . Brady , Technical Lead and Des i gn 
C. Caud i ll , Materials Eng i neer ing 
C. Holt , Materials Test 
J. B. Keough, Systems Test 
I - 1 
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II. PROGRAM PLAN 
To implement the program in an orderly and timely fashion, 
the overall plan shown in Fig. 11 - 1 was formulated . The program 
consisted of four technical tasks that provided for system analy-
sis and design, a materials compatibility experimental test pro-
gram, and a components test activity followed by a system assem-
bly and test activity. A fifth task provided for reporting , 
planning, and documentation . 
In Task I the work was directed toward system design. Pro -
pellants and engine were selected and the system was sized after 
a survey of available components . The results of the materials 
investigation was coordinated into this system design activity. 
The object of Task II was to establish the effects of steril -
ization at the component level so the necessary corrective action 
could be taken and incorporated into the system. To ac complish 
Task II, the components were pro cured and exposed to two complete 
dry heat exposures, each consisting of six dry heat c ycles at 
135°C . Performance degradation was established by compar i ng 
baseline performance tests with additional performance tests at 
the midpoint and completion of all exposures . Each unit was then 
examined in detail and evaluated to formulate the results and 
necessary corrective action . 
Task III supported the design activity . A literature search 
,vas initiated to scree n materials, both metals and nonmetals, 
that would be suitable for use in the environments of propellants , 
ethylene oxide, and dry heat sterilization. This activity was 
then followed by a prescreening metals test; a 600-hr screening 
test of candidate materials of construction; a 600 - hr test of 
candidate nonmetals that included adhesives, coatings , lubricants, 
potting compounds and plastics; and finally, a long - term storage 
test of materials of construction of each propellant tank. 
In the long - term storage activity all the materials in com -
bination that constituted the propellant tanks and expulsion de -
vices were assembled into a subscale tank, loaded with the appro-
priate propellant, exposed to the dry heat steril i zation, and 
then stored at ambient conditions for up to a year . 
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The complete module was assembled, loaded, exposed, and test 
fired in Task IV. The exposure of the assembled and loaded mod-
ule consisted of both the decontamination environment of ethylene 
oxide and Freon 12 at 50°C followed by six cycles of dry heat 
sterilization at 13SoC. After the environmental exposure, the 
module was transferred to the test firing cell, given appropriate 
firing readiness checks and then test fired for 280 sec. The 
performance and degradation were then compared to the assembly 
checkout levels and engine baseline tests performed at the engine 
manufacturer's facility. 
Management of the program was implemented by a project organ-
ization shown in Fig. 11 - 2. It was characterized by the direct 
design and engineering organization shown at the first level sup-
ported by manufacturing, quality, and safety shown on the second 
level. 
Program management was aided and advised by two committees 
made up of recognized leaders in the particular areas of interest. 
The equipment selection committee membership included tech-
nical experts with extensive experience. The function of this 
committee was to meet once or twice as necessary to review the 
system design and the selection of the components. Thus addi-
tional experience was used in the component selection process. 
The Technical Advisory Group membership included individuals 
of demonstrated excellence in systems and project management. 
The group met quarterly for a technical and management review of 
the program. In this way corporate management could focus on the 
program and direct the resources of the corporation in support 
of the project, if necessary. Furthermore, the committee advised 
project members of activities in other programs that were rele-
vant. 
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III. SYSTEM DESIGN 
The first major step to be completed in the program was the 
design of the complete propulsion system. To properly accomplish 
this task, program ground rules were established and a system de-
sign criteria document was developed. In addition, a parallel 
effort was initiated to study the effects of the sterilization 
and decontamination environments on system materials of construc-
tion. 
Many of the program ground rules were specified in the state-
ment of work, providing guidelines for system size and operating 
requirements. Additional ground rules were set up as required 
to establish the scope of program effort. The major ground rules 
used are as follows: 
1) Propellants - Hydrazine-derivative fuels, or blends, 
and nitrogen oxide-derivative oxidizers, or blends, 
including nitric acid; 
2) Thrust Level - Approximately 100 lb f (throttling 
capability over 3 to 1 range or greater was desired 
but was not considered a requirement); 
3) Specific Impulse - A minimum of 275 lbf-sec/lb
m 
at 
maximum engine thrust under vacuum conditions with 
an expansion ratio of 40; 
4) Injector Head Pressure - Not to exceed 500 psi; 
5) Feed System - Gas regulated , pressure fed, with 
positive expulsion assured; 
6) Operating Duration - Minimum of 300 sec; 
7) Exposure to the sterilization environment defined by 
JPL Specification Vol-50503-ETS. The requirement 
included exposure of the propulsion system to both 
ethylene oxide mixed with Freon and to dry heat. 
The design criteria document provided complete definition of 
the system and its operating and test requirements . As the design 
phase progressed the crit eria were updated as necessary. 
Several preliminary steps were necessary to allow the design 
layout of the system to proceed. Selection of propellants was 
required so that an eng ine could be selected . With the engine 
selected, the feed system could be sized and component configura-
tions established . 
III-l 
I 
I 
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A. PROPELLANT SELECTION 
Based upon one of the program ground rules, the prop ellants 
to be selected were limited to hydrazine -derivative fuel or 
blends and nitrogen-oxide-d erivative oxidizers or blends includ-
ing nitric acid. Four candidate fuels and thr ee candidate oxi-
dizers were considered. The candidate fuels were hydrazi"ne 
(N2H4) , monomethylhydrazine (MMH) , unsymmetrical dimethylhydr,azine 
(UDMH), and Aerozine 50 (A-50). Oxidizers considered included 
nitorgen tetroxide (N2 04 ), mixed oxides of nitrogen (MON) , and 
inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA). The major considera-
tions used for propel l ant selection were: 
1) Vapor pressure at elevated temperature; 
2) Stability at elevated temperature; 
3) Material compatibility at elevated temperature; 
4) Engine test experience, including demonstration of 
performance . 
1. Oxidizer Selection 
A summary of the selection factors fo r an oxidizer is pres ente·d 
in Table III-I. 
Table 111-1 Oxidizer Se lection Data 
I Production s p 
High Pe r fo r mance Sys t ems 
Vapor Press ure The rma l Tempe r atur e Demon s t ra t e d usin g This 
Propell an t (p s i @ 275°F) Stability Compa t ibility (sec) Pro pe ll a n t 
Engine Tes t 
Experience 
N2 04 800 De compos it ion Ma t e r ials >290 Many sys - Gr ea t es t 
only s ligh t @ avai l ab le terns 
275 °F 
IRFNA 1 25 Equil i b r ium Ques t io nab le >275 Dron e sys - MinimJm 
pressure 300 terns 
to 400 p s i @ 
27 5°F 
MON >8 00 Decompos it i on Material s >290 Mo r e than Adeq u a te 
onl y s ligh t @ availa ble one 
275°F fo r amb ient 
tempe r ature 
use 
~ ~ -- - --- ~ .- -- - - - - - ~ -.-- -------' 
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The MON mixture was eliminated primarily because of a very 
high vapor pressure. Use of this oxidizer would cause a severe 
penalty in tankage weight for a system that would be sterilized 
with propellants loaded. An additional factor that led to elim-
ination of MON was the complete lack of high temperature com-
patibility data. 
A summary of existing high temperature compatibility data in-
dicated N2 04 would be a better choice than IRFNA. In addition, 
in combination with the fuels considered, N2 04 provides higher 
performance than IRFNA. As indicated in Table 111-1, IRFNA was 
superior in the area of vapor pressure, being less than 1/6 that 
of N204. 
With all factors considered N2 0 4 was selected as the oxidizer 
for the program . It was felt that the high temperature compat-
ibility and performance of N2 04 overshadowed the vapor pressure 
advantage of IRFNA . 
2. Fuel Selection 
Since there was little variation in vapor pressures and high 
temperature compatibility properties for the three candidate 
fuels considered , the main criteria for the selection were thermal 
stability of the fuel, performance with the selected oxidizer, and 
engine availability. On the basis of specific impulse and system 
weight, neat hydrazine is clearly superior to either of the fuel 
candidates from a pure theoretical standpoint; however, from the 
standpoint of thermal stability, it is less desirable than either 
A-50 or MME, and was therefore eliminated. The very limited 
decomposition rate data available for MMH (at ambient, 160°F and 
400°F) are similar to rates observed for pure hydrazine (Ref 1). 
Certain impurities, particularly oxygen, can increase the sensi-
tivity to thermal decomposition markedly. For example, MMH that 
has been exposed to air sufficiently to cause a slight yellowish 
discoloration will show increased thermal instability. 
The low sensitivity of UDMH to catalytic decomposition is 
well documented, and the decreased sensitivity of the mixture 
with hydrazine (A-50), has been demonstrated in the successful 
use of this fuel in regeneratively cooled upper stage engines. 
UDMH was eliminated even though it exhibits superior thermal 
properties because of its low performance capability . Stability 
testing of the candidate fuels is well documented for normal 
storability limits below 160 0 p in both open and closed vessels; 
however, all with decompose rapidly at elevated temperatures. 
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Bomb test data reported by Rocketdyne (Ref 2) reveal the approxi -
mate temperatures at the onset of rapid decomposition for the 
fuels are 480 0 F for 2H4 ) 640 0 F for MMH , and 720 0 F for UDMH . 
Between the normal storage temperature and rapid decomposition 
temperature of the fuels, very little experimental work indicat -
ing deeo position rates has been performed . Consequently , the 
actual relative stability rating for the hydrazine fuels in the 
range of interest at 285°F, can only be speculated . A recent 
Martin Marietta attempt to correlate these data (Ref 3) indic a ted 
that the decomposition rates of the candidate fuels are of the 
same magnitude at ambient temperatures . General opinion of 
various sources in the industry indicate that the stability rat -
ing in declining order is as follows: UHMH , MMH , A- 50 , and 2H4 . 
There is some disagreement as to the comparative stability of 
MMH and A- 50 . The most desirable engine operating characteristics 
favor MMH . 
A summary of the factors considered for fuel selection i s 
presented in Table 111-2 . 
Table 111-2 Fuel Selection Data 
I 
sp 
Hig h Per f ormance 
Tempe r a tur e Dec on s tr a t e d En g in 
Prope ll ant 
Vapor Pressur e 
(ps i a @ 275°F ) The r ma l S t a bili ty Com pa ti b il i t y (sec) Ex pe r 
25 Good i n a b sence of Ma t e ri a l s >290 Min :i 
c ata l y tic ma t e ri a l s ava il ab l e 
MMH 63 Go o d , some se ns i - Ma t e ri a l s >290 Max i 
tivit y to ca t a l ys t s ava il a bl e 
A- 50 75 Very g ood Materia l s >290 Suf f 
a v a il able 
e Test 
ience 
mum 
mum 
ic i e nt 
Note : Based on th e a bove data th e se l e cted fu e l c oul d be eith e r MMH o r A- 50. Addition a l co n -
side r a tio ns a r e : 
1) Less i gn itio n s p ike o ccur s \v ith MMH; 
2 ) MMH burn s coole r; 
3) MMH be tte r f ilm cool a n t ; 
4 ) ~1o r e en g ine Les t ex pe r ie nc e \vith MMJI on candid a t e e n g ines ; 
5 ) A- 50 pe rfo rma nc e in s l ightl y g r ea Le r t h a n MMH. 
I 
I ) 
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As a final verification of the individual selections of oxi-
dizer and fuel, a check was made of th e particular propellant " 
combination. Table 111-3 compares some of the commonly used 
combinations with MMH/N2 04 • 
Table 111-3 Propellant Combination Comparison 
Theoretical Vacuum 
Performance Equil i brium 
P = 150 psia , € = 40 
c 
Propellant State -of- I (sec) Oxidizer/Fuel 
Combination Art Rating i< sp Ratio 
N2 04 /N2 H4 3 340 . 7 1 . 53 
IRFNA/N2 H4 3 325.7 1 . 6 
N2 04 /MMH 1 337 . 7 2 . 2 
1RFNA/MMH 2 320 . 9 2 . 4 
N2 04 / A-50 1 338 . 1 2 . 0 
~':Low numb er indicated highest rating . 
On the basis of all the above information MMH was cho s en as the 
fuel for this system. 
B. ENGI NE SELECTION 
The propellant and engine selection activities were carried 
on simultaneously because of the interdependence of functions . 
Engine selection was accomplished in four phases . The factors 
considered in each phase are listed as follows: 
Phase I - Engine propellant consid erations were : 
1) Propellant test experience; 
2) Production system experience; 
3) Demonstrated performance. 
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Phase II - Engine program restraints were : 
1) Engine availability; 
2) Engine cost; 
3) Engine predelivery characterization. 
Phase III - Preliminary engine screening considerations were: 
1) Selected propellant test experience; 
2) Minimum performance capability demonstrated (-3a); 
3) Duration capability; 
4) Materials of construction. 
Phase IV - Final engine screening considerations were: 
1) 12% ETO - 88% Freon decontamination compatibility; 
2) 280°F extended temperature exposure capability; 
3) Engine rework required to meet system requirements. 
During the first phase of engine selection, a list of small 
possible candidate engines was compiled. The list also included 
engines still in a development of R&D status to provide as much 
test experience as possible. Table 111-4 presents the total 
list of eng ines from which test data were obtained. 
Table III-4 Engines Considered 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
4. 
Rocketdyne - Gemini 23 lb f , 79 lbf' 94 . 5 lb f - ablative 
Rocketdyne - Transtage 25 lb f , 45 lb f - ablative 
Rocketdyne - Apollo 91 lb f - ablative 
Rocketdyne - Beryllium 100 lb f - heat sink 
5 . Marquardt - Apollo 100 lb f - radiation 
6 . Thiokol (RMD) - Surveyor 104 lb f - regenerative 
7 . Thiokol (RMD) - Apollo, C-l 100 lb f - regenerative 
8 . TRW Syst ems - Surveyor backup MlRA-150A - ablative (radia-
tion alternative) 
9 . TRW Systems - URSA-100R 100 lb f - radiation 
10 . Bell Aerosystems - Agena second propulsion 16 lb f ' 200 lb f 
radiation 
11. Bell Aerosystems - NASA Program Model 8414 100 lb f - radia-tion 
-
12 . Bell Aerosystems - NASA Program Model 8374 100 lb f - adiabatic 
wall 
13. I R&D and/or exploratory testing 
r 
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A compilation of the data obtained for the listed engines with 
respect to propellant combination versus experience and demon-
strated performance is presented in Table 111-5 . 
Table 111-5 Engine/Propellant Considerations 
Demonstrated 
Pr9pe11ant Production Substantial Limited Test Performance, I (sec) Combinations System Usage Test Experience Experience sp 
NTO/MMH l, 3"( 4 , 5 , 7, 8, 9, 6 298 
12 
NTO/UDMH 13 260 
NTO/N2 H4 : 13 --
NTO/A-50 2, 5 7, 8, 9 , 11 4 298 
I RFNA/UDMH 13 270 
MON/MMH 8 6 298 
MON/MMH 
Hydrate 6 287 
MON/UDMH 10 260 
,,-
'Numbers refer to engines lis ted in Table 1II-4. 
As a result of the investigations under the first phase of 
engi ne selection, the following 100 lb f engines were carried to the second phase of selection: 
1) Rocketdyne - Beryllium - heat sink; 
2) Marquardt - Model R-4D - radiation; 
3) Thiokol, RMD - Model C- l - regenerative; 
4) TRW Systems - MlRA-lSOR - radiation; 
5) Bell Aerosystems - Model 8414 - radiation; 
6) Bell Aerosystems - Model 8374 - adiabatic wall . 
From the list of Table 111-4, engines 1, 6 , 8, and 12 were 
eliminated at the end of the first phase of selection. Engines 
1 and 8 with ablative nozzles were eliminated because of un-
certainty of compatibility with the ETO decontaminate . In addi-
tion there was considerable doubt that the engines could meet 
the required 300 - sec firing duration. Engine 6 was eliminated 
because of very limited test experience with the selected propel-
lants. 
III-l 
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Engine manufacturers were contacted to determine engine 
availability, detailed performance data, and engine test histories . 
As a result of thes e inquiries thr ee remaLnLng engines were 
evaluated as to ETO and thermal compatibility . All are compatible 
with the defined sterilization syst em requirements. The final 
selection of the engine was based on previous test experience 
with the selected propellants, system adaptability, component 
simplicity , reliability, and development status. 
The engine select i on criteria for final screening between 
the Marquardt R-4D and Reaction Motor Div ision (RMD) C-l eng ines 
ar e presented in Tabl e 111-6. 
The Marquardt engine was selected based on test experience 
of the fixed R-4D design and the RMD C-l engine was chosen as an 
alternat e , if required. 
The R-4D rocket engine, Fig. 111-1, will provide a 27S - sec 
(-30) minimum vacuum specific impulse at 100 lb f thrust using 
N2 04 and MMH propellants at an oxidizer -to-fuel rati o of 1.6 and 
a nozzl e expansion ratio of 40:1, as required. 
Before delivery of the engine t o Martin Marietta, the engine 
contractor performed a hot f ir e characterization . Th is was ac-
complished by expos ing the eng i ne to a standard acceptance test 
pr ocedur e during which three S-s ec steady-state f iring runs were 
made. The acceptance test firings were altitude firings using a 
full bel l with an area ratio of 40 : 1. Results of the firing runs 
are presented as follows : 
Mean OfF 1 . 600 
s 
60/F 0 .006 
s 
Mean F 99 . 6 ib 
vac 
s 
6F 0 . 4 lb 
vac 
s 
Mean 1 286 . 7 sec 
sPvac 
s 
6 1 1 . 7 s ec 
sPvac 
s 
I 
- - - - - -- -- -- - - -- - - -- - --------------- -- -. - ~ 
Test Experience 
Hnrguardt R- 4D 
No. of Altitude Tests; 633 
No , of Altitude Starts: 1,141,000 
Accumulated Ru r n Duration: 489,400 sec 
Total Valve Cycles : 5.812,800 
NTO/A · 50 
Maximum Duralion. One Engine: 13.000 sec 
No . ()( Starts: 103 . 000 
Maximum Sl eady- State Duration: 2 100 sec 
NTO/M}.DI 
~ee Qualification Engines 
No. of Altitude Starts: 26 , 864 
Accumulated Burn Duration: 2136 
Two Development Engines 
Rating: 
~ 
No. of Altitude Starts: 5000 
Accumulated Burn Duration: 2000 sec 
Maximum Steady· State Duration: 1020 
10 
NrO/A-50 and NTO/HMH 
No . of Tests: 4092 
No . of Starts: 431,000 
Accumulated Burn Duration: 148 ,000 sec 
(607. of above tests with NTO/MMII) 
","0/MM11 
Maximum Duration for One Engine: 12,706 
No. of Starts : 9920 
Naxirnum Steady - State Duration : 1400 sec 
Rating: 
-~-- - -- --~ 
Table 111-6 Final Engine Se l ection 
Rei iabi I ity 
Engine 
NM: 55 16 Cyel es 
0.995 (d 501~ Con-
fidence 
0.983 (d 90 7. Con-
fidence 
Valve 
-0.996 @ 50 1. Crl n-
fidence 
The re liability Is 
the same [or A- 50 
and MHlI sinc~ pr o-
pe llant change af-
[ects only per-
[ormance 
10 
Engines 
QualiCica l ion 
Status 
Dev~ 1 oped and 
qual Hied (o r 
SM, LEM . and 
Lunar Orbiter 
.... ith NTO/ A-50 . 
Supplemental 
qual ification 
compl eted for 
NTOI MHlI for use 
o n SH . 445 e n-
gines del i ve red 
wi lh 208 rerns in-
ing to be de-
li ve red _ 
lO 
Engine Deve l o ped and to 
Requi r ed to demon- be qua l ified by 
strate 69 success· 15 Ju l y 1967, as 
[u l engine firings. backup [or SM , 
Most severe duty LEH , S- IVB . and 
cycle: 28 e ngines. MP. Uses both 
20 environmenta' trIO/A-50 and 1{fO/ 
engines. Test to MM11. 
fa ilure : 25 of 48 Over 100 engines 
e ngines total. in program; some 
0 . 99 @ 50'7, Con- already delivered. 
fjdence. 
Corap l exity 
Moderate 
Va I ves 
Individual [uel 
and oxidi~cr 
so lenoid va I ves. 
In jeclo r 
Shrunk fi t in-
jector assemb ly. 
smal l injectroT 
orifice holes 
suscep li b l e t o 
clogging and 
distorti on . 
8 sets , multi-
triplet l ype 
wi th o ne set 
preignitiC'n . 
~ 
Va l ve 
~gle integrated 
torque motor op-
era ted bipr,,)pel -
lant val \Ie. 
In tector 
All welded in-
jector assembly 
moderate injector 
orifice holes. 
4 se ts, vortex 
type. 
10 
124 ETO 
881.. Freon 12 
CC'lmpa t i bi I i ty 
(.1 SO·C (1 22· F) 
Compa t ib l e 
10 
Compa t ible 
to 
Physica I Propert y 
nea t Cycle I CompaUbiJ ity 
Compat ibit i t y of Di ssimilar 
Extended Dul"aLion Materia l Ther -
Cd 135"C C27 5"F) mal Expansion 
Compatible Compa tibLe 
10 10 
Compatible Compatible 
10 lO 
lIigh 
Sys tem I Tempera ture 
Oesign Componl:!nt 
Suitabi lity Exposure 
Supp l y pres- , F"u r 
s ure: 180 s olenoid 
psi. Exisl- valves; 
ing thrust two fuel j 
mount and two oxi-
c hambe r 
pressure 
pickup 
adequate. 
10 
Suppl y 
pressure: 
\79-191 
psi. 
Existing 
thrust 
mount and 
chamber 
pressure 
pickup 
adequate . 
10 
dizer 
subjected 
to 250°(0' 
nonoperat-
ing temper-
atu r e and 
(unctionally 
evaluated. 
No deg rada -
ti on in 
funct ion 
evidenced. 
Va lve 
func-
tionalL y 
t ested wi th 
average co ; 1 
temp at 
5000P with-
out detri-
mental 
effects. 
lO 
Sa tisfies 
PTogram 
Perfo rmance 
Requirements 
Satisfactory 
10 
Rating 97 
Sa tisfactory 
lO 
Rating 94 
H 
H 
H 
I 
\0 
- - - --- --_. - - --- - --~ - - - -- - - - - - - - ---_. - ........ - -
-, 
l 
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Fig. 1II-1 Marquardt R-4D Rocket Engine 
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Data were also provided on the injector head and valve assemblies . 
Flow pressure drop and response under water flow calibration were 
measured to provide a baseline for component degradation during 
sterilization. 
C. PROPULSION MODULE DESIGN 
During the same period of time and in parallel with the pro -
pellant and engine selections , an effort was underway to layout 
the propulsion module . A system schematic was drawn up and a 
component arrangement layout was started . Early configurations 
considered included the tank layout arrangements shown in Fig . 
111-2 . The bipropellant tank configuration was eliminated because 
of the limitations placed on the type of positive expulsion de -
vices that could be used with this tank . In general this type 
of tank is suited for metallic convoluted hemispherical diaphragms . 
Propellants are contained in opposite sides of the sphere with 
double diaphragms between . The pressurant gas is then introduced 
between the diaphragms to effect expulsion . One intent of the 
program was to try at least two types of devices such as dia -
phragms and surface tension syst ems so this approach was dropped 
from further consideration. 
Another problem encountered involved the choice of propellant 
and pressurant tank arrangement . Since the system to be d es i gned 
was not intended to be an exact simulation of a flight system, 
control of the center of gravity was not considered to be of 
paramount importance. On the other hand, the system was designed 
to meet the environmental criteria defined in JPL Sp ec 30250B 
with Amendments 1, 2, and 3, which specified, as an example, an 
acceleration load of ±14 g in three axes for 5 minut es . Under 
this magnitude of loading structural integrity became a major 
consideration. For this reason the arrangement of tanks shown 
by Fig. 1II-2(b) was eliminated. In this case the support of 
the pressurant tank from the major structural truss became quite 
complex and heavy. The configuration of Fig . 1II-2(c), however, 
placed all three tanks in a plane with the structural truss and 
made mounting simple assuming equator ial mounting provisions on 
the tanks. Late in the program a decision was made to use pro-
pellant tanks having only polar mounting provisions . Rather than 
doing a complete redesign including stress analysis , the tanks 
were mounted off the existing box frame using curved tubular 
supports . 
III-II 
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(a) Bipropellant Tank Configuration 
(b) Pyram i d Tank Configuration 
Tripod N2 Tank 
Support 
Tripod Engine 
Suppor t 
,-----------------~ 
4 1. 75 
\~/-'\lJ-
/ I 
;:::::"'oo~~ ) \ Strut 
\ 
(c) Planar Configuration 
Engine 
Stabilizer 
Strut 
Fig. 111-2 System Configurations 
1-----
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The module structural truss assembly is shown in Fi g. III-3 
mounted on its fabrication fixture. 
The primary structural member was made up of a box section of 
carbon steel on which the tank supports and the engine supports 
were mounted. In general, no attempt was made to use high 
strength-to-weight rati o structural materials since the module 
was not intended to be a structural test model. Materi a l investi-
gations provided results sufficient to answer questions concern -
ing the sterilizability of structural materials (see Chapter I V) . 
In the case of the carbon steel parts a zinc chromate c oa ting 
was applied to avoid contact of iron oxide with the ETO vapor. 
Metal oxides generally act as a catalyst to decompose ETO tha t 
would degrade the decontamination atmosphere . The system syhe -
matic evolved during the design phase is shown in its final form 
in Fig. 111-4. Since the system was to be exposed to severe 
environments (heat sterilization) while loaded with propellants , 
design for minimum leakage was emphasized. Three port i ons of 
the system were designed to be hermetically sealed: the oxi -
dizer and fuel storage systems , and the pressurant gas s t orage 
system. Welded joints were used wherever possible to limit ex -
ternal leakage and normally open/norma lly closed ordna nce - operated 
valves were used to limit internal leakage . Bimetallic transi -
tion joints were used to join portions of the systems where mate -
rial change s were required. For example, the propell ant tanks 
were of titanium alloy and the hand valves were of aluminum 
alloy. A titanium/aluminum joint was used in the line between 
the components. The only joints in the hermetically sealed areas 
that were not a weld joint or a transition joint were the ordnance 
valve flange joint and AN fittings in the propellant fill line. 
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The ordnance valve joint incorporates a soft aluminum gasket 
cl amped between serrated flange surfaces and is a low leakage type 
joint. On the external side of the fill and drain and vent valves, 
the line was capped using a soft aluminum seal under an AN flared 
tube cap. The remainder of the systems were subject to lea k age 
only after ordnance valve opening and during module firing so that 
standard AN and MS joints were used allowing more rapid assembly 
and disassembly. 
A drawing system was established to provide for logical 
fabrication and final ass embly of the system . In addition to 
defining th e steps of fabr ication and assembly, all in - process 
insp ection and t est steps were included in the drawing notes. 
For example , the steps of proof pressure test and leak check of 
the various portions of the system were defined in a sequence 
that would alloH for r epair before complete ass embly . Sinc e the 
liquid systems were generally hermetically sealed by weld joints, 
the repair of a leak late in the assembly process could result in 
considerable disassembly for repair. 
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Interface 
Fig. 111-4 System Schematic 
III- lS 
Diaphragm 
Nitrogen Pressure Regulator 
Filter 
Screen 
Propellant Tan k 
Test Point 
Pressure Cap 
Facility Burst Disc 
Ordnance Valve 
Solenoid Valve 
Gas Storage Tank 
Orifice 
Thrust Chamber Valve 
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D. COMPONENT SELECTION 
1 . Analysis 
Analysis of the systems requirement dictated some minimal 
and maximal performance parameters for the individual components . 
Inves tigations were mad e to locate qualified, "off the shelf ," 
components for the system. It was desired that these units 
should have been qualified for systems equal to the stringent 
requirements of a sterilizable system . Requests for supplier 
proposals were issued on all components of the system except for 
the expulsion devices.. In the case of expulsion devices , a brief 
initial survey disclosed that available designs were not suitable; 
and therefore , components would have to be manufactured to meet a 
specific requirement . 
A discussion of th e selection or design of each component is 
presented in the fol lowing paragraphs . 
a . Prop ellant Tanks 
An initial tank sizing analysis was conducted t o determine 
the volumes and minimum allowable wall th ickness for ea ch propel -
lant tank . The following tank vo lume calculations were considered: 
1) Propellant mass loaded; 
2) Approximate vol ume of expuls i on device; 
3) 5% ullage volume; 
4) Propellant decomposition; 
5) Propellant expansion from room temperature (70°F) to 
sterilization t empera tur es (285°F) . 
A 10°F margin was applied to the sterilization temperature for 
the design point . 
The calculations resul t ed in 15 in . and 16 . 25 i n . i ns id e 
diameter spheres for fuel and oxidizer tanks, respectively . The 
minimum wall thickness calculations considered safety factors of 
2 .0 and 2 . 50 for yield and ultimate, respectively . Consid ering 
worst conditions of tank pressure and temperature, the oxidizer 
tank minimum wall thickness required 0 . 292 in. for a maximum 
pressure of 942 psia exper i enced during sterilization . A fuel 
tank minimum allmvable wal l thickness of 0 . 0596 in . was r equired 
for the tank operating pressure of 250 psia . Both tanks were 
initially designed using 321 stainless steel as the material. 
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Following later investigationi in material compatibility 
and the disclosure of iron adduct deposit with the stainless 
steels in contact with N2 04 , titanium was selected for both tanks 
due to its compatibility, high strength-to-weigh t ratio, and also 
its availability . Aluminum tanks, while compatible with the 
fuel, were heavy and not in production by any supplier . 
Several other studies were 
amount of propellant mass loaded. 
70°F propellant and a 1.60 mixture 
III - 7 . 
conducted 
The final 
ratio ar e 
to determine the 
figures based on 
given i n Table 
Table 111-7 Propellant Weight Statement 
Oxidizer Fuel Total 
Item (lb) (lb) (lb) 
Total Usable 69.55 43 . 45 113 . 00 
Unusable 
Propellant Decomposition 0 . 35 1 . 74 2 . 09 
Propellant Sampl e 0 . 20 0 . 12 0 . 32 
Trapped in Feed System 10 . 90 0 . 06 10 . 96 
Loading Uncertainty 0.50 0 . 50 1.00 
Fuel Bias -- 1 . 30 1.30 
Maximum Outage 1.39 0.87 2 .2 6 
Burning Time Margin 1.63 3.89 5.52 
(7 . 46 sec minimum) 
Nominal Propellant Load ed 84.52 51.93 136.45 
b . Zero-g Expulsion Devices 
These devices must be capable of withstanding the sterili-
zation temperature while in contact with propellants with low or 
no permeability of propellant v apor. Elastomers, in general , were 
either permeable, not compatible with the propellants , or cured 
at a temperature less than the sterilization temperature . Metals, 
on the other hand, were not permeable, and not affected by the 
temperature; however they were not compatible with the propellants 
under the usage conditions . Some of the possible candidates that 
were initially considered were: 
Stainless steel and/or aluminum bladder; 
Concentric convoluted aluminum diaphragm; 
Teflon (TFE, FEP laminates) diaphragm; 
Stainless steel bellows. 
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Each of the above configurations were investigated for advantages 
and disadvantages with respect to the environmental and functional 
conditions . 
Metallic diaphragms can apparently stand several complete 
reversals and would be impermeable because of all-metal construc-
tion , However, this system requires a tank of the same material, 
to effect a walded joint, and as material tests proved later, 
stainless steel and/or aluminum would be usable only in the fuel 
system . 
A concentric convoluted aluminum diaphragm would also be 
impermeable to propellants, but would be limited to one complete 
expuls i on cycle and would be limited to the fuel system because 
of material compatibi l ity with N204. 
A d i aphragm made of Teflon laminates, TFE , and FEP, would 
withstand the sterilization temperatures (TFE and FEP are good 
for SOO°F and 400°F, respectively), but would probably swell and 
allow propellant permeation , 
A stainless steel bellows would withstand sterilization 
temperatures and cycling without difficulty but would be limited 
to use in the fuel system . 
In addition to the bladder-diaphragm-bellows-type expu l -
sion used in one propellant tank, a screen-type expuls ion system 
was considered for incorporation in the other propellant tank . 
The capillary screen concept would withstand the sterilization 
cycle without di ff iculty except for possible compatibility prob-
lems between the screen material and the propellant. 
Initially , consideration was g i ven to the use of a screen 
trap for the oxidizer tank. As the materials compatibility test-
ing progressed , it became evident that stainless steel, nickel, 
and aluminum screens were not compatible with N204 at 27SoF, No 
other screen material of the proper mesh size was available so a 
diaphragm or bladder expuls ion device was necessary for the oxi-
dizer tank . 
Results of the 600 -hr screening test of materials in 
N204 at 275°F indicat ed Teflon was compatible. On this basis 
it was decided to use a Teflon laminate diaphragm in the oxidizer 
tank and a screen trap in the fuel tank, 
I 
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Since the tank material was titanium , an attempt was made 
to find a supplier of titanium woven screen in the mesh size 
necessary to support at least 2 in . of MME . Screen of this mesh 
is beyond the current state of the art in both wire drawing and 
weaving . The material becomes highly susceptible to corrosion 
in small diameters and is quite brittle , making weaving extremely 
d i fficult . Further investigat i on revealed etched titanium foil 
was available in proper mesh sizes although the material thick -
ness was a problem . The supplier could etch hole diameters no 
sma ller than the material gage. Material 0.001 in . thick etched 
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to the required mesh size was exposed to fuel (MMH) at elevated 
temperature (275°F) with no material degradation or fuel decomposi-
t i on . Welding of this etched foil into a trap assembly , however , 
requ i red a welding development program. One alternative solution 
was available: use titanium sheet to build up a frame assembly 
and attach stainless steel screen window assemblies using a 
crimping , riveting , or bolting techni que . A seam welding tech-
nique was developed to form a joint , as shown in Fi g . 111-5. The 
stainless stell screen was sandwiched between sheets of titanium. 
A seam weld was made outside the screen to fuse titanium to 
t i t a nium and a second seam was made through the screen . This 
latter weld did not provide complete fusion of the two metals; 
however , it did provide a good mechanical bond and sealed the 
joint aga i nst fuel leakage around the edge of the screen . Seam 
weld samples as previously described were prepared . Although 
the weld was possible and proved to be adequate from a structural 
attachment standpoint, fuel compatibility was a problem . Weld 
samples were passivated in a mixture of water and MME . After all 
gas generation had stopped, the samples were exposed to pure MME 
at elevated temperature . Some samples caused no propellant de -
composition wh i le others of similar construction did cause de -
composition . 
On the basis of the erratic results obtained from the 
weld samples , additional samples using a riveted sandwich were 
tried . Best results from a leakage standpoint were obtained 
using aluminum alloy rivets; however , joints were fabricated 
using monel rivets because fuel tank passivation was best accom-
plished using a water-MME mixture and this mixture will attack 
aluminum rivets . The screen trap in its final configuration is 
shown in Fig . 111 - 6 . 
1II-20 
Titanium 
6A £ -4V ,. 
DETAIL B 
MCR-68-1l9 
165x800 Mesh 
SS 304L 
o 
SECTION A-A 
9.375 
Dia 
8.562 
Dia 
Titanium 
6A£_4V 
165x800 Mesh 
SS 304L 
~: Dimensions in i nches. 
Fig. 111-5 Proposed We lded Configuration of Screen Trap 
I 
_J 
MS 20427M3 
Rivets 
DETAIL A 
MCR-68-1l9 
SS 304L 
165x800 Mesh 
S5 3041 
165x800 Mesh 
5S 3041 
MS 20427M3 
Rivets 
1II-21 
6Af, -4V Titanium 
Rivets 
DETAIL B 
B 
Fig. 111-6 Screen Trap Riveted Configuration 
1II-22 MCR-68-1l9 
c. Pressurant Gas Spher e 
This analysis was conducted to determine the amount of 
nitrogen required for pressurization and to determine if the size 
of the selected container at the selected loaded conditions was 
ade quat e for the pressurization of the propellant tanks. The 
loaded condition was selected to be ambient temperature (70°F) 
and a pressure of 1550 ± 50 psia . The primary factors considered 
in selecting th e loaded sphere pressure were: 
Sphere design pressures at 70°F; 
Required ordnance valve safety fac t ors of 1 . 5 and 2.5 
and an ordnance valve proof pressure of 5400 psia and 
burst pr es sure of 8000 psia at 70°F; 
A margin t o ver ify the proof and burst pressures up to 
a t emperature of 285°F was considered. 
A propellant tank pressurization and thermodynamics com-
puter program (Martin Marietta Program OD04l) was used to per -
form the pressurant storage analysis. This computer program was 
us ed t o simulate the expected test firing . The simulated test 
firing consisted of a 100-sec prepressurization period followed 
by a 300-sec burn (propellant out flow) period. The pressuriza-
tion time of a 100 sec was approximately the time required for 
prepressurization at the regulator design nitrogen flow rate of 
0.015 l b/sec . The burn time of 300 - sec was the design object i ve . 
Because of a computer program limitation, the pressurization and 
prop ellant storage system was simulated by a nitrogen sphere 
supplyi ng nitrogen t o one propellant tank instead of two tanks . 
Th e volume of the single tank was equal to the total volume of 
bo th fuel and oxidizer tanks . Two runs were made -- one run 
us ing oxidizer (NTO) and the other run using fuel (MMH) . The 
computer program calculated the pressure and temperature in both 
th e nitrogen container and the propellant tank . It also calculated 
th e nitrogen mass in the storage container and the nitrogen and 
prop e llant masses in the propellant tank as a function of time . 
As a part of the pressurant s t orage analysis , the poss i-
bility of freezing oxidizer (NTO) during module propellant ex -
pulsion was invest i gated . During pressurant sphere blowdown , 
the temperature of the nitrogen entering the tank could possi -
bly drop below the oxidizer freezing temperature, and therefore , 
could result in some NTO freezing . 
---- -- ~--- -----
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The pressurization and propellant expul sion of the oxi-
dizer tank was simulated using the same computer program that 
was used for the pressurant storage analysis . The results of 
this investigation indicated that while the nitrogen entering 
temperature dropped approximately to the freezing temperature of 
the oxidizer (472°R), the oxidizer temperature only dropped 2°R 
from its initial temperature of 530 o R. The main reason for this 
small drop in liquid temperature was due to the high heat capacity 
of not only the liquid but the propellant tank. Another, but 
less significant, factor that attributed to the small liquid 
temperature drop was the increase in ullage temperature during 
prepressurization. During prepressurization the ullage gases 
were compressed and the temperature increased. This warmed in-
stead of cooled the liquid. This factor is less significant b e -
cause even if the ullage temperature was allowed to cool down, 
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the high heat capacities of both the liquid and tank are sufficient 
to keep the liquid from freezing. 
After obtaining nitrogen and propellant mass flow rates, 
line sizing was completed with the selection of l/4-in. gas lines 
and 1/2-in. propellant lines. 
d. Gas Pressure Regulator 
Pr eliminary investigation fo r a suitable regulator desi gn 
first emphasized a proved off-the-shelf item that would require 
a minimum of changes to meet the desired design parameters. 
Vendors were asked to submit a history of accomplishment, and/or 
qualification, and a materials of construction list. Proposed 
mat er ials were included in the ma t er ial compatibility tests. 
During this period discussions were carried on with the vari ous 
vendors to determine their proposed design philosophies, such as 
single stage versus multiple stage regulation. It was desired to 
achi eve the simplest design possible to provide reliabil ity . This 
had to be accomplished within the range of control parameters that 
were specified by the system analysis. 
A more complete analysis of thermal, pressure, and com-
patibility effects could not be accomplished at this time because 
de tail drawings were not available. This analysis was complet ed 
later in the program and is shown in App endix A. The subjects 
covered include stress analysis, tolerance analysis over natural 
and induced temperature range, and a failure mode analysis. No 
attempt was made to make this a complete analysis in the sense 
of investigating each detail part; however, by inspection, thos e 
ar eas or details were selected that proposed th e most critical 
or probable sources of fa ilur e . 
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e, Solenoid Valve 
Investigation for a solenoid valve was confined to a 
direct acting, normally closed, two-way valve to be used as a 
fill-and-drain valve in the pressurant system. Reliability and 
a low order of external leakage were of prime importance . Since 
this type of valve is manufactured by many different vendors , an 
analysis of suitability resolved into selecting the valves that 
had the most experience in similar environments. Later in the 
program and after selection of a specific valve an analysis wa s 
performed and is shown in Appendix A, 
Very early in this investigation it became apparent that 
soft seat valves using Teflon or similar materials ?n t he main pop-
pet would be vulnerable to deformation and cold flow dur i ng t he 
heat cycling. Therefore, hard seat (metal to metal) valves were 
favored, but this was not made an absolute requisite if the ven -
dor could justify his selection, 
f. Filter 
The filtration requirements for this system were initial l y 
based on the requirements used on similar systems on the Titan III 
program. This called for a nominal lO-~ filter. Later , when the 
engine requirements became known, this was upgraded to a nominal 
5 - ~ filter. 
Manufacturing firms were surveyed to determine design 
capabilities in small lightweight filter assemblies, Information 
initially received disclosed many designs with elastomer ic seals 
and a limited number of all welded filter designs. While all 
welded filters were favored, they were not specifically required 
and final evaluation was based on the results of the material 
compatibility tests. 
A more complete analysis was conducted at a later time 
after component selection. The results are shown in Appendix A. 
g . Hand Valves 
The design of the hand valves required for this syst em 
emphas iz ed a very low order of external and internal leakage . 
Secondary parameters were flow and pressure drop. Initially the 
vendors all proposed stainless steel valves . When stainless 
steel incompatibility with oxidizer became known, all proposals 
were rejected and the vendors were asked to resubmit designs 
using aluminum or titanium. One supplier submitted a design in 
aluminum that duplicat ed an existing stainless steel design. It 
- - -- - - ---- - - - ------- ----
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was apparent that off-the-shelf proven designs would not be avail-
able and each design would have to be evaluated on its mechanical 
merits and its material compatability. Further analysis could 
not be performed at this time because detail drawings were not 
available. However, the analysis was performed later and results 
are shown in Appendix A. 
h. Ordnance Valves 
This valve was supplied by JPL as government-furnished 
equipment. The structural design of the valve was compatible 
with the system operating pressure requirements. Since the 
valve and squib had been exposed to sterilization environment on 
another program without degradation, it was used in this system 
and no further search for a valve was made. This component is a 
combination of a normally open and normally closed valve in one 
housing . 
i. Throttling Valve and Thrust Chamber Valves 
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The initial intent of this program was to provide an engine 
wi th throttling capability . When the selected engine did not have 
throttling valves, it was decided that a separate bipropellant 
throttling valve would be subjected to the component sterilization 
cycles. This valve was submitted as GFE and exposed, in contact 
with the propellants, to the heat sterilization cycles. It was then 
shipped to the JPL for test and analysis. 
The thrust chamber valves -- one oxidizer and one fuel 
were component parts of the eng ine selected for this program. 
One of each of these valves was submitted by the engine manu-
facturer for inclusion in the component sterilization test. 
2. Specifications 
After the initial system studies established the required 
component parameters , specifications were writ t en for each of 
the components and submitted to vendors . A short form specifica-
tion was prepared that set forth the operating requirements, ma-
terials compatibility, and nonoperating t emperature exposure . 
No vibration requirements were imposed. Acceptance testing was 
confined to operating parameters and leakage. 
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3 . Selection 
Crite r ia for the selection of each component were established 
and a weighted grading system was set up. These criteria were 
determined for each component on the basis of function with 
weighting performed on the basis of expected and/or required 
reliability. 
Th e grading sheets were submitted to JPL for app rov a l on 23 
November 1966 . A sample grading sheet is shown in Table 111 - 8 . 
Components were first consid ered on the basis of technical 
qualifications, as indicated by the weighted grading , followed 
by a consid eration of cost and delivery schedule. In the case 
of th e hand shutoff valve , the Teflon diaphragm , a nd the screen 
trap exp ulsi on device, only single proposals were available . 
Therefore, the only considerations in the latter selections were 
whether the component was operationally capable of doing the job . 
The screen trap was designed by Martin Marietta Corporation and 
it was ul t imately decided to build it " in -house . " 
a . Prop el lant Tanks 
The tank design selected, Pressure System s Inc . 80011 -1, 
was the same design used in the JPL Advanced Lightweight Pres-
surization System (ALPS) Generant Tank Program with a few minor 
d esign changes . The inlet and outlet ports were strengthened to 
accommodate mounting provisions . In addition, the forgings that 
were used for the fuel tanks allowed extra metal near the outlet 
port . This extra metal permited machining of a ring to allow 
weld ing of the screen trap to the tank. The diaphragm material 
was Teflon rather than butyl or ethylene propylene compounds as 
used in the ALPS program . 
I n addition to the modifications listed above, the inlet 
shower head holes were drilled to a smaller diameter to prevent 
diaphragm ex t rusion at the high vapor pressure at sterilization 
temperatures . 
I 
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Table 111-8 Component Selection Sheet 
,...---- -------- --- - ----- --- --- ---
Component Selection Criteria Gas 
Pressure Regulator 
1. Basic Design Analysis 
a) Insensitivity to thermal changes 
(-10 -> +10) 
b) Protection of small orifices 
(-10 -> -+10) 
c) Complexity (0 -> 5) 
d) Seat design (0 -> 5) 
e) Struc tura1 capability (0 -> 10) 
2. Materials of Construction 
(0 -> 10) 
3. Leakage 
4. 
a) Internal -> 
b) External -> 
Performance 
a) 
b) oot on lockup (0 -> 5) 
c) Overshoot on inlet "squib valve" 
initiation (0 -> 5) 
d) Pressure band drift due to environ-
mental changes (0 -> 5) 
e) Allowable inlet pressure variation 
(0 -> 10) 
5. Vendor 
a) Previous experience requ~r~ng minimum 
development (0 -> 10) 
b) Delivery (one negative for each week 
past targe t date) 
6. Envelope and Weight (0 -> 5) 
7. Qualification Status 
a) Degree of testing in compliance with 
JPL 30250B (0 -> 20) 
b) Changes required (0 -> 20) 
Total 
III-27 
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b . Expulsion Diaphragm 
Final selection of a diaphragm for the oxidizer tanks 
involved the selection of a type of diaphragm rather than the 
selection of a supplier. Both metal and Teflon designs were 
considered . The Teflon design of Dilectrix was selected prima -
rily because of its qualification status and cycle life capability . 
The Teflon diaphragm consisted of laminates of TFE (4 mils thick) 
and FEP (4 mils thick). It also incorpora ted a crown of FEP 
(0 . 030 to 0 . 035 in . thick) at the gas inlet area to prevent ex -
trud ing of the Teflon through the barrier plate located in the 
inlet port (Fig . 111-7). 
c . Pressurant Tank 
The Menasco tank, PiN 812500 - 501, was selected becaus e 
it scored higher than the other supplier tanks , primarily in the 
area of test experience . Another Menasco design, PiN 785000 -503 , 
had been initially selected because it had better mount ing pro -
visions and low er cost . How ever , the material was titanium , 
7Ai -4Mo , which is ext r emely difficult to weld . A d ecis i on was 
made not to risk the we lding probl ems . Only a sing le bottle 
fabricated from th e 7A£ - 4Mo material ex isted . I n addition, 
Menasco indicated that no additional bottles of this material 
would be made , therefor e , loss of the bottle at any point in the 
program would require a change t o anothe r bottle configuration. 
No modifications to the selected tank were requ ir ed . 
d. Gas Pressure Regulator 
The selected design , Sterer Drawing 35570, was chosen in 
preference to Sterer Drawing 23010 because it is a proved , 
qual i f i ed d esign. It was basically the same design as that used 
on Mariner II (Sterer Drawing 18910) . Material in the cap and 
ball reseating pin was changed from 2024-T4 Ai to stainless st ee l . 
Other changes include the addition of a 10 -~ f ilter on the inlet 
sid e , change of inlet and outlet ports, and change of pressure 
setting to conform to the present application . 
e . Sol eno id Valve 
The chosen design was selected becaus e it was basically 
the same as Sterer Drawing 31580, which was qualified for use on 
the biosatellite . Minor changes included th e substitution of 
Kynar for a nylon threadlock. The thread lock was in a noncritical 
area and was backed up by a f inal wir e lock . The solenoid pott i ng 
compound was changed to one that was compatible with ethylene oxide 
and the ports were changed to conform to the present application . 
---.~-~-
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This valve i ncorporates filters at both the inl et and 
outlet ports, thereby reducing the possibility of seat contamina-
tion during both the fill and drain operation. Sinc e this valve 
must be clos ed during the thermal cycling, the all~metal s eat 
precludes any degradation by cold flow that might be present in 
a soft seat design. 
f. Filter 
Th e Western filter and the second choice designs were 
rated equal on a technical basis with the Western filter selected 
on the basis of cost. Al l filter designs were of stainless steel, 
however , in this cas e this was not a problem since th e filter 
assemblies were not in contact with propellants during the heat 
sterilization cycles. 
g. Hand Shutof f Valve 
Results of th e 600 -h r compatibility program indicated 
that iron or nickel bearing alloys could not be used in contact 
with oxidiz er . ·In additi on , aluminum was mildly incompatible 
with N2 04 at 600 hr, but not at 300 -hr exposure. Only titan i um 
proved t o be a completely compatible metal . All proposals 
originally r ece i ved indicated use of steel hand valves . A second 
round of proposal reques ts indicat ed no titanium component de -
signs and only a s ingle aluminum design. Therefore , despite the 
partial incompatibility, th e aluminum va lve desi gn by Vacco was 
selected. This decision was i nfluenced by the fact that although 
corrosive action would occur on th e aluminum, th e propellant 
would not be degraded as would .be the case with st eels . Sinc e 
both the customer - supplied aluminum ordnance valves and the 
selected hand valves were overdesigned structurally, the a ttack 
would not cause structural failure . I f a flight system were to 
be built, titanium components should be used thr oughout that part 
of the system expo sed to oxidizer (N2 04 ) during heat sterilization . 
E. COMPONENTS AND SYSTEM TE ST PLAN 
As a part of Task I -- the analysis and design of the propul -
sion sys tem - - a compr ehens ive test plan, MCR - 67-20, was prepared 
to initiate the support activity of the Test Department. The 
test plan included th e step by step activity required for both 
Task II, Componen t Test and Evaluation, and Task I V, Syst em Test 
r--
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and Evaluation . In this way a uniform approach to the test sup -
port activities could be obtained . Figure 111-8 presents the test 
requirements of Task II and IV . The dashed line and phantom areas 
show how support activities of design engineering contributed to 
the overall success of the test activity . 
The tests in Task II were programed through a second series 
of test cycles to establish some degree of margin of the com-
ponents. In this way initial information of the component 
reliability could be considered . 
The requirement for test procedures was established by the 
test plan . The procedures provided step by step directions for 
performing each operation correctly and uniformly each time. 
They also provided for safety precautions , facility preparation, 
and instrumentat i on instructions . 
By establishing a log book system with a checkoff procedure, 
each component was tested in accordance with the plan . In that 
way effective controls were maintained for comparison of perform -
ance degradat i on . 
The provisions of J PL Specification VOL 50503 -ETS were in -
terpreted and implemented by the test plan. The heat steriliza -
tion test consisted of 12 cycles of exposure to the components 
and six cycles of exposure to the assembled module that followed 
the time - temperature profile shown in Fig . 111 - 9. During the 
heat cycles the test atmosphere was gaseous nitrogen. 
Sterilization requirements also dictated that the assembled 
module be qualified for exposure to the decontamination environ -
ment. This consists of six cycles of exposure to a mixture of 
12% ethylene oxide and 88% Freon 12 over the time - temperature 
profile shown in F i g . 111-1 0 . To be effec t ive , the conc en t ra -
tion of the mixture i s 600 mg/liter of gaseous atmosphere at a 
relative humidity of 50% . The remaining atmospheric constituent 
was gaseous nitrogen . 
In addition to setting up the test requirements of the pro -
gram the test plan set forth the schematic layout of all test 
fixtures for the components and of the complete module . This 
represented a major portion of the plan and presented a clear -
cut outline for the test fixture design activity . 
The instrumentation list for each component test and the 
complete module firing test was prepared that established the 
channel to be instrumented, the expected range and the accuracy 
required. 
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F. FLIGHT SYSTEM DESIGN 
As indicated previously, no attempt was made to design and 
build a flight -qualified system. It would be well , however, to 
point out the differences between this syste~ and a similar flight 
ready system. In general, the differences are those that would 
make the system more nearly meet a specific set of performance 
requirements in a reliable way. The specific system differences 
are as f 0 11 ow s : 
1) Structural design and fabrication materials would be 
of th e greatest strength-to-weight ratio compatible 
with the required environments . This would probably 
result in the use of titanium alloys for a major 
portion of the structure; 
2) System components would meet the specific performance 
required . Components selected for use in the program 
were necessarily of the off-the-shelf varie t y . An 
attempt was made to obtain units qualified on other 
programs which would meet the performance requirements 
of this program. Sp ec ifically , the following changes 
would be mad e -
a) Propellant Tanks - Each tank would be designed 
to meet its specific r equir ement . In this program 
both the fuel and oxidizer tanks were ident ical. 
The particular design selected nearly matched the 
oxidizer tank requirement of vo lume and maximum 
operating pressure but was considerably overde -
signed for the fuel application, 
b) Regulator - The regulator chosen for the module 
very nearly matched the performance requirement. 
Modifications were made in the end connections 
to make the regulator compatible with th e ex t erna l 
l eakage criteria so that this component, which had 
been adequately qual i fied on another program, 
would r eq uir e no change if a flight system were 
buH t, 
c) Hand Valve - Much difficulty was exper i enced in 
finding a hand valve meeting the leakage and 
compatibility requirements of the system. Neither 
steel nor aluminum alloys ar e compatible with oxi -
dizer (N2 04 ) at the sterilization temperature 
(275°F) . Flight system design would require a 
r 
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valve of titanium using a titanium bellows stem 
seal and a hard seat and poppet. The valve used 
was of aluminum alloy and used a chevron stem 
seal packing of Teflon. Although adequate per-
formance was obtained, the poppet and seat were 
oxidized after testing and the stem seal packing 
leaked as a result of extrusion of the Teflon 
packing, 
d) Ordnance Valve - Again the use of a titanium 
valve would assure compatibility with the oxi-
dizer. In addition, a problem was experienced 
with the flange gasket seal joint on the propel-
lant side of the valve. For the core of a flight 
system, welded tube joints would be used at both 
the inlet and outlet connections. The valve used 
met all performance requirements because it was 
qualified for spacecraft use, 
e) Line Filters - No difficulty was experienced 
the propellant line and gas system filters. 
stainless steel construction is allowable in 
case since the filter is not in contact with 
with 
The 
this 
pro -
pellant at sterilization temperature. For a 
flight system the filters used would be sized to 
meet the specific flow rates expected to minimize 
weight, 
f) Solenoid Valve - It is not clear that a solenoid 
valve would be required in a spacecraft system. 
In general, this function could be pe rformed by 
normally open/normally clos ed ordnance valves 
unless a large number of actuations were requir ed. 
If such a valve were requir ed, it would be con-
struct ed of compatibl e mat erial and would f eatur e 
a hermetically sealed solenoid coil using high 
temp eratur e insulation on th e coil windings, 
g) Engine, Thrust Chamber Valv es and Throttling 
Valv e - Th ese components ar e normally designed 
for a sp ecific mission. The ir construction 
would be of mat erials compatibl e with heat (275°F) 
and ext ernal e thylene oxid e exposur e , 
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h) Expulsion Devices - Two types of expulsion devices 
were used for the module. Either type would be 
capable of spacecraft use . If a single -burn sy s -
tem were designed, the screen trap device would 
be adequate and reliable . In fact, a screen 
trap device of titanium or tantalum would be 
designed for the oxidizer tank since it is in -
herently more reliable than a diaphragm or bladder; 
3) Design the system to provide additional reliability . 
This would include the addition of such redundant 
components as regulators and ordnance valves; 
4) Control of component and system design, fabrication , 
and test would be greatly increased because larger 
and more detailed specifications are required to 
cover supplier operations . In addition , receiving 
inspection requirements would be increased along with 
specifications covering in-house processes and han -
d ling. The "produc t integr ity" concept of enginee ring 
control would be used to a greater degree . This con -
cept requires that a specific engineer be responsible 
for each component from the original supplier proposal 
evalua tion through the usage on the space vehicle . 
In addition to being responsible , the eng ineer also 
carries the authority to revise or stop the program 
at any point that he feels the component is not 
being used properly . 
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IV. MATERIALS EVALUATION 
A. LITERATURE SEARCH 
Appropriate technical documents were surveyed to select mate-
rials for potential use in the design and fabrication of the 
sterilizable engine module. The purpose of the survey was to 
assure that only those materials showing the most promise would 
be evaluated, testing would be minimized, and that selected test 
methods would yield useful design data. 
The following basic characteristics were considered in the 
survey: 
1) Compatibility of the selected propellants -- mono-
methylhydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide -- when ex-
posed to the dry heat sterilization temperature of 
275°F; 
2) The compatibility of materials of construction with 
the selected propellants at sterilization temperatures 
and for one year storage at room temperature; 
3) Thermal properties of materials and propellants at 
the sterilization temperature; 
4) Compatibility of materials with the decontamination 
agent of 12% ethylene ox ide / 88% Freon 12. 
1. Monomethylhydraz ine (MMH) 
Only a limited amount of data was available on the propellant 
at either room or elevated temperatures. Since the chemical 
properties of monomethylhydrazine and hydrazine are quite similar, 
and since hydrazine presents the more critical condition due to 
its greater reactivity, it was assumed that their compatibility 
characteristics were interchangeable. Furthermore, a review of 
the compatibility of selected materials revealed no discrepancies 
in the data. 
Additional information was noted in the Olin Chemical Division 
Monomethylhydrazine Product Data (Ref 4) . If long - term life is 
not a consideration, a material may be used although it would not 
normally be recommended for general applications. Olin also 
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indicates (Ref 5) that decomposition can be caused by contact 
with rust, molybdenum, and copper or its alloys, resulting in a 
spontaneous fire. When a film of MMH comes in contact with such 
me t allic oxides as those of iron, copper, lead and manganese, it 
may cause the MMH to decompose often with sufficient temperature 
increase to cause spontaneous ignition. 
Numerous aerospace and research organizations have been active 
in testing compatibility of N2 04 with various materials. The work 
done by Aerojet-General and Martin Marietta in support of Titan 
vehicle development greatly restricted the list of materials to 
be tested in this sterilization program . The literature search 
confirmed that in addition to the Martin Marietta Propellant 
Compatibility Report (Ref 6) there were data available covering 
the temperature range of 60 to 180°F, but very little data at 
the sterilization temperature of 275°F . Mart in Mariet ta tests 
have shown that the degradation rate of materials at elevated 
temperatures is not linear, and that significant side effects may 
be experienced. 
The literature also suggested that the formation of particulate 
matter i n the presence of ferrous alloys would be cause for con-
cern. If the ferrous alloys exhibited corrosion in the presence 
of N2 04 at 275°F, significant quantities of Fe(N03 )3 . N2 0 4 would 
be formed. This substance is an insoluable ni trat e formed in 
N2 0 4 , con taminated with nitro s y l chloride (NOcl) i n the presence 
of metallic iron . 
3 . Compatibility of Mater i als 
A group of candidate materials of construct i on was developed 
so that our literature search could be confined to the most 
prom i sing materials. All materials shown to be incompatible with 
N2 04 or the UDMH/hydrazine blend during the Titan program were 
om itted from further conside rat ion. Table IV-I presen t s th e 
data results for the more promising materials considered . 
4. Thermal Pro perties of Materials 
A study of the effects of the thermal property var iation in 
the temperature range from 70 to 285°F was conducted . The ef -
fects of th e the r mal environment on the chemical and physical 
properties of the candidate materials have been compiled in 
Tables I V- 2 and I V-3. 
--------~ 
Table IV-l Compatibility of Materials Literature Review 
; Material N2 Q4 N2 H4 /MMH Reference Remarks 
304L Stainless Steel C'I< C 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 Data limited to 160°F 
321 Stainless Steel C C 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 Data limited to 160°F 
17-4Ph (hlO75) Stainless C C 9, 10, 11, 12 Data limited to: 
N2~' 140°F 
N2~' 100°F 
Titanium 6A£-4V C C 8, 9, 10 MMH, 160°F 
N 2 04 , to 200°F 
A-286 Steel C C 8, 9 Room temperature 
Haste110y Stee l C t 8, 9, 13, 14 Up to 125°F 
Maraging Steel -- * No information found 
Teflon C C 7, 8, 9 Up to 160°F 
"l<C = Compa tib Ie. 
tContradictory information found. 
*Maraging steel not recommended because oxides are easily formed that could 
cause the fuel to decompose. 
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Table IV-2 Ethylene Oxi de and Thermal Compatibility of Metals During Decontamination and Sterilization Cycles 
Material Coefficient YTS a t ! YTS at 
of thermal 70· F 280· F 
expansion 
at 70 to 280 · F 
in / inlfr 
304 st. stl, plate 9. 0 to 9. 4 x 10 - 6 28 kSi 25 ksi 
321 st. stI., sht, pIt, strip 8.4 x 10-6 30 -35 ksi .. 
9.2 x 10-6 347 st. , stI., sht, pIt. strip 40 ksi max. • 
446 st. sti. 5.6 x 10-6 45 ksi .. 
17 -4 ph st. stI. 6.1 x 10-6 170 ksi min 160 ksi min 
17 - 7 ph (th10 50) sht. and pIt. 5.9 x 10 -6 approx 140 ksi min 130 ksi min 
WaspaUoy 6. 7 x 10 -6 approx 56 ksi 55 ksi 
A- 286, Sheet and plate 8 . 9 to 9. 3 x 10-6 95 ksi min 92 ksi min 
L-605, bar and forgings 6. 8 x 10 -6 approx 45 ksi min 36 ksi min 
AM -3 55, bar and forgings 6.5 x 10 -6 approx 155 ksi min • 
Rene' 41 6. 5 x 10-6 approx 100 to 130 ksi .. 
Inconel X -7 50 7.1 to 7.6 x 10-6 100 ksi min 99 ksi min 
Molybdenum, comm. pure 2. 8 x 10 -6 approx 79 ksi min .. 
Molybdenum, comm. pure 2. 8 x 10-6 approx 43.7 ksi min • 
Alnico IV 11.3 x 10-6 - -
6061-T6 aluminum 13.4 x 10-6 35 ksi min 32 ksi min 
Titanium, 6AL -4V 5. 3 x 10-6 120 ksi min .. 
-6 Titanium, 6AI-4V 5. 3 x 10 120 to 150 ksi 106 to 132 ksi 
Beryllium 120/0 Beo 6. 5x10-6 50 ksi min 45 ksi min 
Ta ntalum/ 100/0 w, sheet 3. 7 x 10 -6 82 ksi min .. 
Columbium sheet 4.0 x 10 -6 approx - -
Maraging steel 5. 6 x 10-6 245 ksi min • 
Hastelloy C, sheet 6 . 5x 10-6 168 ksi 62 ksi 
Carpenter 20, sheet 9. 4 x 10 -6 "'~ . 50 ksi • 
-~---.--~ 
-- --- -- - --- - - ---
.. Less than 5% reduction in tensile strength be tween 70° F and 280· F 
... Coefficient of expansion is between 68· F a nd 1200 • F 
UTS at I UTS at ~thylene Remarks 
70°F 280·F !oxide 
k:ompatible 
75 ksi 70 kSi C (I) , (2) 
85 -90 ksi • C I 100 ksi max .. C 
75 ksi • C 
190 ksi min 180 ksi min C 
170 ksi min 165 ksi min C 
80 ksi 76 ksi C 
140 ksi min 139 ksi min C 1 
125 ksi min 110 ksi min C Hot worked and stretched 
170 ksi min • C 
170 ksi max • C 
160 ksi min 159 ksi min C 
91.3 ksi min .. Stress relieved 
58.2 ksi min .. Recrystallized 
2. 3 ksi 2. 2 ksi C No yield strength listed 
42 kSi min 35 ksi min C Sheet and plate 
130 ksi min , • C Annealed Sheet, pIa te, bar 
130 to 160 ksi 107 to 132 ksi C Hea t trea ted bar & forging I 70 ksi min , 60 ksi min Pressed block 
96 ksi min I· I 80 to 100 ksi 65 to 80 ksi Cold worked 
I 255 ksi min I· C For N20 4 use only 
120 ksi 120 ksi C 
90 ksi I" C Group .. c .. 
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Table IV-3 Summary of Typical Nonmetals Compatible with Decontami nation 
and Sterilization Cycles 
Malerial Use Trade Naille Basic Ma teria I Applications 
Adhesives PD -454 Epoxy General applications 
PD - 4b8 Epoxy General a ppli cat!ons 
RTV -102 ilicone One Componelll -100 ' to 320' F 
RTV - S11 Silicone General applications 
RTV - 560 Silicone Genera 1 a pplica tions 
Eccobond 57c Epoxy Electrically conductive - 70 ' to 350' F 
RTV-60 .S ili c one General applications 
Eccobond 601 £'poX}' Thermal1y conductive 
Coatings and Finishes • D-4D paint Silicone -al kyd Thermal control coa ting 
• Vitavar PV-IOO Silicone -alkyd Thermal control coating 
• Wash pri mer Penetrant primer Penetran t primer 
• Zinc chromate primcr Zinc - chroma te Corrosion protection 
Si licone pri mer SS110 1 Silicone Primer for adhesive bonding 
• Lowe Brothers 17865 Glyceryl-p thalete Heat resistant paint 
MSD-10,'; Zinc oxide-silicate The rmo conductive coa tinl/: 
Tapes • 3M -850 Metallized polyester Sealing and joining mylar sheet 
Schjeldahl GT Polyester Hea t seala hie adhesi ve ta pe 
• 3M - 56 Polyester Harness bundle wrap 
• 3M -EE -3990 Copper foi l tape Elec tromagneti c harness shieldi nl\ 
Silicone tapes DC - 269 Silicone Sea I com ponenr agai nst corrosi ve 
environment 
AM -FAS TV-20-60 Fluorocarbon Insulation tape 
Encapsulants RTV-60 Silicone Enca psula ti ng 
LTV-602 Silicone POlling and encapsu lating 
Insulating Material Tissue Glass - 200a Glass fiber-Ce llulose Thermal insulation 
Amfab 20 -60 Fluorocarbon - glass Thermal insula tion 
·Epoxy glass S -30205. P-2 Epoxy -fiberglass Circui t boards 
Thermofit RNF -IOO Polyolefin Thermal insu lation 
Mylar (pre -shrunk 300' F) POlyester Electrical and moistu re insu la tion 
Lubricants and ' . .1reases Grease G-300 Silicone Bearing lubri cant 
• Dry film Mol ybdenum -disulfide Lock assemblies 
Fabroid G lassfi bers -fluorocarbon Bearing surfaces 
Grease MSD - I04 Si lve r filled silicone Joinr filler 
• Ste rili zable in an iner! atmosphe re 
\OlT: . Durec - Hcr l~ 
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In the metallic area, members of the ferrous, titanium , and 
other heat-resisting groups exhibit little change in the tempera-
ture range, Aluminum alloys may exp erienc e a slight loss in 
properties at the maximum temperature and those effected by 10ng-
term overaging will experience some degradation in elongation 
and tensile strengths and an inc rease i n susceptibility t o i nter -
granular and stress corrosion. 
In the nonmetals area, a review of data presented in reports 
from ea r lier studies wa s made. Wh en using information of this 
type fo r some of the plastics, the form ulation and cure cycle 
must be known . Compatibili ty propert ies can be significantly 
changed by variation in these items. 
Table IV-2 lists the compatibility of a cross section of the 
materials studied, 
5. Candidate Materials Compatibility with 12% Ethylene Oxide/88% 
Freon 
Results of the surv ey on compatibility of the candidate mate -
rials with the ethylene ox ide decontamination fluid indicate 
that data are availabl e on most material families. Those data 
have been compiled i n Tables IV-l and IV-2. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF TEST TECHNI QUE 
The materials test program included several distinct test 
activities in thr ee broad categories: (1) tests of materials in 
contact with propellants i n the ster ilization temperature of 
275°F; (2) test of materials in a dry heat environment in a 
nitrogen atmosphere; and (3) special purpose tests that included 
material compatibility with che ethylene ox ide decontamination 
agent, and f l ammab ili ty tests of propellant with the decontamina -
tion agent to mention only two. 
While the latter two categories were straightforward in test 
approach, we concerned ourselves with the materials testing in 
contact wi th propellants . To assure val id results in th is area , 
a series of short - term prescreening tests were performed. This 
grou p of tests served to eliminate those materials showing de -
gradation and to provide design and operations data for later 
screening tests and long -t erm storage tests. Figure IV - l shows 
the overal l materials test program in block form. 
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To implement the materials test program a Materials Evalua -
tion Test Plan, MCR - 66-63, was prepared and submitted to JPL . 
It des cribed the tests to be run, the materials to be submitted 
for evaluation, and the test procedures. In addition, the 
equipment design, the safety precautions, and the instrumentation 
requirements were described. Detailed results are presented 
elsewhere in this report . 
Instruction for the preparation of the material test speci-
mens was presented. The necessary control ranges and instrumen-
tation rang es and necessary accuracies were detailed. The test 
plan provided uniformity i n test approach that led to reliable 
test results and evaluations . 
1. Material Prescreening Tests 
So that ti~ely information could be obtained from this series 
of tests simple test containers were employed . Hoke cylinders of 
304 stainless steel were used for the oxidizer (N 2 04 ) tests, and 
300 series stainless steel tube sections were used for the fuel 
(MMH) tests. The test durations were from 1 to 200 hr. Me tal 
specime ns conformed to the NASA Langley Research Center configura-
tion shown in Fig . IV-2 . Specimens were stressed to 50% and 75% 
of yield strength on the double beams , respectively . Standard 
processes were used for weld ing and cleaning equipment and speci-
mens. 
The high activity of the propellants obs cured some of the 
results of the very early tests and made it necessary to contin -
ually reappraise the test techniques . Dur i ng the course of the 
prescreening tests, it was determined that i so lation of test 
specimens and met i culous care in the equipment cleaning contributed 
most to the later success of the screening, long-term , and special 
tests. 
For later tests, specimens were contained in glass test tubes 
each containing some propellant so that cross talk between spec i-
mens and the propellant was isolated . Careful cleaning, passiva -
tion, and inspection techniques were used to reduce propellant 
reactions or decomposition to an absolute minimum . 
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Stress Specimen B 
'- B Stressed Specimen 
(b) Dissimilar Metal Stress Specimen 
Fig. IV-2 NASA-Langley Test Specimen Configurations 
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2 . Screening Tests 
To provide the necessary design data for materials selection, 
candidate materials for propellant storage tanks including those 
mater i als for expulsion devices were exposed to the propellants 
for 300 and 600 hr at 275 °F. The shorter duration provided data 
for initial selection with a full 600 - hr exposure providing final 
verification. The exposure duration was -established to meet the 
requirements of the Voyager environmental sterilization specifica-
t i on for piece parts, VOL 50503 ETS, January 12, 1966. A contin-
uous exposure of the planned duration was used rather t han six 
cycl es of 96 hr each . Since there were no moving parts involved, 
it wa s decided that continuous exposure to a full duration wa s 
justified as opposed to the cyclic exposure with attendant risk 
of refluxing the propellant out the glass tubes during the cooling 
cycles . 
The specimens, all Langley specimens except Teflon and 1100 - 0 
aluminum , were arranged in a rack inside a high pressure ve ssel 
described in the next section. Ea ch specimen was in a glass test 
tube loosely stoppered to prevent contamination of the vial by 
vapors from the sacrifical propellant in the bottom of each high 
pressure vessel. Eac h specimen and ve ssel was throughly cleaned 
and passivated. The bombs were charged wh ile maintained under a 
gaseous ni t rogen blanket to avoid oxygen contamination. Slow 
heating and cooling rates were employed so that the propellants 
in the individual tubes would not reflux into the main reservoir 
of propellant. Figure I V- 3 shows the overall arrangement of 
~est tubes and holding rack. 
Temperature of the high pressure fuel vessel was controlled 
by an ethylene glycol bath to eliminate any potential hot spots 
caused by a heating tape . A localized hot spot might initiate 
fuel decomposition. The ox idizer vessels were heated by heater 
tape since decomposition of the oxidizer was unlikely at the 
temperature of 275°F. The oxidizer test setup and the fuel 
test setup are shown in F i g . I V- 4 and IV - 5 , r espective ly . 
3 . Long-Term Storage Tests 
Subscale tanks containing the materials of construction, in-
cluding expulsion devices, to be employed in the propulsion 
module were subjected to the temperature environment for evalua-
tion after a one-year storage at ambient conditions. Three oxi-
dizer tanks and three fuel tanks were exposed. One of each 
configuration was opened at four-month i nterva l s , representing 
a full year ' s storage . A four th was held as a control specimen . 
MCR-68-119 IV-ll 
l"1g. IV-3 Specimen Test Tubes and 
Holding Rack 
Fig. IV-4 Oxidizer Test Fixtures 
Fig. IV-S Fuel Test Fixtures 
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Each subscale tank was fabricated from titanium 6A l -4V sheet 
stock since tubing of this material was not available. The fuel 
tank contained material representing the screen trap device. A 
screen sample of l6Sx800 mesh 304L stainless steel wire cloth 
was sandwiched by monel rivets between O.OSO-in. 304L steel stock. 
One member of this sandwich was in turn riveted to a titanium 
6AL -4V str ip . The titanium in turn was welded to the wall of the 
vessel. To yeild additional information, a Langley specimen of 
titanium 6A l -4V having a weld in the stressed area wa s included 
i n each vessel. All welds were made with commercially pure 
t itanium rod material (Fig . IV-6). 
Fig. IV-6 Long-Term Storage Tanks , 
-------- - ---
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Each subscale oxidizer tank contained a sample of the Teflon 
laminate representing the expulsion bladder in those tanks. The 
Te flon strip was approximately 2xO.2S in. The thickness was 
made up of a laminate of 0.007S-in. TFE and 0.007S-in. FEP. The 
strips of Teflon were unstressed. Each tank also contained a 
welded titanium specimen similar to the fuel tanks. 
4. Ethylene O~ide Tests 
Materials compatibility tests performed with the ethylene 
oxide decontamination agent were controlled in the following 
manner: 
1) 12% ethylene oxide/88% Freon 12 was the decontamina-
tion agent; 
2) The concentration was 600 mg/liter of atmosphere; 
3) The remaining constituent was gaseous nitrogen; 
4) The test temperature was 122°F; 
S) Relative humidity, 4S% ± 10; 
6) Duration, 168 hr or as applicable. 
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C. TEST FIXTURE DESIGN AND FABRICATION 
The screening 
24 in . long. One 
a bolted flange. 
tiers, each tier 
test pressure vessels were 6 in. in diameter by 
end was closed by a pipe dome and the other had 
The specimens were mounted on a rack in three 
containing nine glass specimen containers. 
The oxidizer vessel was fabricated from schedule 80-304 stain-
less steel seamless pipe. The bolted flange and dome were 310 
stainless steel with a rating of 900 psi. The vesse ls were hy -
drostatically tested to 1600 psi for a period of 5 minutes. 
The fuel vessel was the same size as the oxidizer tank but it 
was 304 stainless steel throughout. The flange and dome were 
rated at 150 psi and the cylindrical pipe was schedule 40. 
Figure IV-7 shows a typical schematic of the vessel installa-
tion . The oxidizer vessels were he ated by electrical tape and lo-
cated in a separate test cell. The fuel vessels were immersed in 
a barrel containing ethylene glycol for an even temperature bath . 
The fuel vess els were plumbed similar to the oxidizer tanks but 
located in a different test cell. Both tank configuration and 
associated equipment were cleaned according to Martin Marietta 
Dr awing 32 7-902000. for liquid oxygen use. 
Pressure and t empera tur e measurements were made using Tabor 
transducer Model 176 and chromel/alumel thermocouples. Deadweight 
accuracies were ±O.OOl% of full scal e using Heise gage calibration 
equipment . Thermocouples were calibrated by selected temperature 
steps checked agains t a laboratory thermometer. Temperature con-
trol was maintained to within +2°C by a stepless power application 
to resistive heaters . 
I nsul ation ---.., 
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To Atmosphere 
Barricade 
Pr essurization Monitoring and 
Vent System. Typical for N20 4 
Bomb. 
6-in. Stainless Steel 900 ASA Rating 
3 eRiAl Temperature Measu r ements 
,1. Typical test fixture configur ation for 
N2 0 4 test. 
2 . Fuel test fixture is the same except fo r 
pressur e ratings of flange and pipe and 
method of application of heat with 
ethylene glycol bath instead of heater 
blankets. 
Fi g . IV-7 Compatibility Screening Test Fixture 
D. MATERI ALS TESTING 
1. Material Testing with Propellants 
a . Pre screening Tests 
This series of short - term tests was performed to verify 
liter ature data and to assist in developing procedures for con-
ducting the later screening tests . The tests consisted of ex-
posing small material samples to each propellant in combination 
IV- IS 
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with the dry heat sterilization temperature of 275°F for periods 
up to 120 hr. Sample containers were fabricated from 304 stain-
less steel Hoke cylinders or from I-in. tubing sections of appro -
priate materials. The materials tested included: 
606l-T6 Aluminum FEP and TFE Teflon 
1100- 0 Aluminum B-59l-8 Butyl Rubbe r, Packer 
6A£-4V Titanium E5l5 - 8 Ethylene Propylene Rubber, Packer 
321 Stainless Steel AF-E - 110 Carboxy Nitroso Rubber 
Nickel 
Lead S-97ll Silas tic Compound 
A number of important items of information was developed 
during this series of subscale tests. The formation of adducts 
of iron was a major problem. With only one exception, the phe -
nomenon was found in all tests conducted on ferrous-based alloys 
in the presence of N2 0 4 • In that instance a sample of 321 stain-
less steel was placed in an open glass vial containing N2 0 4 and 
inserted into a 304 stainless steel Hoke cylinder, which also 
contained N2 0 4 that did not , however, cover the vial . Afte r t he 
system was exposed to 275°F for 120 hr, a light residue was f ound 
on the walls of the Hoke cylinder, but none on the specimen . This 
phenomenon led to additional tests . These tests were conducted to 
ascertain whether the ferrous-based alloys would form the adducts 
in the absense of any other metal and any nonmetal . 
Special containers were fabricated with appropriate 
welded end plates to assure a single constituent system rather 
than introducing unknowns from commercially available tube fit -
tings. Both propellants were tested for 96 hr . 
The results of these tests proved adducts of iron will be 
formed by any ferrous - based alloy when in contact with N2 04 at 
275°F . Rate of formation appears to be approximately linear and 
increases as the amount of alloying agents increasep . Evidence 
indicates nickel and molybdenum as major causes of adduct forma -
tion. Conversely no residual contamination is formed when alu-
minum alloys or titanium alloys are exposed to the same environ-
ment . 
Fuel did no t react with any metal alloy except 316 stain-
less steel . This alloy was not considered for systems use but 
did form a part of the container used for screening tests . No 
attack was observed on the metal, however, decomposition of the 
fuel did occur . This was attributed to the presence of molybde-
num in the alloy . 
" 
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No nonmetals were tested that proved to be comp l~tely 
compatible with N2 0 4 at 275°F. TFE and FEP Teflon specimens were 
slightly affected in tests up to 70 hr. Results were not clear 
since the first series of specimens was exposed in stainless steel 
Hoke cylinders, which resulted in oxidizer contamination. A sec -
ond test of 69 hr at 275°F in a 606l - T6 aluminum container re -
vealed similar effects on the Teflon materials, and a thin, white 
precipitate remained on the container walls and the Teflon speci-
men after the propellant was drained. 
Elastomers including silastics, butyl rubber, ethylene 
propylene rubber, and nitroso rubber lost significant mechanical 
properties, blistered, ignited , or went into solution after short-
term exposure to N2 04 at 275°F. 
Both nickel and lead sustained attack when exposed to 
N2 04 at 275°F. This resulted in formation of nickel nitrate and 
lead nitrate, respectivel y . Sufficient attack occurred to elimi-
nate both materials from further consideration . 
All metals exposed to MMH fuel demonstrated compa tibility. 
Teflon was the only nonmetal unaffected by exposure to the fuel 
at 275°F. Ethylene propylene rubber was the least effected of 
elastomeric rubbers when tested at 275°F for 24 hr. 
Tables IV-4, IV-s, and IV-6 present the complete test 
history and results of the prescreening test series . 
b. 300- hr Screening Test 
This test was performed in the same manner as the full -
scal e 600-hr test except for duration . It was to provide advance 
information for materials selection and to indicate any basic er-
ror in the conception of the 600- hr test. 
The results of the 300-hr test showed no attack on any 
materials exposed to the fuel . The following materials were all 
found to be compatibl e : 
304 stainless steel Carpenter 20 Cb 
321 stainless steel Hastelloy C 
347 stainless steel 6Af, -4V titanium alloy 
17-7 stainless steel llOO-O aluminum 
17-4 stainless steel 2014 - T6 aluminum 
A286 aged 2219-T8 aluminum 
IV-17 
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Table IV-4 Prescreening Tests, N2 04 Compatability with Metals 
Material 
Tested 
606l-T6 
Aluminum 
6A!, -4V 
Titanium 
Type 321 
Stainless Steel 
1100-0 
Aluminum 
Lead Shavings 
(chemically pure) 
·Type Specimen 
and Container 
Specimen placed in glass 
tube within Hoke cylinder.* 
Stressed specimen.t 
Specimen placed in glass 
tube within Hoke cylinder. 
Stressed specimen. 
Specimen placed in glass 
tube within Hoke cylinder. 
Stressed specimen. 
Hoke cylinder, strip 
specimen. 
Specimen placed in glass 
tube in Hoke cylinder 
shavings. 
*Hoke cylinders, type 304 stainless steel. 
Test 
Conditions 
195 hr at 275°F 
195 hr at 275°F 
195 hr at 275°F 
195 hr at 275°F 
88 hr at 275 of 
tSelf -stressed specimen, NASA Langley type at 75% of yield strength. 
Results 
Specimen unaffected . No res-
idue in filtration of propel-
lant inside glass container. 
Heavy residue in Hoke cylinder. 
Specimen unaffected. Crystals 
found on edge of specimen. No 
residue from filtration of 
propellant inside glass con-
tainer. 
Light residue on Hoke Cylinder. 
Specimen unaffected. No residue 
from filtration of propellant 
inside glass container. Light 
residue in Hoke cylinder. 
Light residue in Hoke Cylinder. 
Specimen unaffected. No res-
idue from filtration of propel-
lant inside glass container. 
Light residue in Hoke cylinder. 
Formed a lead nitrate coating on 
shavings. Observed lead nitrate 
crystals, small weight increase. 
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Table IV-S Prescreening _Tests, . N2 04 Compatibility with Nonmetals 
Material 
Te .ted 
Silicone Rubber 
S-9711 
Ethylene Propylene 
Rubber 
E-S1S-8 
Butyl Rubber 
B-S91-8 
TFE-FEP 
Type Specimen 
and Container 
Strip specimen tested in 
glass test tube contained 
in l x6 in. stainless steel 
tube. 
Strip specimens tested in 
same container concurrent 
with test No.3. Specimens 
were 2 in. apart, separated 
by gl ass. 
Strip specimens tested in 
same container concurrent 
with test No . 2. Specimens 
were 2 in. apart, separated 
by glass. 
ASTM standard tensile 
specimen stainless steel 
cont a iner. 
Test 
Conditions 
2 hr at 275°F 
12· minutes at 
275°F 
12 minutes at 
275°F 
18 hr at 240°F, 
70 hr at 275°F, 
Total run 88 hr. 
Liquid propel-
lant lost within 
first 48 hr. 
Rer-=tinder of 
tes ·~ conducted 
in vapor phase. 
Results 
Specimen dissolved 
completely. 
Specimen burned. 
Specimen contained small 
surface blisters. Volume 
increased 10%. 
TFE-ultimate tensile 
reduced by 7.3%, elon-
gation reduced by 50%. 
FEP-ultimate tensile 
strength reduced 12%, 
no change in elong ation. 
No other significant 
changes noted in either 
FEP or TFE. 
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Table IV-6 Prescreening Tests, MMH Compatibility _with Nonmetals 
Material 
Tested 
B591-8 
Butyl Rubber 
ES15-8 
Ethylene Propylene 
Rubber 
BS91-8 
Butyl Rubber 
Teflon 
TFE -FEP 
Films 
Teflon 
TFE-FEP 
Type Specimen 
and Container 
Strip, stainless steel 
container 
Strip, stainless steel 
container 
ASTM tensile specimen, 
stainless steel con-
tainer 
Film, stainless steel 
container 
ASTM tensile specimen, 
stainless steel con-
tainer 
Test 
Conditions Results 
24 hr at 275°F I Fuel discolored - Sample 
volume increased 10%. 
Hardness loss 10-12 Shore A. 
24 hr at 275°F I Fuel discolored - Sample 
volume increased 7%. 
Hardness loss 5 Shore A. 
48 hr at 275°F I Apparent fuel decomposi-
tion after 24 hr. Units 
contained to vent at 90 
psig. Fuel discolored and 
had strong ammonia odor. 
B59l-8 volume increased 20%. 
E515-8 volume increased 10%. 
28 hr at 275°F Specimens unaffected. 
88 hr at 275°F I TFE - ultimate strength 
reduced 2.6%, elongation 
reduced approximately 10% 
from original value. FEP-
ultimate strength reduced 
7%, elongation reduced less 
than 10% from original value. 
---- --- --- ----
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Figure IV-3 shows the fuel specimens after the 300-hr 
exposure. The specimens were unaffected and the propellant was 
a clear light straw color, unchanged from its original condition . 
Each specimen was isolated from the other by the stopper shown in 
each test tube. 
Alloys found compatible with N2 0 4 were: 
1100-0 aluminum 
20l4 - T6 aluminum 
22l9-T8 aluminum 
Commercially pure titanium 
6A£-4V titanium 
Hastelloy C 
606l-T6 aluminum 
Alloys found to be incompatible with N2 04 were : 
304 stainless steel Nickel 
321 stainless steel A- 286 
347 stainless steel Carpenter 20 Cb 
17 - 4 stainless steel Maraging steel 
17-7 stainless steel Lead 
The formation of adducts of iron was found in all in-
stances of exposure of ferrous - based alloys t o the oxidizer . The 
ferrous materials were incompatible because of the formation of 
a material in the oxidizer that would be detrimental t o the sys -
tem operation . The adduct is identified because it : 
1) Precipitates from the liquid propellant; 
2) Does not transfer in the vapor phase; 
3) Has a large volume when wet, but shrinks to less than 
10% of original volume when dry; 
4) Has the apparent viscosity of cold molasses with a 
high adhesive strength; 
5 ) Is amorphous when dried of oxidizer . 
The maraging steel was the on l y ferrous allow which demonstrat ed 
structural failure. It was prestressed to 75% of yie ld . The 
specimen fractured in both the tested stressed area and in areas 
around the rivet. Significantly , this alloy contained the least 
amount of corrosion resistant metals, was the highest strength 
alloy tested, and formed the greatest amount o f adduct (Fig. IV- 8). 
IV- 21 
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Figures IV-9, IV- 10, IV-ll show the specimens after ex-
posure to N2 0 4 for 300 hr at 275°F. The small amounts of propel -
lant remaining are due to distillation that occurred during rapid 
cooling of the bomb from 275°F to 40°F. Unaffected bright speci-
mens are aluminum alloys. The titanium specimen (not shown) had 
a similar appearance, but the test tube was broken during removal 
from the test bomb. Rivet staining may be seen in several speci-
mens . Ferrous - based alloys show a blackened effect (iron adduct) . 
Iron adduct formation is most clearly seen on the bimetal speci-
men in Fig . IV - 1l (aluminum interior specimen and 321 stainless 
ou t er specimen). Note fractured maraging steel specimen at ex-
treme right. 
Figure IV-12 shows the 304 stainless steel specimen rack 
after 300 hr in N2 0 4 a t 275°F. The rack was clean and bright be-
fore exposure . Deposits are iron adduct. The rack was made from 
stainless steel rather than aluminum alloy as specified in the 
test plan to provide uniformity of test bomb materials . 
c . 600- hr Screening Test 
1) Metals Tested in Propellants 
The materials tested in contact with propellants were 
not tested in the dry heat since all the materials are known to 
be capable of withstanding 275°F. Maraging steel was not tested 
in MMH because of the risk of oxidation that wou ld react with MMH . 
All other materials discussed b elow were tested in MMH and none 
were attacked by the fuel. The reaction of each material to N2 0 4 
is presented in the following paragraphs . 
Titanium 6A£ - 4V - There was no attack on this material 
as shown in Fig. IV- 13. Figure IV-14 shows the condition of etched 
titanium foil before and after exposure indicating no attack . 
Aluminum - Alloy designations 1100-0, 20l4 - T6, 22l9 - T87, 
and 606l - T6 were exposed to N2 0 4 . All alloys were attacked by the 
propellant resulting (usually) in intergranular corrosion or in 
pitting . In all instances, a residual corrosion product was formed . 
This produc t varied from a white , granular deposit to a thick, vis·~ 
cous , semifluid . The products were amorphous . These results were 
not evident at 300 hr. Preliminary designs had to be reviewed to 
remove the aluminum usage except for limited application. Figure 
IV- 1S sho~vs the attack sustained by 606l-T6 that was typical of 
all the aluminum alloys tested. Figure IV- 16 shows the condition 
of aluminum screens , indicating corrosion and pitting. 
-- --~ 
MCR-68-119 IV-23 
Fig. IV-8 Oxidizer Test Maraging 
Steel Specimen 
Fig . IV-9 Oxidi zer Test Specimens 
IV-24 MCR-68-1l9 
1'°i8. IV-IO Oxidizer Test Specimens 
Fig. IV-ll Oxidizer Test Specimens 
MCR-68-119 
Fig. IV-12 Oxidizer Test Specimen Rack 
... 
Fig. IV-13 Titanium (6Al-4V) after Exposure 
to N2 04 for 600 hr (200X) 
IV-2S 
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(a) Before Exposure to N2 04 (b) After 600 hr at 275'-F (200X) 
Fig. IV-14 Etched Titanium Foil after Exposure to N2 04 for 600 hr at 275°F 
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Fig. IV-15 Aluminum (6061-T6) after Exposure 
to N2 04 for 600 hr at 275 of (200X) 
Fig. IV-16 Aluminum Screens (5056) after 
Exposure to N2 04 at 275°F 
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S tainless Steels - Alloys of 304 , 321 , 347 , l7 - 4pH , 
l7 - 7pH, and A- 286 were exposed to N2 0 4 • All alloys were attacked 
by the propellant , resulting in intergranular corrosion and pit-
ting . In all instances a residual corrosion product wa s formed . 
The product was extremely viscous , amorphous on drying , and ac -
celerated corrosion of dissimilar metals , except t i tanium . Spec -
trographic analysis of a typical corrosion product indicated that 
elements present were the same as those contained in the alloy . 
Figure I V- 17 shows the attack on the 347 alloy which was re pre -
sentative of this group of alloys . 
Maraging Steel - This material was severely atta c k ed . 
All specimens showed evidence of pitting, intergranular corrosion , 
and stress corrosion . Maraging steel specimens were the on l y s pec-
imens tested that fractured . Figure IV - 18 shows the severe a tt ac k . 
Carpenter 20 Cb and Haste110y C - Both of these mate -
rials were attacked to a minor degree . Figure IV - 19 shows photo -
micrograph of the specimens. 
Bimetallics - Specimens of bimetallic beams were test -
ed to determine the cathodic effect if any . Alumi num was tes t e d 
as combined specimens with either 321 steel and titanium 6A£ - 4V . 
The results indicate no deleterious effect of the bimet a llic spe c -
imens . The results of the bimetallics were the same as the i nd i -
vidual specimens . Figure IV - 20 shows the results of the bimetal -
lic test from a titani um- 6061 aluminum specimen . The v i scous ad -
duct resulted from attack on the monel rivet. 
Nickel - Nickel screen material was exposed to N2 0 4 
and was severely attacked with a resultant heavy deposit of n i ckel 
nitrate (F ig. I V - 21) . 
Long - Term Storage Tests - The long - term tests de s cr i bed 
previously completed the sterilization exposure to propellant s on 
J une 6, 1967 . Ambient storage began June 6, 1967 without clean-
ing the propel l an t s . Fuel and oxidizer tank specimens were open ed 
at 4 - month intervals . After 12 months the fuel tank showed no 
degradation of the materials or propellant . 
• 
(a) As Removed from Test (b) Specimen Section (200X) 
Fig . IV-17 Stainless Steel (Type 347) after Exposure _ to N2 04 for 600 hr at 275°F 
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IV-30 MCR-6B-1l9 
Fig. IV-1B Steel (Maraging) after Exposure to N2 04 for 600 hr at 275°F 
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(a) Carpenter 20 Cb (b) JIastelloy C 
Fig. IV-19 Materials after Exposure to N2 04 for 600 hr at 275°F (200X) 
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IV-32 MCR-68-119 
Fig. IV-20 Bimetallic Couples Titanium 6At-4V and 
6061-T6 Aluminum after Exposure to N2 04 
for 600 hr at 275°F 
_ ___ ~_ __ __ __ __ _ _ __ _ _________ __ ~ ____ .J 
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Fig. IV-2l Pure Nickel Screen after 
Exposure to N2 04 for 600 
hr at 27SoF 
The oxidizer tank showed no degradation of the Te flon. The 
stre ss welded specimen of titanium showed some disco lora tion . 
Figures IV-22 and IV-2 3, show the welded specimen . Detai l ed ex-
amination r evealed no cracks had formed . Magnification up to 
2000X showed the di scoloration to be a surface phenomenon . It 
was concluded that the deterioration resulted fr om the formation 
of oxides, that t he oxide was only Angstroms thick, and that the 
presence of the di scoloration of the specimen has no detrimental 
effect on the properties of titanium . 
2) Nonmetals Tested in Propellants 
Teflon and Kynar were tested in bo th fuel and oxi -
dizer . Teflon showed no attack by the MMH fuel , however , some 
white fl ockin g was visible in the N2 0 4 via l s . The weight loss 
was less than 0.1 mg . No other attack was experienced in the 
N2 0 4 · 
Kynar was severely attacked by both the MMH and N2 0 4 . 
It has n o va l ue in this application . 
IV-33 
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Fig. IV-22 Face of Stressed Titanium Specimen 
Fig. IV-23 Edge of Stressed Titanium Specimen 
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2 . Materials Tested in Dry Heat 
All the materials in the following discussion were exposed 
to 275°F for 600 hr in a gaseous nitrogen atmosphere . Table 
I V- 7 presents the results of the testing performed on adhesives . 
A significant increase in shear strength is shown for each ad -
hesive a fter exposure to 275°F. This is a result of further cross 
linki ng of molecules, which is attendant with postcures for these 
types of ma teria ls . Along with the increase in shear strength, a 
decrea se in flexibility occurs that causes the adhesive to become 
brittle and lose its ability to resist failure under vibrational 
lo ading . 
Table IV-7 Properties of adhesives after Exposure to 275°F 
Tensile Shear Adhesion 
(avg psia ) 
Materia l Contro l 300 hr 600 hr Mode of Failure 
I V-35 
Dow-Corning 93 - 046 160 130 227 80% adhesive; 20% cohesive 
Hysol l - C Epoxy 1000 2280 2440 85% adhesive; 15% cohesive 
Armstrong A- 6 Epoxy 780 3090 2376 10% adhesive; 90% cohesive 
Devcon F Epoxy 530 2360 3910 2% adhesive ; 98% cohesive 
Table IV- 8 presents the r esults of the testing performed on 
plastics and rubber filmw . The aluminized Mylar, S- 971l rubber, 
EPR- l rubber , and SR634 bu t y l rubber, were degraded by the heat 
exposure . The major effect appears to be an increase in hardness 
and hence, reduction of elongation . 
Table IV- 9 presen t s the results of testing of potting compounds 
and sealing resins . Only PR- l527 compound of polymethane degraded 
to an unacceptable level. This is evident by the reduction in hard-
ness . 
Table IV- lO presents the results of testing on coatings and 
finishes . 
3 . Specia l Tests 
During the course of the progr am several unplanned special 
tests were performed to answer specific questions of materials 
compa tibility. The majority of these tests were concerned with 
the compatibility of various materials in the ethylene oxide (ETO) 
a tmosphere . The tests and results are described in the following 
par agraphs . 
_ I 
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Table IV- 8 Properties of Plastic and Rubber Sheet and Film after Exposure at 275 °F 
Average Tensile Strength (psi) Percent Elongation (avg) Durometer Hardness 
Material Control 300 hr 600 hr Cont r ol 600 hr Control 600 hr 
Kynar 7,460 7230 7044 --- 30% D78 D81 
Alumini zed Mylar 19,700 - -- 16300 89io 51io NA NA 
Teflon (TFE) 2 , 200 2060 2210 - -- 16770 D60 D64 
Teflon (FEP) 2,960 2"920 2545 --- 326% D64 D72 
EPR-l l,773 --- 1960 180% 11% A72 All 
SR634 Butyl 1,872 --- 1874 30 1% 180io A77 A78 
Silicone Rubber 60 638 66 7 681 --- 150% A60 A68 
S-9711 Silicone Rubbe r l, 083 --- 84 2 52 8"/0 240io A54 A63 
- --- - ----
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Table IV- 9 Properties of Potting, Encapsulating, and Sealing Resins after Exposure at 275°F 
Volume Resistivity* Dielect r ic Constantt Durometer Hardness* 
Material Control 600 h r Control 600 hr Control 600 hr 
Epon 828 - Mica filled (amine cu r e) 6.0 x 1014 4.7 ·x 1015 3.68 3 . 70 D90 D90 
PR-1527 Polyurethane Casting Resin 1.0 x 1013 1.0 x 1012 5 . 30 5.92 A38 A15 
TRV-20 Silicone Potting Resin 4.6 x 1013 1.0 x 10 15 3.04 3.08 A52 AS7 
LTV -602 Silicone Potting Resin 1.1 x 1014 8 . 6 x 1014 2 .82 2 . 82 A26 A23 
Epon 828/Versamid 140 Potting Silicone Resin 1.6 x 1016 6 . 2 x 10 15 3 .32 3 . 28 D84 D87 
Dow-Co r ning 0-9-0031 2 . 4 x 10 14 4 . 9 x 10 14 3 . 74 3. 81 AS8 AS7 
1'Measured at 250 vde, values i n ohm-em. 
tMeasu r ed at 100 KC . 
*Durometer hardness is not consis t e nt with those i n t he 300 -hr r eport . I 
Note: l. The MIL - S-8S16 polysulfide ru bbe r po t t i ng compound ~as not t es ted i n t he 600-h r test. It had lost all 
I significant physical proper t ies af t er 300 hr . 
2. Onl y PR-1527 polyu r e th ane was degrad ed t o an unacceptable l evel. The hardness is es pecially reduced . 1 
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Table IV-IO Testing of Coatings and Finishes after 600 hr 
Exposure at 275°F 
Material Remarks 
White Acrylic Lacquer 
11MS K227 
Ablative Coating 
MMS K456 
High Emissivity Silicone 
Coating MMS K474 
Embrittled , adhesion fair. Flakes away 
with checkerboard cut . Loses adhesion 
in the bend area after lBO-deg bend 
around a 1/4- in . mandrel . Specimen 
yellowed significantly . 
Excellent adhesion. Tougher and darker 
than control specimens . Failed 90- deg 
bend over I-in. mandrels . 
Good adhesion. Coating somewhat stronger 
than control sample . No flaking . The 
coating yellowed somewhat. Absorption 
increased from 0.14 to 0 . 16 . Emissivity 
decreased from 0 . B6 to 0 .85 . 
- -- - - - - -~--- ---- - -~~-~ ---
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a. Reactivity of Propellants with ETO 
The purpose of this test was to determine if propellants 
leaking from a pressurized container would react with the ETO 
mix ture. The ETO mixture was 12% ethylene oxide(88% Freon 12 
maintained &t 600 mg of ETO per liter of atmosphere and at 122°F 
with 50% relative humidity as defined by JPL Specification VOL 
50503-ET8. 
Monomethylhydrazine was injected into the chamber in a 
sufficient quantity to produce a concentration of 5x l05 ppm. A 
6-psi pressure rise resu lted with a temperature increase of less 
than 5°F. 
Nitrogen tetroxide was injected into a similar atmosphere 
at a concentration of 5xl05 ppm resulting in a 26 - psi pressure 
rise and a temperature increase of 22°F . This level of reaction 
woul d have been sufficient to rupture the sterilization chamber . 
Vapor detectors and automatic purge systems were added to the 
design of the chamber to protect the chamber. 
b. Capability o f Vapor Detectors t o Operate in an ETO Atmo s -
phere 
Fixed vapor de t ector s manufact ur ed by Te l edyne Sys t ems , 
Inc. PIN ASl 110621, Model 4075M, with solution formulated to de-
tect nitro gen tetroxide or Aer ozine- 50 we r e exposed t o ETO. The 
ETO wa s in a mi x t ur e o f 12% ETO and 88% Freon 12. The concentra-
tion o f ETO wa s 325 mg per lit e r o f atmos phere . Ambient t empera-
tur e wa s used and no humidity contro l wa s provided . 
The f ue l de t ector r es pond ed wi th s purious s i gna l s and t he 
s ignal l eve l s inc r ea sed with time . When exposed t o a calibra t ed 
fuel vapor, the de t ec t or r es ponded t o t he s timu l us . However, the 
de t ec t or cou ld no t be de pe nded on f o r con t i nuous unattend ed use . 
The oxid i zer vapor de t ector perfor med no r ma lly and wa s 
sati s fa c t or y f or use . La t e r expe ri ence in t he con tro lled ETO 
atmos phe r e o f 600 mg per lite r at 12 2°F and 50% r e lative humid ity 
f or 180 hr ha s shown the de t ec t or t o per f or m nor ma lly . 
c . Compatibility o f Copper wi t h ETO 
Two co ppe r t ube fittings wer e exposed t o th e ETO envi ron-
ment a s s peci fi ed by VOL 50503 - ETS f o r TA a pproval of pi ece pa r ts . 
The r esu lt s o f the t es t a r e indicat ed in Fig . IV- 24 . On l y su per-
ficial staining was f ound on the test specimen . Copper is con-
sidered compatible on t he basis o f this test. 
IV-39 
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~ ,r-Control .:~,, / ' Sample 
Test Sample 
Fig. IV-24 Copper Tube Fittings from ETO Test 
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d. Compatibility of rransition Joints with Propellants 
The object of this test was to expose a cold welded ex-
truded transition joint to propellants under the sterilization 
environment. A ~-in. joint of 6A£-4V titanium and 606l-T6 alumi-
num was exposed to N2 0 4 at 275°F for 600 hr. Figure IV-25 shows 
the joint after test. The joint was examined visually under high 
magnification. There was no evidence of degradation of the bonded 
joint. A fine coat of aluminum oxide was found on the aluminum 
portion of the tube joint. 
Fig. IV-25 Transition Joint, Titanium 6A£-4V and 
606l-T6 Aluminum Alloy 
A second transition joint of 304L stainless steel and 
titanium 6A£- 4V alloy was exposed to monomethylhydrazine at 
275°F for 600 hr. No attack was noted on the specimen and no 
fuel decomposition occurred. 
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e . ~ompatib i lity o f Gr ease with ETO 
A general purpose high temperat u re g re as e was te s ted f or 
compatibilit y with ETO. The g reas e wa s Martin Marietta Specif i -
cation MMS - N3l2, which i s a s ynth etic base l ubric ant contain ing 
10% tungs ten disulfide suitabl e f or -65 to + 400 °F application. 
There wa s no b reakdown of the greas e when te s ted f or 26 hr in 
ETO ac co rding to specifica tion VOL 50503 - ETS. Subs e quent usage 
in the sterili zation c hamber for a b lower be a r i n g l ub ric ant 
showed completel y sati s f actory perf orman ce. 
f . Freon/ Tit a nium Comp a t i b ility Test 
Data deve l o ped by other i nvestigators , namely NASA- MSC, 
Boe i ng , duPon t , and Ae r ospa ce Corpo r a t ion , have shown tha t titani -
um 6A£ - 4V al loy wa s not comp a tib le wi th F reon MF , but tha t it was 
compatibl e with Freon TF / Oxy f ume 12 material . The decontamination 
a gen t i n sterilization exposu r e contains Freon 12, which is equiva -
len t t o a DF o r "difluoro" designation between MF -"mono f luoro" and 
TF-" trifluo r o " f ormu l a tions . The r efore , i t was decided to perform 
t es t s t o a scerta in t he compat ibility of the materials . 
The pro b lem involved the availability of chlorine in the 
Freo n 12 and its ef f ect on titanium . Specifically , it was de -
s ired t o kn ow i f the decon t amination atmosphere would initiate 
stress cra cking o r whether an existing structural flaw would 
pr opa gate . Four specimens were tested . Each was a Langley sample 
s t ressed t o 125,000 psi . Two specimens were notched in the area 
of ma ximum s tr ess and two were not. The test was run for 168 hr 
u n de r the f o llowing conditions : 
1) The decontamination mi xture was 12% ethylene oxide 
and 88% F reon 12 at a concentration of 600 mg per 
liter of chamber volume; 
2) Relati ve humidity was maintained at 45 ± 10%; 
3) The temperature was 122 ± 1°F at all times . The de -
contamination gas was preheated to 122°F before intro -
duction into the test chamber . 
The photomi crographs of the specimens shown in F ig . I V- 26 show 
n o de t rimenta l effects resulting from the tests . 
---- --- ----. -- -- --- --- --- --- --- ._-- --- --
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g . Ardeform 301 Stainless Steel Compatibility with N2 0 4 
A specimen of 301 stainless steel formed by the Ardeform 
process and supplied by Arde Incorporated, was exposed to N2 0 4 
at 27S oF for 600 hr . The degree of attack was substa ntially less 
than any other 300 series steel alloy . Although the amount of 
viscous adduct was substantially less , the material was not con-
sidered suitable for propulsion system construction when sterili -
zation is a requirement . 
h . Compatibility o f Fluorosint with N2 0 4 
A sample o f fluorosint valve seat ' material , supplied by 
JPL, was exposed to N2 0 4 at 27SoF for 600 hr . No change in weight 
or dimensions was noted . 
i. Passivation of Monomethylhydrazine Systems 
Considerable interest was shown in whether or not . MMH 
wou ld vio lently decompose when heated to 27So F. During the mate-
rials testing program decomposition of MMH was of ten evidenced by 
extreme discoloration and elevated pressures in the test vessels . 
It soon became apparent that the decomposition of MMH at 27So F wa s 
associated with system cleanliness . When any alloy tested was ex-
posed t o heated MMH without proper cleaning , d ecomposition was ob -
served . 
A program to develop and verify cleaning and passivation 
procedures was initiated . The chemical cleaning consisted of 
hydrochloric acid baths . This was followed by a solution of nitric 
acid fortified with 17% hydrofluoric acid in extreme cases . The 
passivation procedur e consisted of exposing the mater ials to a 
2S% MMH solution in water at 27SoF for 76 hr . 
The procedure was verified by testing a ,bimetallic speci -
men of 2014 aluminum and 304 stainless steel joined with monel 
rivets . This combination of materials was selected because these 
materials were considered the most potentially reactive, based on 
previous test experience of nonpassivated specimens . The speci -
men was cleaned and passivated according t o the above procedures . 
The metal specimen was immersed in a v ial of MMH and exposed to 
27SoF for 600 hr . A control v ial of MMH containing no specimen 
was als o exposed . 
I 
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The propellant decomposition is listed in the following 
tabulation as obtained by gas chromatography techniques. 
MMH with Bimetallic 
Standard MMH Control Sample Specimen 
MMH 99.49/0 98.06% 97 .61% 
Water 0 . 46 1.48 1. 94 
Hydrazine 0 . 00 0.22 0 .20 
Ammonia 0 . 04 0.23 0.24 
Air 0 . 01 0.01 0.01 
These results indicate very little difference between the control 
and test specimen. From these results it was concluded the clean-
ing passivation procedures was verified . 
j. Determination of the Va por Pressure of MMH at Elevated 
Temperatures 
A test was conducted to verify the v apor pressure and 
stability characteristics of MMH fuel at the temperature levels 
associated with the decontamination and ster ilization processes. 
The schematic of the test fixture is shown in Fig. IV-27. 
The glass test vessel had a capacity of 185 ml, and contained an 
integral thermometer well . The glass outlet tube of the test 
vessel was connected to the stainless steel fi~ture piping by a 
Swagelok connector with a Teflon seal. A relief valve and ap-
propriate hand valves were provided in the system . 
The test vessel was supported and comp l etely immersed in 
an ethylene glycol bath. The bath container was equipped with 
wall heaters and an agitator to control the heating of the bath. 
A vacuum pump was provided to evacuate the test vessel 
and connecting piping before filling with MMH. A 300- series 
stainless steel Hoke bottle (300 ml capacity) was provided to 
hold the fuel sample for introduction into the test vessel . 
The instrumentation locations are shown in the schematic 
of the test fixture (Fig. IV- 27). Vapor pressure was measured 
with a strain gage - type transducer and a potentiometric voltmeter . 
Accuracy of this system was iD.l psia for pressures up to 50 psia 
and ±D.S psia fo r pressures above 50 psia. Temperature of the MMH 
was determined with a mercury-in - g lass thermometer having a ran ge 
of OaF to 300°F and an accuracy of ±oF. Bath temperature was read 
with a copper-constantan pyrometer having an accuracy of ±3°F in 
the range of interest. 
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The test system was thoroughly cleaned before assembly, 
and proof-pressure tested after assembly. The system was then 
leak-checked at 285°F with helium, using a mass spectrometer 
leak detector. 
The 300 ml supply bottle was filled from the storage drum 
by GN2 pressure transfer and then connected to the test fixture 
fill port with the bottle stop v alves closed. The test system up 
to the bottle stop valve was then evacuated to approximately l50-~ 
Hg. The vacuum system was then isolated and the stop v alves on 
the supply bottle opened to admit approximately 120 ml of MMH in-
to the test vesse l (MMH level about 2 in. above the bottom of the 
thermometer well). The fill v alve was then closed and the supply 
bottle was disconnected. 
The test runs were made by heating the bath to obtain MMH 
temperatures of 150°F, 200°F, 250o~, 275°F, and 285°F. In some 
cases, the temperatures was first brought to 285°F and the set-
points were run in descending order. One test run included a 
hold period of 30 minutes at 285°F as a stability test. 
The result s of the test are shown in Fig. IV-28. The 
experimental results indicate a v apor pressure of 63 psia at 
275°F, which is 11% higher than the previously published data. 
k. Compatibility of Humidity Sensor with ETO 
The primary relative humidity sensor was an Alnor dew-
pointer. Since the Alnor is not a continuous device and provides 
no output signal for recording and control, a secondary system 
was installed. The secondary system is an electrical hygrometer 
manufactured by Hygrodynamics Inc. and consists of a lithuim 
chloride cell , the resistance of which responds to temperature 
and water vapor content, and an electrical control box that pro-
vides an output to be used to drive a strip chart recorder. 
The object of this test was to determine whether or not 
the device was affected by the presence of ETa. Testing was con-
ducted at 122°F in a 100% sterilant gas mixture with humidities 
ranging from 30 to 70%. 
The results of these tests indicated the sensor was af-
fected by the presence of ETO but the effect was not commulative 
and it was repeatable. The sensitivity of the device was greatly 
affected because the resistance of the sensor changed from ap-
proximately 2 megohms to approximately 20,000 ohms. For this 
reason a broadband sensor gave meaningless information. With 
narrowband sensor, 40 to 60% relative humidity was successfully 
correlated with the Alnor dewpointer and was incorporated into 
the contro l system. 
There was evidence the electrical sensor was affected by 
ETO concentration , however , this was not pursued since the chamber 
was operated at a constant concentration of ETa. 
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V. COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT AND TEST 
A. COMPONENT PROCUREMENT AND ACCEPTANCE 
, To assure compliance with the specifications set forth under 
Component Selection, Chapter III.D, each of the component accept-
ance tests was witnessed by a Martin Marietta engineer or repre-
sentative. Durirrg these tests it became apparent that further 
development was necessary on s'ome components to achieve the re-
quired objectives. These prob1~ms were attacked as soon as they 
were defined and changes were made to produce an acceptable com-
ponen t. , The componen t procurement acceptance tes ts and prob 1em 
areas are discussed in this section. 
1. Propellant Tanks 
a. Oxidizer Tank with Diaphragm 
The diaphragms for the oxidizer tanks were manufactured 
and tested at the Di1ectrix Company. All units passed the ac-
ceptance test and were then shipped to Pre ssure Systems, Inc, for 
assembly into the oxidizer tanks. 
The first oxidizer tank was t es t ed for acceptance at the 
Wyle Laborator ies on July 17, 1967. Following visual examination 
and recordin g the outside diameter in thr ee diametra1 planes, the 
unit was subjected to a gaseous proof pressure of 2050 psig for 
three minutes. The unit was then vented to room ambient pressure 
and allowed to stablize to room temperature. A recheck of the 
three recorded diameters showed no chan ge . Internal leakage 
through the Teflon bladder was then checked with gaseous helium 
at 1.0 psig. After stabilization, the leakage was constant at 
0.56 cc/min or 33.6 cc/hr. The acceptanc e level for the bladder 
alone is zero bubbles of gaseous nitrogen in 5 minutes . Since 
the bladders had all passed thi s preliminary test, it was assumed 
that the indicated leakage was a result of the assembly of the 
tank hemispheres and Teflon bladder. This could be accounted 
for as increased diffusion rate throu gh ,the bladder because of 
the use of helium instead of nitrogen and/or a leak at the rim 
seal. Because the leak was not enough to caus e an y great dis-
crepanc y during expulsion , this discrepancey was acc ep ted and 
a chan ge in the rim seal design on the next unit was planned. 
~--.~ 
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The final test was the external leakage check using helium gas 
at 2045 psig over a period of three minutes. No leakage was de-
tected with a mass spectrometer. The unit was accepted for com-
ponent test. This was the first attempt by the tank manufacturer 
to install a hemispherical Teflon laminate bladder in a propel -
lant tank. His previous experience history involved only elastic 
rubber bladders that do not cold flow or creep under relatively 
low loads. 
Sealing of a rubber diaphragm involves clamping of the rub·· 
ber lip at the tank girth in a cavity made up of flat machined sur-
faces. Due to the elasticity of the rubber, enough squeeze can 
be built in to provide a good seal. In the cas e of Teflon the 
preload resulting from squeeze is soon relieved by cold flow of 
the material and must, in some manner, be restricted to maintain 
a seal. Restriction may be accomplished by minimizing the flow 
area. A joint design shown in Fig. V-l was used for the first 
tank. The serrations penetrate the Teflon and act as multiple 
series orifices to limit the Teflon flow. For this joint to work 
properly, it must be pre loaded adequately to allow proper penetra-
tion of the serrations. In the first tank, several conditions 
were present that were not conducive to making a proper seal: 
(1) the diaphragm lip seal area was rough and irregular; (2) tank 
hemisphere preload was not measured and was probably too low to 
cause proper penetration; and (3) the height of the serrations 
was not sufficient to br id ge across measured irregularities in 
lip seal thickness. It was decided that a revised seal design, 
Fig. V-2 would be used for the module tank. 
Since the surface between the gas side hemisphere and the 
diaphragm lip is the primary seal area across the diaphragm, only 
this ar ea was modified. This serration configuration was designed 
to provide several advantages over the previous configuration of 
Fig. V-l. With a hemisphere loading of 50 lb per linear inch of 
seal, the two lar ge serrations will fully penetrate the Teflon 
skin of the seal surface . The displaced Teflon will fill the 
cavity between the serrations. With the two larger serrations 
fully penetrated, the two shorter serrations will penetrate ap-
proximately half way through the Teflon . This will provide a 
grip in the Teflon i f the larger serrations have separated the · 
seal completely. Therefore, a fully trapped Teflon seal is pro -
vided (between the large serrations) with gripping action by the 
smaller serrations to assure diaphragm retention. 
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For this assembly 50 lb/in. of seal preload was used. It 
was a requirement that the preload be measured by a torque cali-
bration of the threaded rods used to load the hemispheres during 
welding. 
As one additional step to ensure a leaktight system, the 
diaphragm seal area was hand worked to provide a better finish and 
tighter tolerance on the seal thickness. The initial seal thick-
ness was 0~ 1170 to 0.1238 in. After rework by hand sanding, the 
thickness was 0.1170 to 0.1190 in. 
Following the above changes, the module unit was assembled 
and submitted for acceptance test. A diaphragm leak check was 
performed using 1 psig helium gas on the tank liquid side. A 
tube was connected to the gas side port and submerged in water 
to collect leakage gas. No leak was noted over a 5-minute period. 
At the completion of this check the tank was vented and then pres-
surized at both ports to 2060 psig for she ll proof pressure. On 
ventin g to ambi ent anothe r diaphragm l eak check was performed 
with an i ndicat ed l ea ka ge of 9 sec/minute of he lium. The tank 
wa s he ld at I psig fo r a considerabl e time with no reduction in 
l ea k rate . Press ur e was inc reas ed on the liquid side port in 
100 ps i increment s to 700 psig . The l eak rate was considerably 
hi gher at the highe r pressur e l eve l. The tank pr essur e was then 
r e duc ed t o 1 ps i g . At about 15 ps i g a large quantit y of gas was 
s uddenly expel l e d, i ndic a Ll ng a ga s bubbl e had existed on the gas 
s ide of t he diaphr a gm. At this time , l ea ka ge began to decreas e 
and a f t er one hour t he rate wa s at 3 . 8 cc / minut e with 1 ps i g on 
the tank liquid port. 
After conside~ing various cours e s of action, including cut-
t i ng the t ank open with poss ible loss of hemi s pher es or dia-
phra gm, it wa s decided that the tank wo uld be acc epte d with t he 
indicated leakage . Enough f i ring marg i n exist s to allow fo r a 
3 . 8 cc/minute oxidi zer l eaka ge over the 5-minute firin g time . 
In addition , i t i s no t antici pa t ed that this l ea ka ge rate can 
occur during f irin g sinc e a ~ of muc h l es s than 1 psi is s uf-
f icient t o move the diaphr agm during expu l s i on. 
A final check of diametral dimensions showed no change be-
fore and after the proof pressure. 
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b. Fuel Tank and Screen Trap 
The screen trap assembly design was revised during the 
latter stage of trap fabrication. Welding of the cone section at 
its large diameter end to the flat sheet portion did result in a 
problem. The acute an gle (approximately 23 deg) weld resulted in 
the formation of metal oxides within the angle. Since the oxides 
gener a lly cause fuel decomposition , they must be removed before 
fuel exposure . The procedures available for removal included such 
mec hanical c lean ing as wire brushing and grinding or pickling us -
ing a mixture of nitric acid and hydrogen fluoride. The weld area 
is inaccessible to effective wire brush or grind cleaning. In 
addition, pickling results in chemical attack of the metal, whic h 
is insignificant on the sheet stock, but is quite significant on 
the wire screen . 
The pickling approach was used with care so that the solu -
tion did not contact the screen . Subsequent exposure to MMH in -
dicated the cleaning was adequate . 
Welding of t he cap on the small diameter end of the cone 
resulted in a similar problem with the weld surfac e on the inside 
of the assembl y . To allow mechanical cleaning a l - in.-diameter 
hole was c ut in the center of the cap and was later covered with r 
a riveted patch. A single rivet hole was left in the center of 
the patch for final bubble point check (Fig. IV-3). 
The bubble points obtained for the complete assemblies 
were 2 and 2.5 in . of water , respectively . 
The two units were then shipped to Pressure Systems, Inc , 
for assembly into the fuel tanks. 
The first fuel tank, for use in the component test, was 
tested for acceptance at the Wyle Laboratories on July 12, 1967 . 
After passing visual examination , the outside diameter was meas -
ured in three diametral planes. The unit was then subjected to 
gaseous proof pressure of 2050 psig for 3 minutes and then re-
turned to room pressure . The outside diameter was again checked 
at the same points and showed no change within the limits of the 
mi c rometer (0.001 in.). The unit was then subjected to the out -
side leak test. After pressurizing to 950 psig for 3 minutes with 
He , the maximum indicated leakage was 1.0 x 10 - 9 sec/sec . The 
maximum allowable is 1 . 0 x 10 - 8 scc/sec . Therefore, the unit 
passed all tests satisfactorily . 
__ J 
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The second fuel tank , for use on the module , passed a ll 
acceptance tes t s . The only difference from t he first un it wa s 
in the leakage rate , which was 5.8 x 10 - 9 scc/sec He . This is 
still below t he allowable rate and therefore acceptable . 
2. Gas Pressurant Tank 
The gas pressurant tank was pur chased as an off -the - shelf 
item. It had been proof and leak tested by the vendor . The only 
addition to this tank was the welding of spec i al fitt i ngs furn i shed 
by Martin Marietta Corporat i on . The welded joints were X-rayed 
and showed no exc essive porosity , therefore , the un it was acc ep t ed 
for inclusion in the module . 
3 . Gas Pressure Regulator 
The first of two regulators was passed through the ac ceptanc e 
test on J uly 10 , 1967 , and the sec ond on July 13 , 1967 . Resu l ts 
of the tests are tabulated below . 
Examination of Produc t 
Proof Pressure 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 
Outlet Pressure (psig) 
Time Applied (min) 
Internal Leakage 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 
Leakage (10.0 max) 
External Leakage 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 
Leakage (0.1 max) 
Time Applied (min) 
Overshoot Pressure 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 
Lockup Pressure Cpsig) 
(278 max) 
Accepted 
2400 
380 
2.0 
1600 
4.2 scc/hr (GN 2 ) 
1600 
0 . 04 scc/hr (GN 2 ) 
15 
1600 
264 
Ac cep t ed 
2400 
380 
2 . 0 
1600 
6 . 4 scc/hr 
(GN2 ) 
1600 
0 . 02 scc/hr 
(GN2 ) 
15 
1600 
259 . 0 
Regulation 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 
Final Pressure (psig) 
Flow Rate (lb/sec) 
Outlet Pressure (psig) 
(248 ± 5) 
Lockup Pressure 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 
Flow Rate (lb/sec) 
MCR -68-119 
1600 
350 
0.015 
Max 248 
Min 249 
Lockup Pressure (270 max) 
1600 
0.015 
264 psig 
Both units passed satisfactorily and were accepted. 
1600 
350 
0.015 
Max 248 
Min 244 
1600 
0.015 
261 psig 
Later in the program, when the SIN 2 unit was assembled into 
the module, a functional test disclosed that the internal leak-
age was excessive and the regulation pressure had shifted down-
ward . The leakage value was 68 scc/hr of GN 2 compared to the 
allowable value of 10 scc/hr. The regulation pressure was 241 
to 245 psig compared to the allowable 248 ± 5 psig. The regulator 
was returned to the supplier for repair and adjustment so that 
the sterilization exposure would be initiated with the regula-
tion band in the required limits. 
The supplier's inves tigation r evealed a scratch mark in the 
regulator valve seat, presumably the result of passage of a 
foreign particle . The regulator seat was repaired, and the reg-
ulation spring was heat treated at 325°F for 24 hr at its work-
ing stress leveJ to obviate the set - point de gradation that had 
been exh ibited by the componen t test regulator. On receipt of 
the r epair ed regulator, it was found that the inlet tube had 
been indexed incorr ectly ; therefore , the inlet fl an ge and tube 
assembly was removed in the Class 100 clean room and reinstall ed 
in th e correct position. The results of the acceptance test, 
conducted at the supplier ' s facility, is listed in the following 
tabulation. 
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Examina tion of P'roduc t 
Proof Pressure 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 
Outlet Pressure (psig) 
Time Applied (min) 
Internal Leakage 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 
Leakage (10.0 max) 
External Leakage 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 
Leakage (0.1 max) 
Time Applied (min) 
Overshoot Pressure 
Inl e t Pressure (ps ig) 
Lockup Pressure (ps i g) 
(278 max ) 
Regulation 
Initial Press ure (psig) 
Fina l Pressur e (psig) 
Flow Rate (lb/s ec) 
Outle t Pre s s ur e (psig) 
(248 ± 5) 
Lockup Pr ess ur e 
Inl e t Press ur e (psi g) 
Flow Rate (lb/sec) 
Loc kup Press ure (psig) 
(270 Max) 
MCR-68-119 
SIN 2 (after rework) 
Accepted 
2400 
380 
2.0 
1600 
3.0 scc/hr 
1600 
o scc/hr (GN2 ) 
15 
1600 
269 
1600 
350 
0.015 
Max 251, Min 244 
1600 
0.015 
264 
Followin g installation in the module, the prefiring f unctional 
t es ts were conducted . The t e sts con f irmed that all parameters 
we r e within specification except the internal leakage. Th i s was 
measured at 14.5 scc/hr c ompared to the allowable 10 sec/hr . Be -
cause time did not permit another return to the supplier , and the 
exc essive leakage was not in a range that would be harmful during 
the firing sta ge , it was decaded to acc ept the unit for t es t. 
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4. Solenoid Valve 
The solenoid valves were tested at the vendor's facili ty and 
were accepted. Results of the tests are listed below. 
Examination of Product 
Proof Pressure 
Inlet/Outlet Pressure (ps ig) 
Time Applied (min) 
Dielectric 
Vol tage Applied (500 ± 50 
Applica tion time (min/ ap-
plication) 
Arcing or Flashover 
Pin A to Body 
Pin B to C 
Fault Indica tor Light 
Pin A to Body 
Pin B to C 
Insulation Resistanc e 
Applied Vol ta ge (500 ± 50 
Pin A to C Resistanc e (50 
me gohms min) 
Coil Res is tance 
Re sistanc e Pin A t o B (20 
ohms min) 
Performanc e Test 
Flow Test 
vac) 
vdc) 
Inl e t Pre s sure Drop whil e 
Flowing (1550 psig and 12.5 
scfm, GN2 ) 
Pressure Drop (50 psi min) 
Internal Leakage (Deener gized) 
Inl e t Pr essure (psig) 
Stabilization Period (min) 
Internal Leakage (50 scc/hr 
He, max ) 
WL1. 
Accepted 
3750 
1 
1 
None 
None 
No 
No 
500+ 
22 
27 
1550 
5 
0.22 
~ 
Accepted 
3750 
1 
1 
None 
None 
No 
No 
500+ 
22 
27 
1550 
5 
0.52 
V-ll 
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External Leakage (Ener gized) 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 2250 2250 
Stabilization Period (min) 5 5 
External Leakage (1 x 10 - 8 
sec/sec He, max) 0 0 
02ening and Closing Res20nse 
Initial Inlet Pressure (ps ig) 1550 1550 
Step Input Signal (vdc) 25 25 
Opening Response (0.050 sec , 
max) 27 26 
Closing Response (0.050 sec, 
max) 12 13 
Con tam ina tion Check 
Cleanliness Verified per 
SPS 881 Accepted Acc epted 
5. Fil ter 
Acceptance testing of the four f ilter units was conducted at 
the Garwood Laboratories Inc. Each unit was subjected to visual 
examination, proof pressure, and an external l eaka ge check , per 
LAB 6002513, and passed satisfactorily. 
The units were then subjected to the bubble point check while 
submersed in alcohol and indicated 22, 23.25, 24.0, and 24.2 in . 
of H2 0 pressure, respectively. The minimum acceptable i s 15 . 9 in . 
of H2 0 pressure, therefore, all units passed satisfactorily. 
6. Hand Shutoff Valve 
The first of nine hand valves was passed through the acceptance 
test on June 8, 1967. Results are shown in the following tabula -
tion. 
Examination of Product 
Proof Pressure 
Pressure (psig) 
Time (min) 
External Leakage 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 
Leakage (1 x 10- 8 sec/sec He , max) 
Internal Leakage 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 
Leakage (zero bubbles in 5 minutes ) 
.§lJLl 
Accepted 
1500 
2 
1000 
2 X 10- 8 
1000 
Zero 
The only parameter in ques tion was the external leakage. 
Since there was some doubt about the heavy he lium background 
being responsible for this out of specification reading, the unit 
wa s accepted. 
The f i nal e i ght units were i nspected and all me t the specifi-
ca tions listed above . 
During the assembly of c omponents on the chamber c over fo r 
the component test series , diff ic ulty was experienc ed with the 
hand valve. The tank-side port is 0.020-in. wall aluminum tub e 
welded into the valve body . Connect i ng tubing i s butt-we lded to 
this port . This proc ess anneals the tub e in the area of the weld 
and makes the unit quite fragile . In two cases the joint wa s 
broken adjacent to the weld on th e valve body s ide . Sinc e stresses 
would be induced into this joint in the module through thermal 
effec ts during steril i zation , it was decided that all valves 
would be modified in-house to improve the strength in this area. 
The tub e port was mac hined ou t of one of the valve bodies and a 
1/4-in. AN male fitting was welded i nto the body. A short t est 
series consisting of proof pressure , and internal and external 
l eaks was conducted at Mar tin Marietta to prove this change . The 
valve passed all t es ts sat i sfactorily and the o ther valves were 
also c onverted to provide units for the module assembly. 
V.13 
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B. TEST FIXTURE DESIGN AND FABRICATION 
1. Component Functional Test Fixtures 
Test fixtures were designed and developed for the functional 
test of each component. A typical schematic and actual test 
setup for the regulator valve are shown in Fig. V-4 and V-5. 
To ensure that the test was performed correctly and uniformly 
each time, the same instrumentation and piping was maintained 
throughout , and where possible, the same personnel were used for 
each test. The test units were supplied with spool connections 
for eas y insertion and removal from the test fixture . Also where 
necessary, as in the case of the regulator, Fig. V-6, a nolding 
fixtu r e was used to maintain the integrity of the connecting 
points and to prevent inadvertent handling damage. 
The cleanliness of all gases used for test was assured by 
periodic sampling and certification and by including filters 
within the test fixture 
2. Decontaminat ion and Sterilization Chamber 
Assembly of the decontamination/sterilization chamber was 
completed, and checkout tests were conducted , culminating in 
qualification of the chamber in both the decontamination and the 
sterilization configurations . 
Figure V-7 is a schematic of the chamber and accessories. 
Figure V-8 shows the open chamber with the shroud removed. The 
electrical heaters (heat source for sterilization tests) are 
located on the lower flange of the shroud. Figure V-9 is a view 
into the chamber showing the blower assembly and the hot water 
heat exchanger. The hot water heat exchanger is the heat source 
for ETO decontamination tests. The locations of the distribution 
temperature thermocouples are shown schematically in Fig. V-IO. 
Following a preliminary adjustment of the cam controlling the 
ascent portion of the heat sterilization cycle , the checkout tests 
resulted in qualification of the chamber . Temperatures were main-
tained within the limits specified in JPL Specification VOL 50503~ 
ETS. 
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Fig. V-S Functional Test Setup, Regulator 
Fig. V-6 Regulator Holding Fixture 
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Fig. V-8 Sterilization Chamber, Shroud and Dome Removed 
Fig. V-9 Sterilization Chamber, Internal View 
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The significant results in the heat sterilization cycle are 
indicated by the maximum temperature sp reads summarized in the 
following tabulation. 
Maximum 
Temperature Allowable 
Phase Spre ad (F 0) Spread (OF) 
Temperature Ascent 5 14.4 
Constant Temperature (275 °F) 5 7.2 
Tempera t ure Descent 3 14 .4 
The results of the ETO decontamination chamber qualification 
are summarized in the following tabulation. 
Maximum 
Temperature All owable 
Phase Spread ( OF) Spread ( oF) 
Temperature Ascent 5 14 .4 
Constant Temperature (122°F) 2 7 . 2 
Temperature Descent 1 14 .4 
The ox idizer vapor detector was encapsulated within a pressure 
chamber to permit operation at the 22 psia chamber pressur e us ed 
during ETO decontamination . The fuel vapor detector was not 
enclosed since it was only used during the ambient - pressure dry 
heat sterilization tests because of chemical incompatability of 
the wet reagent cell used in the detector and the ethylene oxide . 
The humidity control system initially was conceived as an 
essentially open - loop system consisting of a superheated steam 
generator and two visually monitored humidity sensing systems . 
The prime measurement system for humidity was an Alnor dewpointer . 
This instrument was installed next to the decontamination chambe r 
in an enclosure that maintained it at a temperature approximately 
equal to that of the chamber to prevent condensation of the water 
vapor in the chamber gas . Since the Alnor instrument was not a 
continuous readout dev i ce and has no output signal to us e for 
recording and control , a secondary humidity sensing system was 
- ._--- .---- ~--------- -- ----- --.-
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installed in the chamber. The secondary system wa s an electrical 
hygrometer manufactured by Hygrodynamics , Inc. The hygrometer con -
sisted of a lithium chloride cell, the resistance of which responds 
to temperature and wa ter vapo r content, and an e lectrical control 
box that has an output used to drive a strip-chart recorder. 
The feasibility of using the electrohygrometer fo r easier 
monitoring of relative humidity was established earlier in the 
program by pilot tests. The test results showed that, although 
the output of the hygrometer cell was affected by t he presence of 
sterilant gas , the output could be correlated with the tru e r el a-
tive humidity as determined with the Alnor dewpointer. Fur ther-
more, the test results indicated that the effect of sterilant gas 
on the sensing cell wa s not cumulative, i.e ., there was no change 
with exposure time. It was , therefore, conclud ed that the e l ectro-
hygrometer coul d be used as a relative measure of humidity condi-
tions in the chamber a f ter establishing the required conditions 
on the basis of Alnor dewpoint data. 
Installa~ion and checkout of the fuel vapor det ec tor and 
oxidizer vapo r detector was completed , placing the steril ization 
chamber in a ready condition for Task II sterilization. 
Instrument Accuracy - A t est program to verify the instru-
mentation accuracy of the Cold Flow Laboratory was completed . 
Typical emp irical 20 accuracies for pres s ure measurements 
using the nominal 2% full - scale system accuracy technique were 
better than 1%. An in - system stimulus calibration was perf ormed 
on the same transducers to demonstrate the nominal 1% full -s cale 
accuracy capability and the typical 20 accuracies were better 
than 0 . 32% full - scale on all recorders . A 4 -hr drift evaluation 
of the same parameters indicated a slight degrading effec t of 
system accuracies . Accuracy varied with the type of recorder 
used . Typical end -to- end system accuracies over a 4 - hr period 
were better than 0 . 26% full scale using the CEC recorder , 0 . 32% 
full scale using Bristol recorder , and 0 . 68% ful l scale using a 
Sanborn recorder . 
A simulated dynamic stimulus was used to demonstrate the merit 
of electronically filtering dynamic signals that have frequency 
components beyond the recorder response. This filtering was per-
formed at the data amplifier . Typical data showed no significant 
change in the accuracy of the CEC and Bristol recording . A 250 Hz 
V-21 
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input to the Sanborn recorder produced an error of 9.58% full 
scale . Electronic filtering to 10 Hz reduced this error to 0.57% 
full scale . 
Typical 20 acc uracies for thrust measurements were better than 
0.37% full scale over a 4-hr period. 
Temperature data acquisition and recording indicated a better 
than 0 . 80% full scale accuracy over a 4 - hr period for thermocouples 
subjected to a temperature range of - 100 °F to +250°F. The platinum 
temperature probe demonstrated a 0.12% accuracy over the same period . 
C. TEST METHOD 
The test methods f or each component are defined by the Com-
ponent and Sys tem Test Plan, MCR - 67 - 20. In addition to this 
document, detailed procedures were written for each component . 
Ea ch procedure is complete in itself providing step- by- step 
direction , and lists of necessary equipment and instrumentation. 
A schedule for the component functional tests is shown in Table 
V-I. 
Detailed procedures were also prepared for component instal -
lation and removal and for the heat sterilization test. 
I 
I 
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Table V- I Component Functional Test Schedule 
Before and After Each Before Final 
Component Sterilization Test Disassembly 
No. No . 
Test Type Runs Test Type Runs 
Oxidizer Tank Leakage I Expulsion Demonstration 1 
wi th Diaphragm 
Fuel Tank with Leakage I Expulsion Demonstration I 
Screen Trap 
Regula t or Leakage 1 
Cracking Pressure I 
Regulation Band I 
Lockup Pressure I 
Response I 
Flow Capac i ty I 
Solenoid Valve Leakage I 
Response 3 
F low Capacity I 
Dielectric Resistance I 
Fil ter Flow Capacity I 
Hand Shutoff Leakage I 
Valve Flow Capacity I 
Operating Torque I 
--
Ordnance Valve Leakage I Opening Response 1 
Bridge Wire 1 Opening Flow Capacity 1 
Resistance Leakage (Cartridge Pins 1 
Throttling ( J PL to Perform 
Valve Functionals) 
Thrust Chamber Flow Characteristics 5 
Valve (1 ea) Response Time 3 
Leakage 1 
Dielectric Test 1 
Voltage, Pull In 3 
V-24 
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D. COMPONENT STERILIZATION 
1. Presteri1ization Functional Testing 
A presteri1ization check of the critical parameters was run 
on all t he components to establish a baseline for comparison . 
Some of the parameters may not agree exactly with those determined 
during acceptance testing and reported in Section A of this chap -
ter. This can be explained by the difference in test setup and 
instruments used. Nevertheless these figures are valid for a 
comparison test. The one notable difference is in the leak test 
on the oxidizer propellant tank. The oxidizer tank as received 
from the suppli er was reported to have a leak through the dia -
phragm . Leakag e rat e was indicated to be 0 . 56 cc/minute of helium 
with a pressure across the diaphragm of 1 psi . When the s~me leak 
check was performed at Martin Marietta using nitrogen , no leakage 
could be detected . The pressure wa s raised in increments from 
1 psi to 250 psi acros s the diaphragm with no indicated leakage . 
The applied pressure was from the tank liquid outlet side, which 
pressed the diaphragm against the tan k g as side hemisphere . The 
conclusion reached was that the leak was originally in the l i p 
seal area rather than through the skin of the diaphragm . In addi -
tion , cold flow of the Teflon in the seal area finally closed the 
leak originally detected at the supplier test facility, The re -
sults of these tests are shown under Subs ection 4, following. 
2 . First Sterilization Series 
Foll ow ing the completion of all required presterilization 
functional tests, the test components were loaded with propellants 
as required and were mounted in the sterilization chamber lid as 
shown in Fig. V-II. X-ray photographs were taken of the oxidizer 
tank in an effort to determine the position of the diaphragm , 
The diaphra gm could not be detected in the pictures because if 
it were properly placed against the inlet side of the tank if 
would not be detectable , 
Analysis of the loaded oxidizer showed that the NO content 
was 0.47%, which was within the 0 , 4 to 0 . 8% specified by the 
MSC-PPD - 2 specification. 
Sterili zation testing of the components was started on August 
1, 1967, and continued through six cycles of heat sterilization. 
Testing was completed on August 29 , 1967. The sterilization was 
per JPL Speci fication VOL - 50S03 - ETS. 
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Components exposed to the first series of heat sterilization 
cycle s and the fluids contained during the series are listed in 
the following t abulation. 
Component 
Oxidizer Tank~~ with Teflon 
Diaphragm 
Fuel Tank with Screen Trap 
Regulator 
Solenoid Valve 
Filter 
Hand Shutoff Valve 
Ordnance Valve 
Fluid Contained 
Air 
Air 
Air 
*The oxidizer tank failed during the sixth cycle 
and was removed before completion of the sixth 
cycle. 
The results of each cycle of sterilization are summarized in 
the following paragraphs . 
Cycle 1 was completed without incident with respect to the 
chamber . The oxidizer tank pressure history, however, indicated 
that the chamber temperature was approximately 3°F low during most 
of the constant temperature portion of the cycle, while the fuel 
tank was at equilibrium pressure for the indicated temperature. 
It was believed at this time that the chamber temperature was 
actually low, therefore the temperature was raised at the third 
cycle to compensate for this disparity. However, following the 
failure of the platinum resistance probe used for chamber tempera -
ture control during the sixth cycle, a test was run to determine 
the actual vapor pressure versus temperature for the MMH. This 
is reported in Chapter IV.D.3, llS pec ial Tests. 11 The resul ts of 
these tests proved that the oxidizer vapor pressure was correct 
for the intended chamber temperature . The fault was in the tem-
perature readout and the fuel vapor pressure versus temperature 
data were not correct . Therefore, for most of the first six cy -
cles, the chamber temperature was actually above the intended 
sterilization temperature. 
Cycle 2 was interrupted at 31 hr and 50 minutes into the run 
by a failure of the facility power system . On restart, a blower 
drive bearing failed, causing additional down time . After repairs 
------ -~- -----~ 
MCR-68- ll9 V-27 
the test was restarted with cycle time starting when propellant 
vapor pressures were stable at 275 °F. This occurred 16 hours 
after the start of heating and at an agreed on cycle time of 30 
hr into the run . Therefore, the cycle was penalized 1 hr and 50 
minutes plus the reheat time of 16 hr because of the down time. 
Cycle 3 was completed without a problem . 
During Cycle 4 , the chamber temperature ran low at 273°F due 
to a malfunction in the temperature recorder/controller. In addi-
tion, the oxidizer tank pressure appeared to be unduly low during 
the run and a leak in this tank system was suspected. After the 
cycle was completed, the oxidizer tank and connecting lines were 
pres s urized to 750 ps i g wi th GN2 . No lea ks were found as a re -
sult of this check . To avoid introducing a correction in oxidizer 
tank pressure in later cyc l es , the GN2 was removed by evacuating 
the system and allowing the ox i dizer to boil for approximately 20 
minutes . Detailed evaluation of the data at the low chamber tem -
perature indicated that the ox i dizer tank pressure was consistent 
with previous cycle test data. 
The chamber t~mperature recorder/controller was repaired and 
Cycle 5 was run at a chamber set temperature of 277°F. The cycle 
was completed without incident except for the continuing suspec ted 
low oxidizer pressures . This is explained in Chapter IV .D.3, 
"Special Tests." 
Cycle 6 was marked by periodic malfunction of the chamber 
reference temperature (Trc) recording system, because of heat-
induced degradation of the electrical lead to the sensor in the 
chamber. Sinc e the Trc recorder is also the controller, the spu -
rious signals from the sensor caused the chamber temperature to 
drop below the required operating band during certain periods of 
the test. To compensate for the test time at under-temperature 
conditions, the normal 76-hr test period was extended on an hour -
for - hour basis . 
Toward the end of the extended test run (within 4 hr o f the 
scheduled initiation of cooling), the chamber oxidizer vapor de-
tector sensed a leak from the oxidizer tank test item and caused 
an automatic shutdown of the chamber . The oxidizer tank test 
item was removed for inspection and failure analysis. Cycle 6 
was continued with all the remaining components by reheating the 
chamber at the prescribed rate, allowing a stabilization period 
of 8 hr at 275°F chamber temperature, and then completing the re-
maining 4 hr of scheduled time at 275°F plus the normal 6 - hr cool-
down . 
V-28 
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3. Second Sterilization Series 
The second series of heat sterilization cycles on the system 
components was completed on October 13, 1967. Cycles 7 thru 12 
are summariz~d in the following paragraphs. 
Cycle 7 was started after all components had been subjected 
to the midsterilization functional tests. The oxidizer tank was 
not installed, having been removed from sterilization testing 
for failure analysis during the previous cycle . The throttling 
valve furnished by JPL was installed in the chamber to undergo 
the first six cycles of sterilization testing. The fuel and oxi -
dizer passages in the throttling valve were half-filled with MMH 
and N2 0 4 , respectively. The remaining components were installed 
in the sterilization chamber as they had been installed during 
the first six sterilization cycles. This cycle was uneventful 
with t he exception of a chamber shutdown at T + 17 hr caused by 
spurious signals from the fuel vapor detector . Chamber tempera -
ture was restored in approximately 2 hr. Equilibrium fuel vapor 
pressure (fuel temperature) was reestablished 8 hr after shutdown , 
at which time testing was resumed at the T + 17 hr mark . 
Cycle 8 was marked by an unusually wide excursion in chamber 
reference temperature during the first half of the run . This was 
caused by slippage of a shim under the cam fo llower of the tem-
perature contro ller. During the latter half of the cyc le, the 
temperature set - point was increased to compensate for the l ower 
temperature experienced during the earlier part of the cycle . 
The controller problem was rectified at the conclus ion of the 
cycle . 
Cycle 9 was interrupted at T + 48 : 50 hr by loss of facility 
GN2 pressure in the test area, wh i ch caused the chamber tempera-
ture controller to shut off the chamber heaters . This conditio n 
occurred during unattended chamber operation on Sunday, October 1. 
The shutdown could not activate the chamber kill alarm system, 
therefore, it was not detected until the following morning, at 
which time the chamber had been at under-temperature cond itions 
for approximately 18 hr . Equilibrium chamber temperature and 
fuel vapor pressure (fuel temperature) were reestablished at 
16:50 on October 2, at which time the cycle timing was resumed 
at T + 48 : 50 hr elapsed time. The cycle was conc luded withou~ 
further incid ent . 
Cycles 10, 11, and 12 were completed without incident . 
I 
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4. Sterilization (Pre, Mid, and Post) Functional Tests 
Results of the pre , mid, and poststeri1ization functional tests 
on each of the components are presented in the summary data sheets 
(Tables V-2 thru V-8). The performance of the thrust chamber 
valves is shown for the functional tests run before sterilization 
and after completion of the 12 sterilization cycles. The response 
data from the midsteri1ization functional test was adversely af-
fected by interaction between the valve solenoid coils caused by 
the data acquisition system loading the direct coil. Loading of 
the direct (data pickoff) coil caused the response time of the 
valves to increase by approximately a factor of three. Inasmuch 
as the interaction phenomenon was not discovered until after the 
second series of sterilization cycles was underway, accurate re-
trieval of the true response characteristics of the valves was 
not feasible. In addition, since the operating characteri~tics 
of the valves was not significantly changed after 12 steriliza-
tion cycles , it was assumed that there was no significant change 
in valve performance at the midsteri1ization point. 
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Table V-2 
Component Name: 
Part Numbers: 
Oxidizer -
Fuel -
Serial Numbers ; 
Oxidizer -
Fuel -
MCR - 68-119 
Performance Data , Propellant Tanks 
Propellant Tank 
Mart in Marietta LAB 6002514 -00 9 
Pressure Systems, I nc 80092 
Martin Marietta LAB 6002514-019 
Pressure Systems , Inc 80092 
SiN 0001 
SiN 0001 
r-------------------------~----------------._----------------_.------------.-------
Item 
Fuel Tank 
External Leakage 
Helium at 400 psig 
(sec/sec) 
Hydrion Paper Indi ca -
tion (pH) 
Expulsion, -1 g 
Quantity Load ed (lb) 
Qua nt ity Expelled (lb) 
Oxidizer Tank 
External Leakage 
Helium at 930 psig 
(sec/sec) 
Hydrion Pap er Indica-
t ion (pH) 
I nternal Lea kage 
GN2 , 1 psid (cc/hr) 
Expuls ion , -1 g 
Quantity Loaded (lb) 
Quantity Expelled (lb) 
Presterilization Midsterilization Posts ter ili zaticn 
Zero 
- -
50 . 5 
- -
Zero 
Zero 
80 . 7 
- -
No basic indica -
tion 
- -
- -
Leakage at test 
fitting 
210 cc /min (He) 
---
Zero 
- -
- -
0 . 96 
Not Tested 
I 
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Table V-3 Performance Data, Pressure Regulator 
Component Name: 
Part Number: 
Serial Number: 
Pressure Regulator 
Sterer PiN 35540 
Martin Marietta PiN LAB 6002515-009 
1 
V-3l 
Item Presterilization Midsterilization Poststeri liza tion 
Leakage Rate 
External (Bubbles GN2 ) 
Internal (GN2 scc/hr) 
Hysteresis 
Ini t ia l Outlet Lockup 
Pressure (psig) 
Minimum Outlet Pressure 
( psig) 
Maximum Outlet Pressure 
(psig) 
Regulation 
Inlet Pressure, Initial 
(psig) 
Inlet Pressure, Final 
( psig) 
Average Flow Rate 
(lb/sec) 
Outlet Pressure (psig) 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Response 
I nlet Pressure, Average 
(psig) 
Outlet Pressure, Lockup 
( psig) 
Overshoot (psig) 
Zero 
4 .2 
269 
259 
263 
1560 
408 
0 .015 
247 
250 
1650 
260 
o 
*One 1/4-in.-diameter bubble every 5 minut es . 
Initial 
Zero 
56,000 
250 
243 
247 
1 , 513 
320 
0 .014 
231 
235 
1,500 
252 
o 
Final 
Zero 
12.00 
264 
248 
253 
1500 
342 
0 .015 
234 
234 
4900 
256 
246 
254 
1519 
351 
0 .015 
231 
235 
1599 
244 
o 
J 
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Table V- 4 
Component Name : 
Part Number : 
Serial Number : 
I tem 
Leakage Rate 
Internal Leakage (He~ 
lium) 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 
Leakage (sce/h~) 
External Leakage 
(Helium) 
I nlet/Outlet Pres -
sure (psig) 
Leakage Rate (sec/ 
hr) 
Flow Capacity (GN2 ) 
Corrected I nlet Pres -
sure (psia) 
Corrected I nlet Tem-
perature (oF) 
Corrected Flow Rate 
(lb/sec) 
Response 
Average I nlet Pressure 
( psig) 
Opening Time (sec) 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Closing Time (sec) 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Dielectric Strength 
Pin A to Case , 500 vac 
(microamps) 
Pin B to Case , 500 vac 
(microamps) 
MCR- 68 - 119 
Performance Data , Solenoid Valve 
Solenoid Valve 
S terer P /N 35580 
Martin Marietta PiN 6002 516 -001 
2 
Pre s terilization Mid s ter i liz a t i on Pos t steri l i za tion 
1560 
3 ,3 
2200 
Zero 
1550 
70 
0 ,070 
1545 
0 ,102 
0 , 102 
0 ,082 
0 .089 
4 
4 
1530 
2 ,0 
2200 
Zero 
1550 
50 
0 ,072 
1543 
0 , 102 
0 , 108 
0 ,081 
0 ,092 
o 
o 
1544 
o 
2200 
Zero 
1550 
70 
0 ,071 
1533 
0 , 104 
0,104 
0 ,084 
0 .084 
500 
500 
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Table V-5 Performance Data, Filter 
Component Name: Filter, 5 Micron Nominal 
Part Number: Western Filter Company PiN 20477-5 
Martin Marietta PiN LAB 6002513-009 
Serial Number: None 
V-33 
Item Presterilization Midsterilization Pos tsterilization 
Pressure DroE (GN2 ) 
High Pressure 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 1550 1537 1552 
Flow Rate (lb/sec) 0,015 0,015 0,016 
Pressure Drop ( psi) 0 0 0 
Low Pressure 
Inlet Pressure (psig) 375 248 280 
Flow Rate (lb/sec) 0,014 0,016 0,014 
Pressure Drop (psi) 0 0 0 
I 
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Table V-6 
Component Name: 
Part Number: 
Serial Number : 
Item 
Oeerating Torgue ~Helium 
248 esig2 
Shutoff Torque (in./l b) 
Leakage at Shutoff 
(cc/min) 
Leakage (Helium, 935 psig) 
Internal (cc/min) 
External (scc /sec) 
Fl ow Cal2acity ~GN2 2 
I nlet Pressure ( psig) 
Outlet Pressure (psi g) 
Fl ow Rate (1b/sec) 
Capacity Factor (Cv) 
~'(Maximum allowable torque . 
MCR - 68-1l9 
Performance Data, Hand Shuto ff Valve 
Hand Shutoff Valve 
VACCO NVB 32181 
Martin Marietta LAB 6002512-009 
213 85-1 
--
Presteriliza t ion Midsterilization Posts terili zation 
--
10~'( 10 ~'" 10~\-
1.9 to 3 . 8 41 .0 to 44 . 5 16 .0 to 20.0 
19 720 Zero (16 in .- lb) 
Zero 1.12 x 10 -5 1 .35 X 10 - 5 
250 250 250 
250 250 250 
0 0 0 
0 .0765 0 .0720 0 .0725 
0 .45 0 .42 0 .43 
Complete shutoff was not obtained, as indicated by 
lea kage rate noted . Complete shutoff occurred at 17 in .- lb . 
-.- ------' 
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Table V-7 Performance Data, Ordnance Valve 
Component Name: 
Part Number: 
Serial No: 
Squib: 
Item 
Leakage Rate l Helium 
@ 4250 ± 50 psig 
(sec/sec) 
Internal: 
External: 
Resl20nse 
dP c / dt, psi/sec 
Pressure Drop, Design GN2 
Flow @ 260 psia (psi) 
Ordnance Valve 
JPL No. D4700696 
015 
P /N J4700697 
Presterilization Midsterilization 
Zero Zero 
Zero Zero 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
V-35 
Poststerilization 
Pre- Post-
firing firing 
. Zero Zero 
Zero 7 .3 x 10- 7 
N/A 42,500 
N/A 1.4 
V- 36 
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Table V- 8 Performance Data , Thrust Chamber Valves 
Item 
Oxidizer Valve , s iN 575 
Pull - in Voltage (vdc) 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Opening Re s ponse (sec) 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Closing Response (sec) 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Leakage : External (bubbles 
GN2 ) 
I nternal (cc GN2 1 
hr) 
Pressure Drop, Design Flow 
( psi) 
Insulation Resistance 
(megohms) 
Fuel Valve , siN 576 
Pull - in Voltage (vdc) 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Opening Response (sec) 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Closing Response (sec) 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Leakage : 
External (bubbles GN2 ) 
Internal (cc GN2 /hr) 
Pressure Drop , Design 
Flow (psi) 
Insulation Res i stance 
(megohms) 
Presterilization Postster il iza t io n 
14 .0 13 .2 
14 .0 13 .0 
0.0118 0 .0125 
0.0112 0 .0123 
0.0084 0 .0090 
0.0079 0 .0090 
Zero Zero 
Zero Zero 
27 . 5 29 .2 
500+ 500+ 
11 . 5 11 .3 
11.5 11 .3 
0 .0089 0 .0118 
0 ,0087 0 .0120 
0 ,0094 0 .0096 
o ,0091 0 .0087 
Zero Zero 
Zero Zero 
13 .8 14 .2 
500+ 500+ 
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E. COMPONENT DISASSEMBLY, INSPECTION , AND PERFORMANCE 
1. Propellant Tanks 
a. Oxidizer Tank 
A major problem occurred during the final cycle of first 
sterilizat ion series. With approximately 4 hr remaining in the 
constant temperature portion of the cycle, an oxidizer leak caused 
an automatic chamber shutdown. When the chamber cover was removed, 
an oxidizer vapor leak was detected on the lower fitting of the 
oxidizer tank . Since the tank was sterilized in the inverted po-
sition, the leak was coming from the gas side port . 
The tank was removed from the chamber and the lea k ~ate 
was measured without changing the tank's orientation. This was 
accomplished by removing the hand valve and cap from the gas side 
port and attaching a piece of tubing . The tubing was routed to 
a graduated cylinder. Tank liquid side pressure (top port) wa s 
increased to 60 psig using gaseous nitrogen as a pressurant . 
Liquid lea ka ge from th e gas side port was measured at 58 cc/minute . 
This indicated that liquid was passing through the diaphragm or 
around the diaphragm seal at the tank girth . X- ray pictures were 
taken of the tank to determine diaphragm position and liquid level . 
There appear ed to be gas pocke ts near the girth seal on the gas 
side of the diaphragm and the tank liquid surface was just at the 
girth weld . To establish the leakage point , the tank was plumbed 
to a receiver vessel as shown by Fig . V-12 and the receiver tank 
scale reading was taken . The two tank hand valves were opened 
and the liquid side was pressurized to 60 psig . An increasing 
scale reading indicated the liquid leak was still present . To 
determine the leakage point the leak was allowed to con tinue until 
liquid stopped flowing and ei ther gas was expe lled or no further 
flow of gas or liquid wa s noted . A stopping of liquid flow fol-
lowed by no gas flow cou ld indicate a quantity of liquid on th e 
gas side of the diaphragm . This could result from permeation of 
the Teflon diaphragm during temperature cycles and would not rep-
resent a leak in the normal sense. A continuation of gas flow 
after t ermination of liquid flow would indicate an uncovering of 
the leak point, Fig . V-13 . 
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GN2 Supply 
Regulator Receiver Tank 
Test Tank 
Scale 
Fig. V-12 Oxidizer Tank Le ak Measurement Schematic 
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Leak Point 
Gas Flow 
Fig. V-13 Determination of Leak 
Point during Drain 
At the completion of l iquid flow , a scale reading was 
taken and g as flow continued . Tipping the tank did not reestab-
lish the liquid flow and all indications were that the tank was 
empty . Si nce all liquid drained through the leak, the indication 
was that the leak was in the gas inlet port area. 
A decontamination process was initiated that consisted of 
placing the tank in an oven at 200°F . A gas ejector was connected 
to the tank gas port to hold the diaphragm i n place and a tube was 
inserted approximately 6 in. into the liquid side port and a gas -
eous nitrogen purge was ma i ntained . After two days of baking and 
purg ing , the contamination level was at 11 ppm and no further de -
crease could be noted . At this time decontamination was termin -
ated . 
Additiona l X- ray pictures were then taken and a bores cope 
inspection was att empted . A clear picture of the diaphragm was 
obtained indicating that the diaphragm was not in contact with the 
dome in the ar ea of the diaphragm seal . The borescope inspection 
was unsuccessful because the light was inadequate to get a clear 
image and the instrument could not be placed close enough to the 
inside surface to obtain any detail . 
The oxidizer tank was sectioned through the weld j oining 
the tank hemispheres so the diaphragm could be removed in one 
piece . The diaphragm retainer ring did not separate from the 
sectioned tank as expec t ed , and as a result some diaphragm damage 
Was incurred near the seal when removing it. 
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A leak test of the diaphragm after removal disclosed a 
leak at the apex of the hemisphere and another near the sea l . The 
leak near the seal may have been incurred when the diaphragm was 
removed from the tank. The leak at the apex, shown in Fig. V- 14, 
was identified before the tank was sectioned . The failure of the 
diaphragm at the apex is attributed to a high stress concentration 
imposed at the failure point because of the sudden change in cro ss-
section area at that point (Fig . V- 1S). The original design called 
for a gentle taper over the cross section area change, however , it 
was not provided in the finished part. 
Creases in the removed diaphragm shown in Fig . V- 14, V- 16 , 
and V-1 7 , while not desirable did not disclose any leakage. The 
creases resulted from a slightly oversized hemispherical diaphragm 
with respect to the hemi spherical tank internal dimensions . In 
addition to providing potential leakage points in the diaphragm, 
these creases also create voids be tween the diaphragm a nd tank 
wall that provide additional gas side volume for propellant per-
meation . Future diaphragms of this type should be designed so 
that a small amoun t of stretch is required to prevent accumula-
tion of material and subsequent creases . TFE -FEP diaphragms may 
be stretched up to 2% before the material begins to yie ld. The 
diaphragm design stretch must be considered for the wor st case 
during sterilization and the tank wall growth must also be con-
sidered . 
This failure resulted in further investigation of the dia-
phragm permeation mechani sm and the affect of diaphragm leakage 
on other sterilization program objectives. 
The main concern presented by diaphragm leakage is insuf -
ficient oxidizer to complete the planned 280 - sec hot f ire demon-
s tration . Oxidizer depletion could cause engine shutdown in a 
fuel -ri ch condition . This would not be detrimental to the engine 
but would cut the hot fire demonstration short . 
The diaphragm was to be positioned at the bottom of the 
tank with the propellant hydrostatic head maintaining it in in-
timate contact with the tank wall . This would prevent diaphragm 
flexing during system sterilization , thereby extending its useful 
life . If the diaphragm leaks , this positioning would be unsatis -
factory because the propellant transferred to the gas side would 
not provide the expulsion efficiency required for successful sy s-
tem operation . The problem is trapping of usable propellant on 
the ga s side during expulsion. 
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Fig. V-14 Diaphragm Ape x Patch 
Diaphragm Material Ape x Patch 
~ ____ '--_..., / Le a kage 
As Received Buildup 
Design Requirement 
Fig . V-IS Diaghragm Ape x Patch 
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Fig . V-16 Oxidizer Tank Diaphragm 
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Fig. V-17 Ox idizer Tank Diaphragm Seal Area 
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Teflon permeation to N2 04 liquid and vapor was reviewed 
to assure complete understanding of the permeation mechanism and 
the effect of permeation on the containment of the liquid propel -
lant during the sterilization cycle. 
In a crack-free diaphragm that has no pin holes , the mech -
anism of permeation occurs in three distinct steps: 
1) Solution of permeant into diaphragm - The permeant 
dissolves into the permeable Teflon membrane on the 
side of its higher concentration . High absorption 
of N2 04 into the Teflon is evidenced by swelling of 
the membrane; 
2) Diffusion of permeant through the membrane - The per -
meant diffuses through the membrane to the side of 
lower concentration . (The process depends on the 
formation of 1tho les " in the plastic network due to 
thermal agitation of the chain segments . ); 
3) Evaporation on the low concentration side of the 
membrane - The permeant emerges as vapor due to 
evaporation on the low concentration side of the 
membrane. 
Generalization of permeation by activated diffusion is 
governed as follows : 
1) Permeation rate increases exponentially with temper-
ature; 
2) Permeation is essentially independent of hydrostatic 
pressure; 
3) Materials of the same molecular size that wet the 
membrane permeate at a higher rate; 
4) Once nitrogen tetroxide is absorbed in the Teflon 
membrane, the di ffusion through the lattice is molec -
ular in nature; 
5) The driving force required for permeation to occur 
is the differential partial pressure, gas pressure, 
or vapor pressure (different mole concentration) 
between the two environments separated by the mem-
brane. 
j 
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In contrast to permeation by activated diffusion, the 
mechanism of permeation through porous materials does not cause 
the permeating molecule to change from undissolved to dissolved 
and does not form transient holes in its passage. Further, small 
pin holes or cracks in the membrane result in liquid leakage, 
which is completely unacceptable. 
Because of the diaphragm leak, its position during ster -
ilization as affected by leakage and the risk to program comple -
tion were reevaluated. The analysis indica tes that the tank 
diaphragm with potential leakage points should be sterilized in 
an upward position to prevent an unacceptable amount of propel-
lant from transferring to the tank pressura nt side. Further, 
with a diaphragm sterilized in the upward position , the amount 
of flexing due to thermal cycling can be a maximum of approxi -
mately 6.5 in . in amplitude, which would be an accepta ble condi-
tion for a 8.25 - in.-radius hemispherical diaphragm . 
The positioning of the diaphragm in the prope llant t a nk 
during sterilization becomes critica l under certain conditions . 
To evaluate the most desirable position, the effect of various 
pertinent conditions were investigated . These conditions are 
presented in Table V-9. The items noted by land 2 are desir-
able; 3, 4 , and 5 are undesirable; and 6 and 7 are unacceptable 
for diaphragm positioning during sterilizations . 
The tank assembly for the system demonstration test con -
tains a leaking diaphragm and has a small tank outlet volume. 
For these conditions, Table V-9 shows that sterilization with 
the diaphragm in the bot tom of the tank would be unacceptable . 
If the diaphragm were positioned in the top of the tank, the re-
sult of the sterili zation would be acc ep table . 
Calculations for the exi sting oxidizer tank assembly hav -
ing a small tank outlet volume of approximately 1.548 eu in. sup-
porting the above evaluation are presented in Appendix B. In 
addition, Appendix C presents calculations of propellant level 
and ullage during sterilization. 
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Table V-9 Diaphra gm Positions 
Condi tions 
(tank outlet volume 
includes voids between Expected 
Di aphra gm Position diaphragm and tank wall) Result 
Top of Tank Leak in diaphragm 
Large tank outlet volume 3 5 
Small tank outlet vo lume 3 5 
Zero tank ou tle t volume 2 
No leak in diaphragm 
Large tank outlet volume 3 4 
Small tank outlet volume 1 
Zero tank outlet vo lume 2 
Bottom of Tank Lea k in diaphragm 
Code: 
Lar ge tank outlet volume 6 7 
Small tank outlet vo lume 6 7 
Zero tank outlet volume 2 
No leak in diaphragm 
Lar ge tank outlet volume 7 
Small tank outlet volume 2 4 
Zero tank outlet volume 2 
1 Minimum (ma x imum of 2 in . ) amplitude diaphragm flex 
for each heat cycle . 
2 Negligible diaphragm movement . 
3 Lar ge (maximum of 6 . 5 in . ) amplitude diaphragm flex 
for each heat cycle . 
4 Overall tan k heat rate sensitive . 
5 Uncertainty in position of leak and amount of propel -
lant transfer to pressurant side . 
6 Excessive propellant on gas side after sterilization . 
7 Flex of diaphragm and entrapment of vapor bubble below 
sea 1 . 
I 
I 
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Diaphragm flexing will occur depending on the tank heat 
input rate and distribution. Considering a diaphragm leaking at 
the apex of the hemisphere with the diaphragm positioned in the 
tank bottom, propellant will leak under the hydrostatic head of 
approximately 1 psi filling the pressure side tank outlet volume. 
The tank outlet volume is approximately 1.548 cu in. If the heat 
input is assumed to reach the propellant in the outlet (a wor st-
case condition during the sterilization heat cycle) before the 
propellant side is affected the propellant on the pressurant side 
will heat to 27SoF with a resulting vapor pressure of ~800 psia . 
Under these conditions, the liquid previously at 70°F equivalent 
to 0.08 lb [see Fig. V-18Ca)] would expand and vaporize result-
m 
ing a large gas bubble that would separate the diaphragm from the 
wall. 
0.08 lb 
V-47 
m 
Propellant 800 psia expanded 
to 275°F and 
14.7 psia 
(a) (b) (c) 
Fig . V- 18 Oxidizer Tank Dia phragm Configurations and Propellant Heights 
during Sterilization 
Figure V-18(b) shows 0 . 08 lb of N2 04 at 275°F and 800 m 0 . 08 lb _ 3 psia would occupy 9 . 3 lb/cu ft - 0.008 f t of space or 13 . 8 cu 
in., thereby raising the liquid level approximately 0 . 1 in. This 
amount of gas , if it occupied an annulus below the seal at the 
tank O.D. having a height of 1.0 in . would be approximately 0 . 8 
in. wide or would separate the diaphragm 0 . 8 in . from the tank 
wall just below the seal. If the bulk temperature of the propel-
lant remains at 70°F and 14.7 psia while the propellant in the 
pressurant side outlet volume is heated to 275°F, the 13 . 8 cu in . 
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of vapor at 800 psia would expand to 75 cu in . if the final vapor 
pressure were 14.7 psia. Expansion to 14 .7 psia would cause t he 
liquid level to rise approx imately 0. 43 in. [see Fig . V-18(c)]. 
Further, as the gas rises from the pressurant s ide outlet 
volume, more propellant will leak into this cavity continually 
increasing the propellant quantity on the pressurant side until 
an equilibrium condition is reached. 
If the tank were sterilized in the upright configuration , 
i.e., the diaphragm in the top of the tank, the vapor that wo uld 
leak through or permeate the diaphragm during equilibrium condi -
tions at 275°F would amount to approximately 0 . 0083 l b . If this 
m 
quantity were expanded to 27 5°F and 800 ps ia , a cond ition would 
exist in which the diaphragm wou l d be pushed away f ro m the top 
of the tank wall by less than lin . 
Various conditions of volume due to permeat io n and lea k-
age as a function of diaphragm position are presented in Table 
V-l O. 
Table V- lO Volume due to Permeatio n and Leakage as a Func tion 
of Diaphragm Po sition 
Propel l ant 
Volume Expa nded t o Vo lume Exp Weight Diaphragm Prope llant (l bm) 
Temperature Volume @ 800 psia 14 . 7 psia and 70°F 14 . 7 ps i a 
anded t o 
a nd 27 5°F 
n . ) Posi t ion Sta t e CO F) and 275°F (cu in . ) (cu in . ) (cu i 
Top of Permeated 0 . 008 275 1 . 548 21. 6 84 . 5 
Tank or leaked Vapor Vapo r Vap or 
vapor 
Botton Prope llant 0 . 080 70 1. 548 13 . 8 75 . o 
of Tank Leak Liquid Liquid Vap or 
Liq uid 
Non1eak Permeated 0 . 008 275 1 . 548 21. 6 84 . 5 
Di a phragm Vapor Vapor Va po r Va p or 
Bo t tom 
I 
J 
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b . Fuel Tank 
The fuel tank poststerilization functional test consisted 
of an expulsion test at -1 g conditions and an external leakage 
test. Inasmuch as the fuel tank had been subjected to steriliza-
tion testing in the inverted position, a partial expulsion was 
first made in the +1 g orientation to fill the propellant trap. 
Subsequent attempts to perform -1 g expulsions resulted in ex-
pulsion of only a portion of the capacity of the trap. Further-
more, the effluent was a mixture of gas and liquid throughout the 
expulsion sequence. The quantit y of fuel expelled during the 
various explusion attempts responded to the method used to fill 
the trap. Since the intent of the poststerilization functional 
test was to assess heat-induced degradation , the resutts show in 
Table V-2 represent the expulsions associated wi th the most ef -
fective trap filling technique. The 0.96-lb quantity expelled 
at -1 g conditions Was demonstrated after the tank had been in 
the - 1 g attitude for about 16 hr . Completely gas - free flow Was 
not attained in any of the several - 1 g expulsion tests . 
A sample of the MMH fuel wa s taken from the fuel tank test 
item after about half of the SO-lb load had been expelled. The 
laboratory analysis, shown in Table V-l1 indicated that no sig -
nificant degradation of the fuel had taken place . The fuel was 
still water -white at the end of the Phase II sterilization test -
ing, indicating that no oxidation had taken place and the slight 
increase in vapor pressure observed during sterilization was 
minor. 
Table V-ll MMH Gas Chromatograph Analysis Results 
Component Volume Fraction (~ 
Monomethyl Hyd razine 98 . 95 
Nitrogen 0.12 
Ammonia 0.09 
Water 0.70 
Unknown 0.14 
Note: MMH from th e Tas k II fuel tank after 
sterilization, LAB Repor t 67B2123 . 
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After the initial attempts to obtain single - phase liquid 
flow under - 1 g conditions , a short test program was initiated 
to accomplish two objectives . The first objective was to estab-
lish a t a nk fill technique which would assure filling of the trap 
so that - 1 g operation of the trap could be determined exclusive 
of sterilization effects . The second objective was to demonstrate 
initiation of positive 1 g outflow without gas entrainment to 
as sure proper engine opera tion during the module firing . 
The tank had been filled initially by evacuating the tank 
in the upright position and allowing fuel to fill through the 
outlet port. This resulted in some fuel vapor caused by fuel 
flashing into the vacuum . Load was determined by checking the 
weight of the source vessel during tank fill. At the completion 
of fill only propellant liquid and vapor were in the tank, result-
ing i n a tank pressure of approximately 2 psia under ambient con-
ditions . This technique could result in fuel vapor being held 
in the trap with consequent trap performance degradation. The 
second technique used for filling involved overfill of the tank 
and subsequent drain back to the proper load. This sequence was 
accomplished by filling the tank und e r a 1 atmosphere blanket of 
nitrogen in the upright position until th e tank was completely 
filled, i . e ., liquid fuel flowed from th e gas inlet port . At 
this time the tank was inverted and liquid was flo wed into the 
gas inlet port until all bubbles from the liquid outlet port were 
removed . The tank was then rotated to the upright position and 
nitrogen was introduced at the gas inlet port to drain back to 
the correct load. The quantity drained was collected in a r e -
ceiver vessel on a scale to determin e proper drain back . As a 
check, the propellant tank was weighed when empty and a gain after 
fill . The desired load was 51 . 03 lb and the amount loaded was 
50 . 70 lb which is well within the loading accuracy required. 
Under this load condition the tank was outflowed in the 
upright position and f l ow wa s ob s erved in a sight glass . No ga s 
flow was noted and after a flow of approximately 10 lb of fu e l 
the tank was inverted and - 1 g outflow was attempted. Again a 
two-phase mixture was expelled with almost the same total liquid 
weight that had been expelled using the vacuum loading technique. 
As a result of the special testing accomplished on the 
fuel tank during the completion of Phase II, it was decided that 
the overfill loading technique would be used on the module fuel 
tank . In this way single phase liquid outflow t o the engine will 
be assured even though - 1 g outflow will not be attempted as a 
part of the firing sequence . 
- - - ----- -~ - --- --
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Upon completion of the expulsion tests, the fuel tank was 
decontaminated and then cut in two at the girth weld. After clean-
ing , the lower half containing the screen trap (Fig. V-19), was 
subjected to a leak and bubble test . The weld joint proved to be 
intact and the first leak appeared at the outer row of rivet s, 
where the titanium is riveted to the stainless steel trap (see 
arrows, Fig. V- 20) . This leak started at 5 in. of H2 0 pressure . 
The screen started bubbling at 8 in . of H2 0 pressure at the sand-
wich connection edge and through the screen . 
The screen trap was then separated from the tank half and 
a hole drilled in the upper plate to permit gas pressure injec-
tion . The trap unit was then subjected to a bubble check. Leaks 
sta rted at the closure plate riveted connection (Fig. V-3) at l~ 
in. of H2 0 pressure. 
The above test indicates that the screen trap was func -
tioning properly although the bubble point was lower than when 
installed; therefore , some other factor was responsible for the 
two - phase flow indicated earlier . 
An examination of the trap and tank assembl y indicated 
that there was a suspect area , namely, the flow area between the 
sma ller diameter base of the cone frustum and the tank wall. It 
appears that on fabrication, this area was smaller than had been 
anticipated due t o shop tolerances . I f this area should provide 
a restriction in excess of the bubble point of the trap closure 
plate rivets (l ~ in . of H2 0) then the two - phase flow wo uld indeed 
occur . 
To t e st this theory, accurate measurements were made of 
th e tank and trap (see Append i x A) and calculation showed that 
the pressure drop at rated flow was equivalent to 2.663 in . of 
H2 0 pressure . Therefore, two - phase flow would occur due to a 
breakdown of the trap at the closure plate rivets . 
2 . Pressure Regulator 
The results of the poststerilization tests on the pressure 
regulator showed that the regulation characteristics were sub-
stantially the same as those exhibited at th e midsterilization 
po int, i.e., the regulation band was approximately 15 psig below 
the specification value. This indicated that the shift in regu -
lation band that occurred during the first set of six steriliza-
tion cycles did not progress measurably during the second six 
cycles. The internal leakage of the regulator had i ncreased by 
a factor of four over the results obtained during the midsterili-
zation functional test. Th e leaka ge rate did not change after 
exercising the regulator . 
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Fig. V-19 Fuel Tank Screen Trap Assembly 
Fig . V-20 Fuel Tank Screen Trap Leakage Points 
___ ~ ___ - - - - - - --- . - - ~ ~-- -----r-~ 
MCR-68-119 
Tear down of the unit started at the square flange holding 
the inlet tube and filter to the main body . The four screws re-
quired very low torque to loosen (approx imately 5-in.-lb). 
The filter , Fig. V-2l, showed some accumulation of dirt on 
the upstream side, but this was not excessive. 
The area inside the unit in the vicinity of the poppet was 
heavily coated with moisture. 
The tungsten carbide ball poppet, Fig. V-22, was coated with 
oxide. The contact area of the stainless steel poppet seat was 
bright as were the sliding areas along the poppet guide . Several 
other bright areas (see arrows) around the seat contact indicated 
a probable contaminant rubbing of the oxide coat . No contaminants 
could be seen in the seat area at this time. 
The low torque required to loosen the square flange holding 
screws indicates a relaxation of the holding force during steri-
lization cycling. This was probably the cause of the external 
leak at this point in the poststerilization testing. It is recom-
mended that future designs incorporate an increased number of 
holding screws to six or eight , and/or change the hard seat cone 
seal to a flat flange with a spring - loaded metallic seal (K-type 
seal) . 
The presence of moisture inside the unit and the bright spots 
along the poppet seat contact indicates that contaminants could 
have damaged the body seat and are responsible for the higher in -
ternal leak. Future designs may consider a downstream filter to 
trap back flow contaminants and/or exercise care in system blow -
down procedure to assure complete pressure relief on the down -
stream side. 
A corrective action for the shift in pressure band is dis-
cussed in Section A of this chapter . 
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Fig. V-2l Regulator Internal Filter 
Fig. V-22 Regulator Poppet Ball 
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3. Solenoid Valve 
There was no measurable change in the performance of the 
solenoid valve; however, the dielectric strength of the solenoid 
coil showed degradation during the last six heat sterilization 
cycles. Moisture may have had condensed inside the potted area 
since the valve is not hermetically sealed. To check this theory 
the unit was placed in a vacuum oven at a pressure of 24 in. of 
Hg below local ambient and a temperature of 250°F for a total 
period of 32 hr. After cooling down to room temperature, the 
unit still indicated about 22 microamps to 500 vac. It was then 
discovered that the measuring instrument was in error. A small 
circuit breaker in the instrument was opening at 22 microamps 
and the instrument could not read above this point. The unit 
was then retested on a hi-pot - type instrument. This test shows 
approximately 500 microamps leakage current at 500 vac , as shown 
in Table V-4. This increase in leakage current indicates a very 
definite degradation in dielectric strength. 
The unit was sent to the vendor for disassembly and failure 
anal ys is. When tested by the vendor with 500 vdc applied from 
Pin A or Pin B to case, the insulation resistance was less than 
1 megohm . The resistance from Pin A to Pin B (through the coil) 
was 22 ohms, which is the nominal requirement. 
The unit was then disassembled, while measuring the insula-
tion resistance at each step; namely, after connector plate screws 
were removed, after connector was removed, after potting compound 
was removed, and after the shell was removed . The insulation 
resistance and coil resistance remained relatively constant 
throughout the disassembly process . 
The insulation on the outside of the coil winding was charred 
black (Fig. V-23) . The magnet wire used for the coil was No. 27 
single Formvar . According to the Bridgeport Insulated Wire Com-
pany's catalog , the rated temperature limit for Formvar insula-
tion is 221°F. The varnish used in wet winding the coil , Tri 
Var No . 116, is also rated at 221°F. 
Any future design should be sp ec ific in calling out a Teflon-
coated wire insulation or some other high temp erature-type in -
sulation that is definitely suitable for extended exposure to 
sterilization temperatures. Coil impregnation, coil wrappings, 
and potting compounds must also be included in this high tem-
perature category . 
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Fig. V-23 Solenoid Valve Coil 
4 . Filter 
There was no measurable change in the flow chara c t eristics of 
the f ilte r, as shown in Table V-5. Press ure drop through the fil-
ter at de s ign flow rate remained at zero (no measurable pressure 
drop using a differential pressure transducer having a range of 
o to 5 psi) . 
Fo llowing the flow capacity tests , the unit was subject e d to 
a bubble point check . With GN2 pressure applied at the inlet sid e 
and the outlet wetted and covered with methanol , th e bubble point 
was between 17.25 and 17.5 in . of H2 0 . This shows a de gradation 
from the a cceptance test figures that we re be t ween 22 and 24 .2 in . 
of H2 0. However , this is still with in the acceptable range sin c:e 
th e minimum spec ifi cation bubble point for this filter weave is 
15 . 9 in. of H2 0 . Future designs should incorporate an allowanc e 
in the a cceptance test to allow for some degradation . 
---,- -~ ---
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The unit was cut open (Fig. V- 24) and examined. No d i r t was 
ev ident on th e inlet side and no separation was v i s ibl e a long the 
welded joints or on the screen surface. 
Fig. V- 24 Component Te st Filter Disassembly 
5 . Hand Shutoff Valve 
The hand shutoff valve continued to leak internall y a t the 
limiting torque value of 10 in. - lb used throughout the test . 
However , at the conclusion of all sterilization test i ng , t he 
valve exhibited zero internal leaka ge (zero cc in 15 minute s ) 
when the stem was torqued closed to 16 to 17 in. - lb . The valve 
should therefore be judged satisfactory from the standpoint of 
shutoff capability . 
The external leakage at the conclusion of the steriliza t ion 
test wa s substantially unchanged from that observed at the mid -
sterilization point , being in the neighborhood of 1 x 10-
5 scc/ 
sec of helium . The leakage was noted at the bonnet ca p , i ndicat -
ing that both the stem packing and the bonnet cap seal were lea k-
ing . Maximum allowable leakage is specified at 1 x 10-
8 scc/sec 
of helium at 935 psig . 
Disassembly of the valve, Fig. V-25 disclosed a very hea vy 
coating of white , powdery, aluminum oxide on the exposed portion 
of the poppet. This was most severe on the 1100 - 0 poppet nose 
(Fig . V- 26) . The oxidation of the anodized body wa s very s l ight . 
V-5 7 
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Fig . V-25 Hand Valve Disassembly 
The s t em chevron Teflon packing showed considerable extrusion 
be t ween t he stem and the backup washer (Fig. V-27) . The stem 
measured 0 . 2476 in . in diameter in the region covered by the chev -
ron packing , and the backup washer was 0.2815 in. at the inner 
d iameter . This left a diameter clearance of 0.0339 in . 
The heavy oxide coating was anticipated because material 
t es ts did show reaction between aluminum alloys and the oxidizer 
at s terilization temperatures. Future designs should consider 
all- titanium construction with a bellows-type stem seal. 
The Teflon packing ex trusion could have caused the external 
l e a kage reported in the poststerilization test results by pe r -
mi t t ing a relaxation of the sealing force . The diametral clear -
ance between stem and washer is excessive and future tests could 
de t ermine maximum clearance versus gland nut torque over extended 
per i ods at sterilization temperatures . 
A program was initiated to improve the stem cap seal [Fig . 
V- 28(a») , since some leaka ge of the Teflon stem packing must be 
expe c ted with operation. As a first step the 1100 aluminum alloy 
g a skets were annealed to the soft condition (1100-0) and maximum 
al lowable torque was applied to the cap. The test unit still 
l e a ked under these conditions. Examination of the unit indicated 
a combination of effects were probably preventing the use of a 
me t a l lic seal. Surfac e finish on the valve body and inside the 
ca p along with out-of-parallel seal surfaces were the main contri -
b u tors . 
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Fig. V -26 Hand ValVl' Poppet 
Fig. V-27 Hand Valve Stern Seal Chevrons 
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The valve was reassembled using thin (0.010 in.) Teflon ga skets 
on each surface of the soft aluminum gasket . Although lea kage was 
decreased considerably, it was not eliminated. In addition the 
Teflon sheet was extruded from between the aluminum washer and 
the valve body and the valve cap . This extrusion process would 
probably continue until virtually no Teflon remained between the 
metal surfaces. At that time the seal loading would be equal to 
the compressive yield strength of the Teflon. With heating and 
cooling, this seal load would be reduced until the seal would be 
ineffective . 
Two other approaches were tried a s shown in Fig . V- 28(b) and 
(c) . Soft aluminum seals with single and double serra tions a nd a 
combination a - ring and aluminum spa cer ring were used . The a lu-
minum seals with serrations did not solve the problem because of 
the surface finishes involved . The combination a - ring a nd spacer 
ring, however, proved to be tight under hand torques. Several 
installations were tried in two different test units with no leak-
age detected in either case. The valves were soaked in an oven 
at approximately 250°F for 24 hr , followed by a mass spectrometer 
leak check using helium at 950 psig . There was no indication of 
leakage. The Viton rubber O- rings we re good for operating tem-
peratures up to 400°F . This material, wh ile not completely com-
patible with the propellants , resists attac k of both oxidizer and 
fuel . It was decided that the module units would be modified to 
use the a-ring seal because the stem cap seal is a secondary seal 
and at worst would see dilute propellant vapors . 
An additional problem involved leakage from the stem packing 
nut lock device, Fig . V-28(c) . This locking device consists of 
a nylon plug backed up by a set screw . During the stem cap seal 
tests this lock frequently leaked. As a repair for the two valves 
in test, a Teflon plug was cut and installed with the set screw . 
The screw was torqued into the body until it was we ll below the 
external body threads . The cavity behind (on the outside of) the 
set screw was packed with Devcon WR. Devcon WR is a suspens ion 
of metal particle s in an epoxy resin and i s generally u sed a s 
metal patching compound . Although the epoxy resin is probably 
not compatible with either the fuel or oxidizer , it was used be-
cause of this particular application . The area of possible con-
tact is the clearance area between the set screw threads and the 
valve body . In additi on on l y a dilute mixture of propellant 
vapor and air trapp ed in the cap vo lume wou ld contact the material . 
Although some degradation might take place at th e surface, com-
plete breakdown is not anticipated. This modification proved 
adequate for the test units and was also added to the module 
valves . 
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6 . Or dnanc e Valve 
The re was no cha nge i n the performance (i . e ., leakage char -
a cteristics) of t he ordna nce va lve a fter exposure to the 12 ster -
ilizatio n cycles. The va lve exhibited zero internal and external 
leakage wh en chec ked with the hel i um ma ss spectrometer leak de -
tector . Fo llowi ng t he l ea ka ge tests , the normally- closed portion 
of the valve wa s f ir ed open with t he same s quib which had been 
exposed to all st eri liza tion tests in the valve . The pressure 
drop of the valv e was then measured a t the design conditions for 
the propulsion mo dule pre s suran t gas supply at the propella nt 
tanks . Following t he f l ow ca pa ci t y te st, the normally - open sec -
tion of the valve was fi r ed closed for the fina l leaka ge t est . 
I nternal l ea kage was agai n zero; however, external leakage of 
helium at t he inlet fl a nge mecha nica l seal had increased from 
zero t o 7.3 x 10- 7 sc c/sec . 
The fla nged j o int of t he unit wa s disassembled . The three 
holding screw s req uired co nsidera ble torque to loosen . The alu -
minum gasket showe d a good imp r in t of the circular ridges and was 
spr ead out ti gh tly a gai ns t the body section . 
The ex t ernal lea ka ge indic a ted a t -the fl a nge joint during 
postfiring t e sts ca n on l y be at tribu t ed to closing forces of the 
s quib actuator. Future des i gn or application should incorporate 
a welded tube design a s t h i s is t he on l y t r u l y hermet i c seal . At-
t empts to de sign a hermetic bo l ted seal always poses problems of 
d i f fe r ential expa ns ion be t ween dissim i lar flanges and seals. In 
this cas e an aluminum f la nge wa s bolted to a titanium flange with 
sta i nl e ss stee l ma chine screws and the seal was aluminum of a 
d i ffe r ent alloy from t hat of the aluminum flange . Even when 
simila r ma terials a re used , there is a problem of heat sink, and 
whe n t r a nsi en t temperatures are involved , there can still be a 
d i ffe r e nt i al movement un l ess the masses and exposed areas are 
exa c tl y a li ke . 
7 . Thru st Chamber Valves 
In genera l, the performance of the thrust chamber valves was 
no t advers e l y affected by the sterilization series . A minor devi -
ation was noted in the response time , which increased by 1 to 2 
mse c , altho ugh t here was a slight decrease in the pull - in volt -
age . Thi s would indicate that internal friction had not increased . 
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F. RELIABILITY EVALUATION 
A reliability estimate was performed on the system. The 
generic failure rates were based on Martin Marietta data. The 
calculations were divided into two major phases, launch and cruise, 
and burn (Table V-12) . 
The launch and cruise phase has a duration of 6500 hr. Two 
modes are considered during this phase and are weighed differently. 
Tanks and associated hardware are considered semi-operational for 
the entire duration , while the remainder of the system is in a 
completely dormant mode . A factor of 0.1 x G
FR 
is applied to the 
first category, and 0 .01 x GFR for the second. 
The burn lasts approximately 300 sec and the standard factor 
of 1000 x GFR is applied for this phase. 
Review of hardware problems experienced during the component 
sterilization and test procedures revealed no evidence that any 
significant degradation of system performance should be assessed 
to sterilization. The sample size prohibits definite conclusions 
concerning the dynamic effect of heat sterilization on the system. 
Instances of material changes were identified and further testing 
would be required to establish the limits of shift ranges. Addi -
tional testing would also be required to validate pertinent fixes 
prescribed. It appears that solution of the problems documented 
would exclude these as reliability risks in future operation . 
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Tabl e V-1 2 St eril i zab le Liqui d Propulsion System Reliability E s t im~te 
-
Launch and Burn 
GFR/10
6 Crui s e Phase, Phase Total 
Components (Quantity) 6500 hr (0 .083 hr) Mi ss ion Re li a b il it Y 
Propellant Diaphragm 1.5 . 001950 . 000246 .002196 . 997804 
Tank (2) 
N2 Storage Tank 0 . 18 . 000117 . 000015 . 000132 . 999868 
Press Regulator 0 . 7 . 000046 . 000058 .000105 . 999895 
Filter (3) 0 .04 .000008 . 000009 . 000017 . 999983 
Ordnance Valve 1000 -- -- .0050 , 995000 
N,C. (5) 
Ordnance Valve 10 -- -- ,000050 , 999950 
N.O , (5) 
Thrust Chamber 2 , 27 . 000295 ,000374 .000669 . 999331 
Valves (2) 
Orifice Assembly (2) 0 ,01 , 000001 .000002 ,000003 , 999997 
Test Point (7) 0 . 01 ,000046 .000006 . 000052 . 999948 
Lines and Fittings 0 . 1 . 000065 .000008 . 000073 . 999927 
Structure 0 .001 -- -- - - . 99999 9 
Total System . 991581 
~----' 
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VI. SYSTEM ASSEMBLY AND TE ST 
A. SYSTEM FABRICATION AND ASSEMBLY 
This phase of the program involv ed the fabrication , a ssembly, 
checkout, and test of the complete propulsion system . Fabrica-
tion and assembly were separate steps. Fabricat i on consisted of 
building the structural truss (Fig. 111-3) , component mounting 
brackets, and othe r structural piece s . Assembly consisted of 
the mounting of supplier components on the truss , tubing develop -
ment , and welding and checkout of the complet ed system . The 
assembled module is shown in Fig. VI - l . 
During assembly , numerous leak check s were mad e t o avoid any 
significant disassembly for r epai r. The ' leak ch eck criteri on 
was severe for the hermitically sealed portions of the system . 
The fuel storage system, the oxidizer storage system, and the 
pressurant gas storage system were leak checked using a helium 
mass spectrometer~ No leak should be greater than 1 x 10-8 scc/ 
sec of helium at each system maximum operating pressure . The 
leakage criterion for the remainder of the system, which included 
the propellant feed systems, the engine, and the pressurant gas 
feed s y stem wa s less severe. In this case , bubble tightness at 
maximum operating pressure using gaseous nitrogen was the require -
ment. 
There was no difficulty in making the system leak tight. The 
functional tests were completed before module sterilizat i on . The 
baseline functional tests were performed on the module solenoid 
(GN2 loading) valve, the two thrust chamber valves, and the pres-
sure regulator as stipulated in the test plan . The results in -
dicated that the solenoid valve and the thrust chamber valves 
were performing satisfactorily. The pressure regulator exhibited 
excessive internal leakage and low pressure regulation . The 
leakage value was 68 sec/hr of GN2 compared to the allowable 
va lue of 10 sec/hr. Further, the regulation pressure was 241 to 
245 psig compared to the allowable of 248 ± 5 psig . The regulator 
wa s returned to the supplier for repair and adjustment so the 
sterilization exposure would be initiated with the regulation 
band in the required limits. The supplier ' s investigation re -
vealed a scratch mark in the regulator valve seat, presumably the 
result of passage of a foreign particle. The regulator seat was 
repaired, and the regulation spring was heat-treated at 325°F for 
24 hr at its working stress level to obviate the set- point deg -
radation exhibited by the component test regulator , 
VI - l 
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Fig. VI-l Assembled Propulsion Module 
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The inlet tube of the repaired regulator was indexed in-
correctly. Therefore, the inlet flange and tube assembly were 
removed in the Class 100 clean room and reinstalled in the correct 
po s ition. FolJowing installation in the module, the presteriliza-
tion functional tests were conducted. The results of the func-
tional test showed that the regulation band was within specifica-
tion limits; however, the internal leakage was again in excess 
of the allowable leakage (14.5 scc/hr, compared to the allowable 
10 scc/hr). 
Before the installation and functional test, the facility 
GN2 supply and exhaust interfaces at the module service panel 
were equipped with 5-micron nominal filters to protect the regu-
lator from contaminant particles in the supply gas and also from 
possible backflow of effluent GN2 • 
The performance of the pressure regulator was judged adequate 
for the desired performance of the module; therefore, no further 
testing was done. 
B. SYSTEM TEST FIXTURES 
The final proof of success of module sterilization was a sys -
tem hot firing . In the case of an actual spacecraft, system 
checkout or functional testing would probably not be possible 
after sterilization and before system usage. In the case of the 
test system, assurance was required that critical components were 
functional before the firing. To accomplish this, s pecial test 
fixtures were required . Critical components were considered to 
be the module regulator, the solenoid valve, and the engine thru s t 
chamber valves . Although the system ordnance valves were con-
sidered to be critical components, they could not be functionally 
checked because of their single usage capability. 
The test fi xture used for the regulator functional test is 
shown schematically in Fig. VI-2. This sy stem provides an ullage 
for the regulator to operate on along with all pertinent instru-
mentation necessary for performance measurement. Gas is in-
troduced upstream of the module line filter, passes through the 
filter and regulator and exists to the test fi xture just dOlvn-
stream of the regulator . 
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For the solenoid valve the functional test consisted of open-
ing and closing the valve. The solenoid valve is indicated as 
NVV in Fig. VI-2. With the line hand valve (NVHV) closed the 
opening of NVV results i n nitrogen tank pressure showing on P
nt . 
NVV was then closed and NVHV opened with P
nt returning to zero. 
Functional testing of the thrust chamber valves (Fig: VI -3) 
involved a response and internal and external leakage test. 
Nitrogen gas was introduced at 250 psig upstream of each valve 
and t hree valve actuations were made. The engine throat plug was 
then installed, and internal and external leak tests were con-
ducted. External leakage involved bubble checking all joints in 
the feed systems and thrust chamber valves . Internal leakage con-
sisted of attaching a tube to the engine throat plug and conduct-
ing a water displacement test. 
After completion of the functional tests, the test fi xtures 
were disc onnected from the module ports and the ports were capped. 
The system was then ready for the firing sequence. 
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C. TEST METHOD 
The propulsion module test method was basically defined by 
the Component and System Test Plan, MCR-67-20. In addition to 
the plan, detailed procedures were written to cover each sequence 
of module usage or test. Procedures written specifically for the 
module are: 
1) Propulsion module assembly; 
2) Propulsion module installation and removal; 
3) Firing tes t; 
4) Module propellant loading. 
Each procedure is complete and provides step-by-step direc-
tion. Lists of necessary equipment and instrumentation are pro-
vided along with a blank for signoff of each step by the tech-
nician. Decontamination and heat sterilization was covered by a 
procedure written to cover general operation of the chamber and 
was applicable to both the components and the assembled module. 
D. DECONTAMINATION AND STERILIZATION 
After module assembly and checkout, propellants were loaded. 
Propellant quantities were measured by we ighing the source con-
tainers before and after loading. The amount of fuel and oxi-
di zer loaded was 51.9 lb and 84.5 Ib ,respective l y . The fuel 
m m 
tank was loaded by an overfill technique to eliminate entrapment 
of a bubble in the fuel tank trap. This consisted of loading the 
fuel tank in the upright position through the liquid port until 
liquid fuel was expe lled from the gas port. The module was then 
inverted and liquid filling wa s resumed through the gas port until 
a ll ga s bubbles were expelled from the liquid port. The module 
was then returned to the upright position and nitrogen gas was 
introd uced into the gas port to drain back t o the co r rect load. 
The oxid i zer tank was then loaded with the module in the up-
right position using a vacuum l oad technique. The gas inlet port 
wa s evacuated, followed by evacuation of the liquid outlet port. 
Wh ile holding the vacuum on the gas inlet port, oxidizer wa s 
introduced at the liquid outlet port until the pro per quantity 
wa s load ed. 
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After loading, the module was installed on the sterilization 
chamber lid and the instrumentation and safety packages were 
connected . A final leak check of the systems was conducted and 
a leak was found at the oxidizer tank outlet ordnance valve. A 
vapor leak was noted at the valve crush gasket flange. Recommended 
torque of the screws on this flange was 40 in.-lb although 30 in . -
Ib had been used_ because of the heat sterilization environment . 
At 275°F the strength of the aluminum flange drops to the point 
where the tapped holes for the flange screws were near the yield 
point under the load created by the 800 psia oxidizer vapor pres-
sure . At this time it was decided to use longer screws with nuts 
at the prescribed 40 in . -lb of torque. The screws were replaced 
in all five ordnance valve flanges one at a time without flange 
disassembly or replacement of the gaskets. For this operation, 
propellants were not unloaded although the gas vessel nitrogen 
pressure was reduced to 1 atmosphere. While the new screws and 
nuts were torqued , the flanges bottomed out (this was not the 
case at 30 in. - lb). A final leak check indicated no further 
leakage. 
As the final item of preparation of the module for decontam -
ination and sterilization testing, the module hand shutoff valves 
were equipped with stem cap seals. The stem lockscrew holes were 
filled on the outside of the lockscrew with the Devcon WR epoxy 
resin . After opening the required valves to admit the propellant 
tank pressure to the pressure transducers and safety package, the 
stem caps were installed and torqued to the 90 in. - lb specifica -
tion value. 
The installation of the propulsion module in the decontamina -
tion/sterilization chamber is shown schematically in Fig. VI-4 . 
The module fuel tank was connected so that the tank could be 
pressure drained if uncontrolled decomposition of the MMH occurred 
by operating remotely controlled valves. 
The first cycle of the required six ethylene oxide decontam -
ination cycles was started, but was aborted shortly after the 
26-hr exposure period started. This abort was caused by an in -
ability to control chamber temperature. After a series of check 
runs, the problem of uncontrolled heating of the chamber was 
traced to Joule heating of the sterilant gas by the blower. In 
addition, problems were encountered in the relative humidity 
control and monitoring systems. 
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During the initial heating phase of the several attempts at 
the first cycle, it became apparent that the 132°F water supply 
temperature to the chamber heat exchanger was not hot enough to 
maintain the required temperature ascent s c hedule. This was 
attributed to the thermal load created by the propulsion module , 
be c au s e the chamber heating system had performed satisfactorily 
with 132°F water during the qualification tests (no test item 
in chamber) . To accommodate the thermal load of the module, the 
operating procedure was changed to permit operation of the chamber 
water sup ply system at 150°F during the initial 1.5-hr heating and 
humidity conditioning phase . Since that phase of the test does 
not i nvolve the use of steri l ant gas, the specification constraint 
of 132°F maximum heater temperature for heating a s terilant gas 
environment wa s not violated. With this change the first cycle 
was completed without incident. Some initial adjustment of the 
humidity control system was required to maintain the desired 
range of relative humidity (Alnor dewpoint) . A da t a h i s t ory of 
t he first ETO cycle is shown in Fig . VI-5. 
The se c ond cy c le was started approximately 3 hr after the 
f i r s t cyc l e was completed. Due to a procedural oversight, the 
heating water temperature was maintained at 132°F instead of 
150°F ; therefore , the ascent to the desired chamber temperature 
of 122°F required 2 . 3 hr. The balance of the test was completed 
without significant incident . Figure VI-6 shows the chamber 
temperature rose slowly to a max imum temperature of 130°F during 
the latter part of the test. This temperature rise was caused by 
setting the cold water bleed flow at too iowa rate just before 
the period of unattended chamber operation. 
Sterilant gas consumption due to chamber leakage remained in 
the range of 4 to 5 lb/hr. Automatic control of humidity was 
maintained throughout the test, although the control set point 
was slightly higher than desired, as from the relative humidity 
history. A chamber gas sample was taken during the test; however, 
the sample container capacity was inadequate for effective purging 
of the Orsat analyzer . A larger container was acquired after the 
second cycle had been completed . 
The third through sixth cycles were completed without incident . 
A sample of chamber gas was taken during the third cycle. The 
sample assayed at only 18% by volume ethylene oxide (ETO) compared 
to the specification value of 27.3%. Investigation showed that 
the samp l e temperature was such that the vapor pressure of ETO 
was very close to the 22 psia pressure of the sample. To obtain 
assurance that the ETO fraction was in the vapor state, it was 
decided to heat subsequent samples to 120°F before conduction the 
Orsat analysis . During the forth cycle a chamber gas sample was 
taken and assayed at 26.5% ETO content by volume. 
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The chamber heating problem was a slow increase in chamber 
temperature at a time when no heating water was being admitted 
to the chamber. The possible causes were thought to be an exo-
thermic reaction of the ETO with the water vapor , a reaction be-
tween the ETO and possible undetected propellant vapor leaking 
from the module, the heat load introduced with the 132°F sterilant 
gas makeup, or the Joule heating by the chamber blower. 
A systematic series of tests was made to obtain an explana-
tion of the uncontrolled temperature increase . The series cul-
minated in a test in which all chamber conditions were representa-
tive of a decontamination test, except the blower was turned off 
for an extended period . The chamber temperature decayed slowly 
during this test, indicating that the dissipation of the blower 
energy was responsible for the temperature increase. 
Although this phenomenon has not been rigorously analyzed , 
the explanation is credited to the significant increase in blower 
horsepower requir.ed when circulating the relatively dense steri -
lant gas and the relatively low heat capacity of the sterilant 
gas. The phenomenon was not observed when operating with nitrogen 
gas in the chamber . 
The problem was resolved by providing a continuous low flow 
rate of tap wa ter (approximately 60°F temperature) into the cham-
ber heat exchanger . This water extracted heat at a slightly 
greater rate than that added by the blower and provides positive 
cooling in that the hot water control valve would be required to 
open periodically . This system had the adverse characteristic of 
cooling a fraction of the chamber heat exchanger below th e dew -
point causing cyclic condensation and reevaporation of water. 
This cyclic phenomenon was detected by an abrupt increase in the 
output of the sensitive electrohygrometer cell when the hot water 
admission valve was opened . Alnor dewpoint readings t aken dur -
ing this phenomenon proved that th e relative humidity excursions 
did not exceed the desired bandwid th of 45 to 55%. 
Future control systems for the wa ter supply system to the heat 
exchanger should incorporate a mixing control va lve . This valve 
would provide water temperatures at the heat exchanger ranging 
between the maximum of 132°F (55°C) and a minimum , which i s a 
safe margin above the dewpoint of the chamber gas . 
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Diff i culties encountered during the first decontamination 
te st demonstrated that , due to normal chamber leakage and possi -
ble hydrolysis of the ethylene oxide , frequent water vapor in -
jection was required . It became apparent that the open - loop sys -
t em wa s fe a sible only if an operator was constantly monitoring 
t h e hygrometer output since attempts at steady - state injection 
of wat er vapBr were unsuccessful . During these attempts, how -
ever , sufficient correlation between the recorded output of the 
electrohygrometer and the Alnor d ewpoint readings was ob t ained 
t o pe rmit instal l ation of a control microswitch on the hygrometer 
out p u t recorder. The funct i on of the microswitch was to open the 
su perheated s team inject i on valve whenever the hygrometer output 
dropped to midscale on the recorder and to reclose the valve as 
soon a s the hygrometer output signal responded with an increase 
in s i gnal on the recorder . A metering valve was installed in the 
s tea m i nject ion l ine to control the time constant of the system 
to prevent excessive excursions in relative humidity . 
The automatic control of relative humidity which evolved in 
the above manner proved to be entirely satisfactory through Test s 
2 thr u 6 . Humid i ty control was completely automatic; however , 
Alnor d ew poin t r eadings we r e t aken a t 1- to 2 - hr i n t erval s d ur -
i ng the day and evening work shifts . Alnor checks made on the 
morn i ngs following unattended night operation verified that the 
hygrometer recorder/controller was effective in maintaining the 
relat i ve humidi t y within specification limits with no operator 
atten t ion . 
When the decontamination test se r i e s was completed, the pro-
pulsion module was removed from the chamber to change the chamber 
to the heat sterilization configuration . The module remained 
mounted in the chamber lid and all connections from the module 
to the pressure transducers and safety packages remained undis-
turbed. 
Before starting the required series of six heat sterilization 
tests , the pressure in the module GN 2 storage tank was checked 
since the pressure was not monitored during decontamination or 
sterilization testing. The pressure in the GN 2 tank decayed from 
the original 1550 psig to 1120 psig over the 23 - day decontamina -
tion t est period . The GN2 leakage was traced to internal leakage 
through the transducer isolation valve (test equipment) . This 
valve permitted installation of a pressure transducer for the 
firing test after the decontamination and sterilization tests . 
It was decided that the module GN2 loading (solenoid) valve inlet 
port would be a suitable point to use for pressure measurement 
I 
~ 
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during the firing testj therefore, the transducer isolation valve 
and its connecting flared tubing were removed from the module. 
The module GN2 tank was recharged to 1500 psig with GN2 , then 
topped off to 1550 psig with helium as an aid in locating the 
source of any future leakage. 
Six heat sterilization cycles on the propulsion module were 
completed. Histories of the chamber temperature and propellant 
tank pressures for sterilization Cycles 1 and 6 are shown in 
Fig. VI-7 and VI-8 for the constant-temperature exposure period. 
All ,cycles were completed without significant incident with the 
exception of an automatic chamber shutdown during the latter part 
of Cycle 2. Shutdown was caused by a spurious signal from the 
chamber fuel vapor detector. Cycle time was resumed at T + 67.5 
hr after reheating the chamber and permitting the propellant vapor 
pressures to attain preshutdown values. 
Pressure in the module GN2 tank was checked at 1540 psig after 
completion of sterilizat ion Cycle 3 with the tank at room tempera-
ture, thus indicating that the GN2 sys tem was leak free. 
Pressure in the module fuel tank increased approximately 11 
psi during the six sterilization cycles, indicating very little 
fuel decomposition. Oxidizer tank pressures were as expected, 
averaging slightly over 800 psia during sterilization . 
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E, SYSTEM TEST FIRING 
After completion of ETO decontamination and heat steriliza -
tion, the module wa~ ready to be moved to the firing stand, The 
preparations for removing it from the chamber required that the 
hand valve positions be changed so the safety relief valve capa-
bility could be transferred from the chamber to the transporta-
tion fixture. The removal of the hand valve caps, to facilitate 
turning the stem, was extremely difficult, requiring several 
hundred foot -pounds of torque. Examination of the stem cap seal 
indicated a deterioration of the Viton O-ring caused by vapors 
from either propellant. The stem packing gland of Teflon had 
apparently again exhibited cold flow, as seen in the component 
tests, allowing leakage from the open valve through the stem 
area into the cap seal area. 
After the module was installed in the test stand, system and 
component functional tests were completed. Performance tests of 
the thrust chamber valves, the solenoid valve (GN2 loading valve) 
and the GN2 pressure regulator were completed. During these 
tests a ll systems control wiring and instrumentation circuits 
were validated . Further , it was ascertained that the poststeri -
lization pressure in the nitrogen storage sphere was 1560 psig, 
indicating no system leakage resulting from the sterilization 
exposure . 
The performance of the components before and after decontamina -
tion and dry heat sterilization is presented in Table VI-l . The 
thrust chamber valves and the pressure regulator showed no s ignif -
icant change in performance. Note that the regulator internal 
leakage decreased from 14 . 5 scc/hr GN2 to no measurable amount . 
The solenoid valve exhibited a degradation of the dielectric 
strength of the solenoid coil similar to that experienced with 
the Task II component test unit . A comparison of the results of 
testing of the component unit and the module unit is presented 
in the following tabulation (the solenoid dielectric strength 
is given in microamps at 500 vac): 
Unit Pretest Posttest 
Task II Component 4 500 
Modu le Assembly 6 278 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- - - ,--- - -- - - _ . ..........,..-' 
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Table VI-l Performance of Propulsion Module Components before and 
after Decontamination and Sterilization 
Component 
Thrust Chamber Valv es 
Oxidizer Valve 
Opening Response, max/min ( sec) 
Closing Res ponse, max/min ( sec ) 
Leakage - External (bubbles GN2 ) 
Internal (cc GN2 /hr) 
Fuel Valve 
Opening Response, max/min (sec ) 
Closing Response, max/min (sec) 
Leakage at 250 psig: 
External (bubble s GN2 ) 
Internal (cc GN 2 /hr) 
GN2 Loading Solenoid Valve 
Leakage , External (sec/sec helium) 
Dielectric Strength ( ~ amp @ 500 
vac) 
Regulator 
Internal Leakage (sec/hour GN2 ) 
External Leakage (bubbles GN2 ) 
Regulat ion: 
Inlet Pressure, Initial (psig) 
Inl e t Pressure , Final (psig) 
Average Flow Rate , GN2 (lb / sec) 
Outlet Pressure Variation , max/min 
(psig) 
Hysteresis : 
Initial Outlet Lockup Pressure 
(ps ig ) 
Outlet Pressure Range (psig) 
Response: 
Inlet Pressure , Average (psig) 
Outlet Pressure, Lockup (psig) 
Overshoot ( psig) 
Preexposure 
0,0092/0,0089 
0 , 0062/0 , 0060 
zero 
zero 
0,0073/0 , 0070 
0 ,0070/0 , 0062 
zero 
12 
zero 
6 
14 , 5 
ze ro 
1498 
350 
0.015 
250/247 
263 
250/247 
1520 
261 
o 
Postexposure 
0 , 0098/0,0095 
0 , 0068/0,0061 
zero 
zero 
0 ,0078 /0 ,0068 
0 , 0078/0 , 0075 
zero 
zero 
zero 
278 
zero 
zero 
1528 
350 
0,014 
248 /244 
259 
258/252 
151 7 
257 
o 
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As part of the pre fire preparations, the propulsion module 
propellant tanks were X-rayed and propellant s am ples wer e r emov ed 
for analysis. From the X-ray photos, it was determined that the 
oxidizer tank diaphragm was in the proper position against the 
upper tank wa ll with no apparent tears in the membrane . Also , 
the fuel level indicated that no measurable fuel loss had been 
incurred . The liquid level in the oxidizer tank could not be 
determined because of inadequate definition in the photos . Opti -
mum positioning of the X-ray source and the film holder was not 
attained because of access limitations imposed by the transport 
fixture, module truss, and hardware . 
The results of the chemical analyses of the propellant samples 
are show n below: 
Oxidizer (% volume) Fuel (% vo lume) 
99 . 88 MMH 
0.31 NH3 
0.033 H2 0 
99 . 15 
0 . 34 
0 . 51 
These results indicated propellant decomposition had not taken 
place and the propellants were satisfactory for use . 
At this time all firing prerequisites for the module had been 
met and on 16 January 1968 the firing was completed without inci -
dent . Although the or i ginal plan had been to fire for 300 sec , 
a duration of 280 sec was used to allow sufficient margin on oxi -
dizer usage . This reduction was necessary due to the inability 
to see the liquid level in the X-rays and to the overs i z ing of 
the flow control orifice in the oxidizer feed system . 
The predicted and actual system performance is shown in Table 
VI-2 and Fig . VI-9, which show that performance was quite close 
to pred ic ted values . The mixture ratio was approx imately 3% low . 
This was attributed to the higher than expected fuel flow. Th~ 
high fuel flow was caused by improper fuel orifice sizing result -
ing from drilling the orifice with the nearest standard twi s t 
drill . Figure VI -9 shows th e chamber pressure to be very close 
to prediction or slightly above. The thrust washe r s were in -
dicating l ow . Further , it is known the load was hers are tempera-
ture sensitive . The computed ( from Pc) specific impulse obtained 
was 188 sec . This corresponds to a spec i fic impulse under vac uum 
conditions of 294 sec at an expansion ratio of 40 : 1 . 
- - - - - -----
-- - - ----- -- - - -- - - ----.--1 
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Table VI-2 Propulsion Module Firing Test Quick-Look Data 
Predicted 
Parameter Value T + 0 sec -'- T + 140 sec T + 275 sec T + 5 sec~ 
Burn Time (sec) 280 
GN2 Tank Pressure, P (psia) nt 1560 1630/1210 1200 
Pressure, Regulator Outlet, P (psia) 260 270 264 
ro 
Pressure , Oxidizer Tank, P (ps i a) 260 271 263 
ot 
Pressure, Fuel Tank , Pft (psia) 260 271 263 
Pressure, Oxidiz er Feed Line, P (psia) 217 272 216 
0 
Pressure, Fue l Feed Line , Pf (psia) 217 272 223 
Chamber Pressure, P (ps ia) 103 0 105 
c 
Fl ow Rate , Oxid i z er , w (lbm / sec) 0 , 227 0 0 . 225 0 
Flow Ra te, Fuel, wf (lbm / sec) 0 . 143 0 0 . 146 
Mixture Ratio, MR (oxid/fue l ) 1. 59 1. 54 
Thrust , F (l b f) t 69 . 5 67.4 
~ 
~Values read at stabilized conditions between T + 5 sec and T + 30 sec. 
[ Fl + F2 ] t Da ta from two of three l oad washers , obtained by: 2 x 3 . 
TVC Response: Opening oxid = 0 . 0128 sec, fue l 
Closing oxid = 0 . 0083 sec, fuel 
Ignit i on 0.0128 sec after oxid TCV opening . 
0 . 009 1 sec , 
0 . 0078 sec. 
910 
264 
264 
264 
217 
227 
105 
0 . 226 
0 . 148 
1.53 
Thrust Termination: Started 0 . 0022 sec , complete 0.0066 sec after oxid Tev closure . 
670 
265 
265 
265 
217 
225 
105 
0.226 
0 . 146 
1.55 
T + 280 sec 
280 
660 
266 
265 
265 
219 
225 
105 
0.227 
0 . 146 
1.56 
67 . 5 
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The high initial pressure in the nitrogen sphere was attrib-
uted to the heat flux caused by the sun lamps in position to 
give adequate lighting for 1000 fps motion pictures . It was 
concluded that the system performance was satisfactory and there 
was no significant degradation caused by the exposure to the 
sterilization environment. 
A visual inspection of the propulsion module after the firing 
test revealed two leaks in the oxidizer system, neither of which 
was seen on the TV monitor. One was a vapor leak at the interface 
between the oxidizer tank outlet and the ordnance valve (EXV-4) and 
a liquid leak at the oxidizer drain valve (ODV) outlet tube con-
nection (Fig. VI -3). 
F . DISASSEMBLY AND EXAMINATION 
Following the postfiring inspection, the residual ' fuel and 
oxidizer were drained into catch tanks for inventory . The fuel 
residual was 9 . 9 lb, compared to the calculated residual of 9 . 2 
lb predicted on t he expected fuel flow rate and burn time of 280 
sec . The oxidizer residual, however, was only 11 . 7 lb as opposed 
to an expected residual of 20 . 4 lb. No conclusive cause was 
found to account for the loss of the 8 . 4 lb of oxidizer . 
In the process of draining the propellant tanks, an internal 
leakag e through the oxidizer diaphragm of 14,000 cc/min of GN2 
was determined at a differential pressure of 1 psid. The diaphragm 
was recycled to the initial position, at the tank top, at wh ich 
time the leakage was again determined to be 14,000 cc/min of GN2 . 
It was concluded that the diaphragm was ruptured. 
The oxidizer tank was removed from t he module and decontam-
inated by baking at 150°F with a 1 psig GN2 purge to remove all 
oxidizer vapors. The decontamination procedure was discontinued 
when the vapor detector indicated a vapor concentration of 2 ppm. 
The tank halves were separated and the inspection revealed the 
diaphragm in the propellant expelled position with a l6 - in . tear 
across the dome. 
The Mar quardt R-4D eng ine assembly was removed from the pro-
pulsion module, visua lly inspected, and decontaminated according 
to Marquardt Corporation procedures. 
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When the hand valve stem caps were removed, several hundred 
foot - pounds of breakaway torque was required . The Viton O-ring 
was highly deteriorated . Normal cap torque was 90 i n .- lb . 
While the seal was highly effective with no evidence of leakage 
throughout the test, the O-ring lost all elasticity and some 
evidence of plastic flow into the threads was found . Figure 
VI - 10 shows the condition of the seal that wa s typical of both 
the fuel and oxidizer hand valves. 
The Viton material was chosen with knowledge of marginal 
compatibility . If a bellows stem is incorporated into future 
valves , the compatibility of the stem seal will not be a problem . 
The dielectric strength of both the component and module 
solenoid valves showed degradation. Failure analysis of the 
component test unit revealed the coil winding badly charred and 
black in color, as shown in Fig . V-23. The coil wire was No . 
27 Formvar wire from the Bridgeport Insulated Wire Company . The 
coil was coated with Tri -Var No . 116, both of which were rated 
at 221°F. Consequently, exposure to 275°F lead to a breakdown 
in the coil winding. . 
The corrective action wou ld be to use a Teflon - coated wire 
in the coil winding, coated with a high temperature material 
rated at 400°F or above . 
As indicated earlier, the module assembly began leaking 
at the oxidizer tank outlet flange after loading . Further, the 
motion pictures of the firing showed the same flange was leak -
ing after the ordnance valves were actuated. The flange in 
question is shown in Fig . VI-ll. Microscopic examination of 
the flange serrations showed no positive cause of leakage , such 
as a double imprint or improper seating of the seal. 
The leakage immediately following the firing of the squib 
on the module duplicated the component test unit. That unit 
also began leaking immediately after firing of the squib . While 
this flange was previously an aluminum structure throughout, 
this was the first time the flange was used with an a l um i num/ 
titanium interface at sterilization temperatures in the presence 
of N2 04 . 
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Fig. VI-10 Hand Valve Stem Cap and Seal 
Fig . VI- ll Ordnance Valve Flange and Gasket 
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The flange differential growth caused by the titanium/aluminum 
interface contributed to a condition that leaks when shock loaded 
by the firing of the squib. The corrective action should be to 
provide a welded joint at every position inside the hermetically 
sealed area and to provide heavier mounting brackets for the 
ordnance valve. 
Figure VI - l2 shows an overall view of the tube shape, and 
Fig . VI-l3 and VI-l4 show a closeup of the failure. The failure 
was typical of high tensile loads caused by very short bend radii. 
No corrosion of the tube is evident . The tube material was alumi-
num alloy 606l -T6. A bend radius of 1/2 in. was allowed by Martin 
Marietta standards for pressures below 1500 psi; however, it is 
not recommended in sterilizab le systems . A rebuild of this tube 
on subsequent firings would limit the bend radius to 4D or lin . 
Figures VI - lS and VI-16 show two views of the diaphragm after 
separation of the tank halves. The d iaphragm wa s in the expe lled 
position and, because of the size of the tear, was not cycled 
back by the postfiring activities. Figure VI-l7 shows a close-
up of the apex doubler. It should be pointed out that the doubler 
was round and symmetrical before the Teflon laminate cure. 
The basic Teflon laminate was 0 . 004 in. of TFE and 0 . 004 in. 
FEP . Inspection reveals no degradation of the membrane, indicat-
ing complete compatibility . Mud cracking was very minimal al-
though the diaphragm was slightly oversized as seen by the dis-
coloration of the tank hemisphere shown in Fig, VI-l8, 
A complete review of the system loading calculations and the 
facility loading fixture tare we i ghts was made. Further, addi-
tional leak checks were made to explain the 8 . 4-lb loss of oxi-
dizer. The results of the review indicated two areas of concern. 
First, an error was made in the loading statement, resulting in 
a residual we ight of 10 .9 lb rather than 20 . 4 lb. Second, a 
small leak was found in the tubing run from the module oxidizer 
tank drain valve to the facility safety package on the outside 
of the chamber. While the leak as measured \vould not account 
for the full leakage, it was measured at ambient temperature 
rather than the 275°F working temperature. While the tank capacity 
would accommodate either incident separately, it could not accom-
modate the combined effect. 
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Fig. VI-l2 Oxidizer Fill and 
Drain Tube 
Fig. VI-l3 Oxidizer Fill and Drain 
Tube Crack, External 
View Fig. VI-l4 Oxidizer Fill and Drain 
Tube Crack, Internal 
View 
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Fig . VI - 15 Module Oxidizer Tank 
Diaphragm Failure, 
Side View 
Fig. VI-16 Module Oxidize r Tank 
Diaphragm Failure , 
Top View 
Point of Initial Failure 
Fig. VI-17 Diaphragm Apex Doubler 
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It was concluded the diaphragm ruptured because of propellant 
depletion. Performance calculations indicated the diaphragm would 
have been required to stretch 0.022 in. This represents a surface 
stretch of only 0.3%. Biaxial loading of a Teflon membrane should 
result in stretch of up to at least 2%. Therefore, the evidence 
seems to point to the initial failure at the stress riser at the 
apex doubler, as shown in Fig . VI-17 . 
Further analysis shows the apex doubler, when in the prefire 
position against the gas inlet side of the tank, shifted during 
the repeated sterilization cycles as seen in Fig. VI-19 . Some 
permeation was evident and a small amount of diaphragm leakage, 
4 scc/hr, was present at the initiation of the testing. It is 
significant, however, that the diaphragm membrane showed no 
tendency to ex trude through the shower head holes when the doubler 
was off center . 
It was concluded that had the run time been reduced to 250 
sec, t he 
firing. 
socia ted 
diaphragm would have successfully surv ived the system 
Further , the failure was not a compatibility problem as-
with the sterilization requirements. 
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Fig. VI-IS Module Oxidizer Inlet Hemisphere 
Fig. VI-19 Module Oxidizer Tank Gas Inlet Fitting 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions are categori zed into four separate areas : 
system , components , piece parts and materials , an d facilities . 
A. SYSTEM 
Succ essful survival of ex posure to the sterilization environ -
ment by a propulsion module loaded with propellants as demonstrated 
by a full duration firing was achieved . Performance of the module 
was wi thin specif i cations . Operation of the module was smooth and 
and normal. 
A mechanical seal or joint with in the hermetically sealed 
portions of the system is an unnecessary risk . All joints within 
the hermetically sealed areas should be we lded . 
Generous allowance should be made for tube bends, line runs , 
and component mounting to withstand thermal expansion . 
B. COMPONENTS 
Only the thrust chamber valves , the standard cartridges and 
the storage tank shells showed no degradation due to the sterili -
~ ation exposure . The remaining components indicated some degrada -
tion during the Task II testing as shown below .. 
Pressur e Regul ator - Re gulated pressure shifted downward 16 
psi. Corrective action was taken to age the spring for the module 
unit . The action was successful. 
VII-l 
Hand Shutoff Valve - St em leakage was evident after six of the 
12 cycles of exposure . Corrective action would be to add a bellows -
type seal , which was not implemented for this program . 
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Solenoid Valve - Dielectric strength increased . Operation was 
satisfactory but examination revealed a breakdown in the coil 
insulation . Corrective action would be to use a high - temperature 
Teflon insulation, which was not implemented for this program . 
Fi lter and Fuel Tank Screen Trap - Both units showed degrada -
tion of bubble point. Allowance could be made for this degrada -
tion . 
Ordnance Valve - External leakage increased after actuatio n . 
This was a mechanical joint that should be redesigned to provide 
a ~e lded tube attachment . 
Oxidizer Tank Diaphragm - Both the component and system unit 
failed at the doubler located at the ape x of the hemisphere t ha t 
acted as a stress riser . The failure in the s ystem unit indicated 
the diaphragm had successfully folded through before failure , 
therefore , the objective of positive expulsion was achieved . It 
was further concluded the failure at the double r occurred because 
of overexpulsion . The component unit was never outflowed . New 
design criteria of the doubler are needed to improve the diaphragm 
design . This was th e only failure that requi r es new technology or 
improved state of the art to fix . 
It was concluded that with the exception of the diaphragm , al l 
of the components may be corrected with new technology . 
C. PIECE PARTS AND MATERIALS 
Tit anium 6A£- 4V alloy was the only material found to be com -
pletely compatible with N2 04 during exposure t o the steriliza tion 
environment . 
Aluminum alloys 1100 , 2014 , 22 19 , 5056 , and 6061 a ll showed 
intergranular attack after 600 hr. No attack was found at 300 hr . 
Fine wire sizes for wire cloth disintegrated in less than 100 hr . 
Teflon , wh il e exhibiting a fine flocking in the propellant, 
was the only nonmetal acceptable for use in bo'th MMH and N2 04 • 
Nonmetals such as butyl , silicon , and e thylene propylene rubbers 
and Kynar were not compatible in either the N2 04 or MMH . 
MCR-68-1l9 
System cleanliness and mate ri al s passivation must be assured 
to s uccessfull y sterilize a fuel system . 
Normal stee l welding practices that allow formulation of meta l 
oxides are unsati s factory for use in sterili zab le hydrazine base 
fuel s ystems. 
For t he same reas on a s above seam wel ding of fraying surfaces 
is not satisfactory in sterilizable hydrazine base fuel systems . 
D. FACILITIES 
Both MMH and N2 04 react to s ome degree with ETO decontamina tion 
agent at 500 , 000 ppm . N2 0 4 caused an increase in pressure t o 22 
pSi a , wh ich may rupture environmental chambers . 
Va por detectors are satisf ac t or y t o determine N2 04 in the ETO 
atmosphere but g i ve unreliable results when sampling MMH and ETO . 
Vapo r detectors to determine relative humidity i n the ETO 
a tmos ph er e may be successfully calibrated to provide automatic 
con tro l of the r e l at i ve humidity . 
VII-3 
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VI I I . RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SYSTEM 
Additional e xperience should be accumulated on the module to 
improve the credibility of the test results . This should include 
additional sterilization cycles and an additional s y s tem firing . 
Although this will provide an improvement in the confidence of the 
results , it wil l not allow improvement of the component reliability 
predictions . 
B. COMPONENTS 
Components containing heat sterili ze d springs with t he s prings 
in a stressed condition should receive pretest heat trea t ment . 
The complete component or the stressed spring should undergo heat 
soak at a t em perature in excess of the sterilization temperature 
for a period of time sufficient to allow st ab ili za tion of the 
spring . Heat soak ing should be done with the spring under stress , 
pref e rabl y at minimum wo rking height , and at a temperature of not 
less than 15% more th an the st e rili z ing temperatu r e . 
A problem was identified during the sterilization of th e oxi -
dizer (N2 04 ) tank which contained a hemispherical Teflon laminate 
diaphragm . No proved sterili zab l e positive expulsion device now 
ex ists for a spacecraft oxidi ze r tank using N2 04 as the propellant. 
A program should be initiated to solve the problems uncovered using 
the present system , or other ex pulsion devices should be designed 
and built for e x posure to the steriliza tion environment . Because 
the problems are known and solvable, the primary approach should be 
to continue with a Tef l on di aph r agm . Oth er wo rkable approaches 
include the design and build of a screen trap assembly made of 
titanium woven screen or e tch e d titanium foil . 
Teflon bladders have historically demonstrated a high permea -
bility of propellants . Recent Teflon bladder material tests in 
N2 04 at 275°F have shown a t endency to slough off Tefl on particles 
VIII- 2 
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that may cause filters to clog or pulsing valves to leak . It is 
recommended that a development program be se t up to depos it 
tantalum , columbium , and/or gold on Teflon laminate coupons, and 
perfo r m s uch propellant compatibility tests and mechanical prop-
ertie s tests as abrasion , permeation , and adhesion . 
C. PIECE PARTS AND MATERIALS 
I f N2 04 is used as the oxidizer for a sterilizable system, 
all por tions of the system in contact with the oxidizer during 
s terilization should be constructed of titanium alloy, 6A£ -4V. 
Although MMH is compatible with all metals tested , the use 
of t i tanium 6A£-4V is recommended , based upon high strength-to-
weight ratio . 
I f an elastic material is r equ ired to perform the seat or 
seal , Teflon is recommended for both N2 04 or MMH use during 
steril i zation . Provision to prevent cold flow of Teflon mu st be 
provided. 
D. FAC I LITIES AND PROC ESSES 
If N2 04 is used as the oxidizer for a sterilizable system, 
it should be required to meet the minimum nit ric oxide (NO) con -
tent spec ified by NASA Spec i fication MSC - PPD - 2A, dated June 1 , 
1966 . 
Curr ent testing at sterilization temperatures indicates that 
inadequat e cleaning and passivation of materials in contact with 
amine fuels such as MMH, UDMH, or hydrazine can result in decom-
position. Th e decomposi tion can lead to very high pressures re -
sulting in tank rupture, mormation of corrosive compounds, or deg-
radation of normal performance . It is recommended that such sys -
tems be thoroughly cleaned , followed by passivation of the system 
in accordanc e with Martin Marietta Materials Engineering Report 
67 -IR . 
Welding of steel or titanium parts that will see hydrazine 
fuels at sterilization temperatures should be done in an inert 
atmosphere, preferably in an in ert - gas purged gl ove box . 
• 
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A welding development program should be implemen t ed s o that 
steel screens may be attached to other basic metal s. A welded 
leaktight s ystem is preferred over the riveted joint chos en in 
this program . 
An exhaustive test program should be i nitiated to determine 
the mechanics of fuel decomposition caused by metal oxides. The 
program should determine whether all metal oxides cause fuel 
decomposition or whether the process is caused by only a few of 
the metal oxides used in the material of construction . 
The feasibility of presterilization of both propulsion system 
components before loading should be determined to eliminate the 
many penalties invo lved in designing tankage for exposu r e to 
propellants at 275°F . 
Possible methods of nonthermal sterilization of propellants 
during l oad should be explored . Potential methods include ultra-
violet radiation , ultrasonic vibration , and filtration . 
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IX . NEW TECHNOLOGY 
The following new technology disclosures have been submitted 
in accordance with the general provi sion of this contract. 
Number 
2 
3 
4 
15 
Title ~ 
Use of Vapor Detectors in Development 
Decontamination Atmosphere 
Materials of Construction Production 
for Nitrogen Tetroxide Tank-
age in Sterilizable Systems 
Sterilization of Fully Sub- Concept 
merged Teflon Bladders in 
Nitrogen Tetroxide. 
Vapor Pressure of Monomethyl- Production 
hydrazine . 
One a dditional disclosure is in process a t the present time 
entitled, "Sterilization of Cold Welded Transition Tubes in 
Propellants ." 
A fixed vapor detector manufactured by Teledyne Systems, Inc, 
was successfully used to detect nitrogen tetroxide , N2 04 , vapors 
at concentration of 5 ppm in the presence of an ethylene o x ide/ 
Freon decontamination atmosphere (ETO) . Conversely an attempt to 
employ a similar detector t o warn of monomethylhydrazine vapors 
in the ETa was unsuccessful . The detector produced spurious and 
unreliable signals . 
The only construction materials tested in this program that 
were compatible with N2 04 were commercially pure titanium and its 
alloys . Steel suffered severe degradation in short duration tests, 
of the order of 24 hr . Not only were the steels affected, but the 
N2 04 formed iron adduct that was undesirable in propulsion systems. 
Aluminum and its alloys showed no attack at 300 hr , but intergran-
ular attack was evident at 600 hr . 
The concept of sterilization of fully submerged Teflon dia-
phragms was an effort to prevent the development of high pressures 
across the membranes . This concept was found to be unnecessary 
in actual use. 
-, 
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Th e vapor pre ssure determination of monomethy1hydrazine pre--
sents new data showing the vapor pressure to be 13.3% higher at 
275°F than previously published. The Martin Marietta determination 
at 275°F was 63 .0 psia as opposed to previously published values of 
55.6 pSia. These data showed that mild decomposition was , in fact , 
not taking place every time the fuel was heated. Rather it confor"med 
to the vapor pressure cu r ve presented in Fig. IV-2B. 
The module design used cold welded transition joints that allowed 
the coupling of dissimilar metals not possible with normal fusion 
wel ding techniques. Materials testing and production usage have 
proved the joints to be compatible at 275°F in a propellant envi-
ronment. 
The items mentioned above are the only items of new technology 
that have been i dentified. No subcontracts over $50,000 and con -
taining the new technology clause were awarded during th i s program . 
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APPENDIX A 
CALCULATION OF FLOW ANNULUS 
J 
MCR-68-11Y 
Actual 
Position Height - Base He igh t 
1 2 .553 1.200 1. 353 
2 2.565 1.200 1.365 
3 2.568 1.200 1.368 
4 2 . 573 1.200 1.373 
5 2 . 571 1.200 1. 371 
6 2 . 553 1.200 1.353 
7 2.571 1.200 1.371 
8 2 . 558 1.200 1.358 
r-2 .875"~ t 1.364 
..c:::::: :==:::.......1.364"Av • Average T 
From Buringt on Hand book - page 12 
1.478 
8. 249 R 
~ 
. 016 8 
Annulus 
2 . 875 TI x . 0168 ~ A 
d :::: 8 .1228 
I 
C 
1.478" 
~ 
1.507 
-1. 364 
. 1430 
- .1 262 
.0168 
A 0:: . 152 in2 
2 . 875 
8 . 2656 
8 . 2656 
4d2 
d2 
d 
h 
h 
h 
p, = 2 VR2 - d2 
2 Y(8 . 249 ) 2 - d2 
4(68 .046 - d2 ) 
272 . 184 - 4d2 
263 . 9184 
65 . 9796 
8 .1 228 
R - d 
8 . 249 - 8 .1 228 
= 0 .1262 in 
A-I 
A-2 MCR- 68 - l19 
Annulus = 0 . 152 in2 
Equivalent orifice diameter 
2 
W = 0 .5 25 Cf d p& eo 
0 . 14 0 . 525 (0 .6) (0 . 19353) 
2 . 2965 = V 54 .86 DE 
5 . 2739 54 .86 DE 
0 .09613 psi 
/ A _ /0 . 152 
deo =~ 0 . 7854 =~ 0 . 7854 
d = 0 . 4399 in . 
eo 
1154 .86 DE 
1 psi = 2717 in . H2 0 
then 0 . 09613 x 27 . 7 = 2 .663 in . H2 0 (&) 
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APPENDIX B 
STERILIZABLE LIQUID PROPULSION SYSTEM 
COMPONENT DES IGN ANALYSIS 
:-- -.-~.-------
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A , FILTER , LAB 6002513 
1, Stress Analysis 
0.062 
~~:r:r:V 
0.250 in. 
0,082 in, 
0 , 750 in, 
Hoop stress at the larger diameter at burst pressure of 4000 
psi 
where 
R 0,750 - 0 ,041 
4000 x 0 , 709 
o ,082 
S2 = 34 , 600 ps i 
0,709 
Hoop stress at the smaller diameter at burst pressure of 
4000 psi 
(Ref B- 1) 
where 
R 0 ,250 - 0 ,031 0 .219 
S2 
4000 x 0 ,219 
o .062 l 
S2 14,150 ps i 
l 
B-1 
___ J 
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The highest static stress is at the larger med ian diameter, 
even though the wa ll thickness is less at the weld ing neck. This 
stress is on the safe side, since the yield stress for 304 stain -
less steel is 35 , 000 psi and the ultimate in tension is 75 ,OcrO 
psi. 
An investigation of the static stress on the end plate at 
4000 psi using Roark ' s (Ref B-1) case 17 equation for flat plates 
indi cates a maximum stress of 19,800 psi. This is wel l below the 
y ield point . 
In reference to any dynamic loading on the screen f ilt er , due 
to sudden opening of the ordnance va l ve , a pressure wave generated 
at the nominal 0 . 174 - in . internal diameter of the valve passes 
through a 90 - deg bend and then into a 3IB -in. tube; and after one 
more bend into a 1 /2 - in . tube, and finall y is expanded within the 
filter to an equivalent diameter of 1 .06 in . Even discounting the 
line l osses , it is not possible for the initial GN2 loading of 
1600 psia max imum to exceed the design differential pressure of 
3000 psi for the filter screen . Since the gas loading is at the 
highest pressure within the system, this woul d be the worst case . 
2 . Tol erance Analysis over Natural and Induced Temperature Range 
All of the parts making up the filter are of 304 stainless 
steel . Therefore , there is no basis for a tolerance analysis over 
the natural and induced temperature ranges . 
3 , Failure Mode Analysis 
An inspection of the filter desi gn, combined with failure 
mode analyses conducted on the Titan systems , indicates that the 
principal failure mode would be nonfi ltra tion . This could be 
caused by an internal rupture of the screen or by a structural 
failure of the screen . 
A secondary mode of failure would be a structura l failure of 
the outside seal weld , causing external leakage. 
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B. GAS PRESSURE REGULATOR, LAB 6002515 
1 . Stress Analysis 
By inspection , the weakest section in the unit is the bellows 
outlet under a possible fail open mode . However, during sterili -
zation, the unit is is olated from the pressurant tank by an ord -
nance valve, and during the actual firing setup, a burst disc is 
installed downstream . The burst disc is set at 350 psig and the 
bellows is proof - rated at 380 psig and has a burst design of not 
less than 633 psig. Therefore , no part of the regulator would be 
affected or destroyed if this failure mode occurred. 
During the early phases of this component design, the vendor 
decided, because of the repeated heat cycling, that it would be 
best to employ a loading spring with a higher spring rate . This 
was done within the same envelope by using a rectangular wire 
spring. This permits the proper loading within a smaller percent -
age of the total spring capacity, thereby minimizing the possibil -
it y of further set or relaxation that would cause the pressure -s et 
band to move downward . 
2 . Tolerance Analysis over Natural and I nduced Temperature Range 
The indu ced temperature range is most critical fro m 68 to 
285 °F. The expansion coefficient for 17 - 4 PH is 6 .0 x 10-6 in . / 
in . / oF and 9.6 x 10 - 6 in . / in . / oF for 302 stainless steel. 
T~~93 i n . mi n ~ 
0 . 4355 111i c:( _______ ~6 ¥-93 
Guid e Pl ate 
17 -4 PH 
6 d1 0 .093 
6 d1 121 X 
6d ~ 0.093 
x 217 
10 - 6 
x 217 
6 d , 194 x 10 - 6 in. 
Pin 
302 SS 
x 6 .0 
x 9 . 6 
x 10 - 6 
x 10 - 6 
in . max 
B-3 
B- 4 
is : 
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Then, the decrease in clearance between pin and guide plate 
194 x 10 - 6 
-1 21 X 10 - 6 
73 X 10-6 or 0 .000073 in. on the diameter 
Therefore , an initial clearance of 0 .0001 in . on the diameter 
would be suffic i ent to prevent binding with possible galling a t 
the ster ilizing temperature. Since these parts are hand fitted 
to a smooth sliding fit , the clearance on the diamete r is not 
less than 0 .0001 in. This has been verified by the vendor . 
3 . Failur e Mode Analysis 
Failure to Regulate - This could be caused by a jamming or 
sticking of the push pin that positions the ball poppet . 
Shifting of the Regulation Band - This could be caused by an 
i mproperly - designed load spring undergoing a relaxation under com-
pression and repeated temperature changes. 
Ex cessive Internal Leakage Causing Overloading of the Propel -
lant Tanks - This could be caused by contaminants on the ball seat 
and/or a hang up of the ball poppet . 
Excessive External Leakage due to Gasket Leak -
C . VALVE, MANUALLY OPERATED, SHUTOFF, LAB 6002512 
1 . Stress Analysis 
a . Maxi mum Permissible Torque on Val v e Stem 
where 
T 
T 
Max S 
s 
30,000 n (0 .093) 3 
2 
37 . 9 in .- lb . 
2T 
-=-=-:r (Re f B-1 ) 
n r 
- - - --- ---.- - - ----- - - --- - - --~ 
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b , Hoop Stre s s at Outlet Tube 
Tube P ,D, = 0,250 in , 
I,D, = 0,187 in , 
2t 0,063 in , 
S2 
PR 2500 x O, llO (Ref B- 1) = = t 0,031 
S2 = 8870 psi (allowable - 34 , 900 psi at 280 °F) 
c, Gland Nut Thread Shear 
Fl PA 2500 x 1l x (0 ,375) 2 
Fl = 1103 lb 
Pitch diameter = 0 , 7094 in, 
Assuming 1/4 - in , thread engagement and 75% efficiency, then shear 
area : 
A = P ,D, x rr x L x e 
s 
O,7094 rr x 0 ,250 x 0 , 75 
A 0 ,4175 in ,2 
s 
S IL 1103 ::: 
s A 0 ,4175 
s 
S 2645 psi (allowable - 24 ,300 psi at 280 OF) 
s 
d , Seat Design 
The present seat des i gn depends on yield or plastic flow 
of a sharp - edged seat against a conical surface on the poppet to 
effect a seal . The material of the poppet is aluminum 1100 - 0 and 
the seat is aluminum 606l-T6 . A better valve design would place 
the softer materia l (1100 -0) in the seat by means of a pressed - in 
ring , Tllis wou ld hav e retained the geometric int egrity of the 
poppet design. However , because of the limited use of the valve, 
the vendor would not accept this suggestion since it would involve 
higher manufacturing costs . Also, in this application , the pop -
pet is raised from the seat and the inlet capped off during steri-
lization, thereby reducing probability of excessive deformation . 
It is recommended that future des i gns consider the soft - seat, 
hard poppet approach , 
B-S 
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2. Tolerance Analysis over Natural and Induced Temperature Range 
All of the metal parts of the valve that would be affected by 
relative movement during the sterilization cycle are made of alu-
minum or aluminum alloy, and there should be no adverse binding 
or relaxation between metal parts. The poppet is made of 1100-0 
aluminum and the seat and body of 6061-T6 aluminum. The relative 
motion between these two parts would be 1 x 10- 7 in,/in./oF and 
would amount to approximately 4 x 10-6 in. The strain imposed 
by closure of the valve would be greater than this amount. At 
the worst condition , this would result in some relaxation of the 
initial closure torque during the sterilization cycle, but could 
be compensated for by increasing the initial torque if leakage 
is detected during the cycle , It is probable that this will not 
be necessary , 
3, Fai l ure Mode Analysis 
External Leakage - In this application, the hand valves are 
being used as fill and drain valves , and the outboard port is 
capped after filling; therefore, external leakage is of pri me 
importance, 
Failure to Open for the Drain Operation - This could be caused 
by torsional shear of the actuating stem, 
Brinelling or Indenting of the Poppet Face from Repeated Use 
of the Valve - Extended use is not a requirement of this applica-
tion . 
D, 1/4-IN, SOLENOID VALVE, N,C" LAB 6002516 
1. Stress Analysis 
a. Stop 
Sterer Detail 16 at burst pressure of 6250 psia . Mate-
rial, Titanium 6A£ -4V: 
0 , 40 in , 0,094 in, 
--'-* - ........-i;t-----+--_+.___, ~ 
0 , 156 in , '--i~-:", ___ -+-__ ---, T 
~ 0 ,312 in, 
_~J 
---------_.- --- - - -- ---
At 
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edge (Roa rk 's fl a t pl ate, c a se 6 , Ref B-1) : 
Max S 3W S 3W = 4rr t 2 ; ::: 4rr mt 2 ; r t 
W = 6250 x 1t x 0 .402 
W' 3140 lb . 
S 3 x 3140 9420 = = 
r 41t x 0 .0942 0 .1111 
S 84 , 750 
r 
3 x 3140 9420 
= :;: ---S t 41t ( 0 \3~ 0 .0942 0 .337 
St 27 , 950 
S2 = S2 + S2 
r t 
S2 0.718 X 10 lO + 0 .0781 X 10l O 
S 0 . 893 X 105 
W = w1t a2 
S 89,300 psi (yield point at 285 °F - 98,500 psi 
guaranteed minimum) 
Since the above calculation shows maximum possible stress and 
minimum possible y ield point , it can be concl uded that the design 
is satisfactory . 
b . Seat Design 
The seat and poppet desi gn are of the hard poppet (tung-
sten carbide), softer seat (17 - 7 PH stainless steel) combination. 
A very fine line of contact is first estab lished , but final seal-
age depends on the yield and plastic flow of the seat; therefor e , 
seat stresses can be assumed to be at or near the y ield point for 
the metal . 
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2 , Tol er ance Anal ysis over Na tur a l and I nduc ed Tempera tur e Range 
St em a nd Body - 17 - 4 PH stainless s t eel, Coeff i cient of ther-
mal exp ans i on is 6 ,0 x 10 - 6 in , / in,/oF, 
Seat - 17 - 7 PH stainless steel , Coefficient of the r mal ex -
pansion is 5 , 6 x 10 - 6 i n,/in , / oF , 
Plunger and Shell Low carbon iron , Co effic i en t of thermal 
exp ans ion is 8 ,4 x 10 - 6 i n, / in , / oF , 
2 
0 ,250 in. 
• 11/32 in. 
f 
1 15/16 in. 
:::...~~t;t;t;t======~l;=:: o . 003 in. 
@ 68°F 
min clearance 
Di ff erentia l mov ement between shel l and plunger , 
Shel l a nd Pl ung er -
6£ 2 x 217 x 8 ,4 x 10 - 6 - ;~ x 217 x 8 ,4 x 10 - 6 
6£ 3645 x 10 - 6 - 626 x 10 - 6 
6£ 3019 x 10 - 6 ( thi s i s movement away f r om stem) 
Stem -
6£1 - 1 , 9375 x 217 x 6 x 10 -6 
6£1 - 2520 x 10 - 6 ( this i s l engthening o f the st em; 
t herefore , i s negat i ve t o indi cat e 
clo s ure o f t he gap) 
-- -- -- -- -- - - -- - -- ------~ -- ~ -
r 
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Body and Seat -
6£2 = 0 . 25 x 217 x 6 x 10-6 + 0.125 x 217 x 5.6 x 10-6 
= 325 . 5 X 10-6 + 152 X 10 - 6 
6£2 = ~77.5 x 10-6 (movement away from stem tip) 
Total = 3019 x 10-6 + 477.5 x 10 - 6 - 2520 X 10 - 6 
6£T = 976 . 5 x 10 - 6 in. 
Therefore, heating causes a movement of the stem tip away 
from the ball, and unseating of the ball poppet could not occur , 
Actual specified clearance is 0 .003 to 0 .005 in. 
The solenoid separation band will increa se clearance with the 
plunger with increase in temperature . Therefore, there would be 
no binding from room temperature to the sterilization temperature 
of 285°F maximum. 
An investigation of the ball poppet and guide shows a coeffi -
cient of expansion for the poppet of 4 .3 x 10 -6 in . /in . /o F and 
for the seat of 5 . 6 x 10-6 in./in . /oF. Therefore, the seat would 
expand at a faster rate with increase in temperature and binding 
could not occur. 
3. Failure Mode Analysis 
a. External Leaka ge 
In this particular application , external leakage is the 
most critical failure mode. In the sequence of operation, the 
inlet port is capped after filling the pressurant tank; therefore, 
internal leakage is not a primary failure mode . 
b. Failure to Open for Initial Fill 
This could be caused by electrical failure and/or exces -
sive internal contamination . However , this is of a secondary 
nature because the valve is a pressure assist opening, from the 
fill port, design . 
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E. PROPELLANT TANKS 
1 . St re ss Analysis 
a . Fuel Tank , LAB 6002514 - 019 
Minimum wall thickness : t = 0 . 120 in . 
Int ernal radius: 8 .250 ± 0 .005 in . 
I.R . = 8 . 255 in . max 
Mean radius : R 8.315 in . 
S PR 2t 
P = 3750 psi (burst pressure) 
3750 x 8 .315 
2 x 0 . 120 (Ref B- 1) 
S 130 , 000 psi (Yield point at 285°F = 143,000 psi or 
155,000 psi at room temperature .) 
The above wall sect i on is heat treated . An investigation of the 
girth area , which is annealed by the welding process , shows : 
3750 x 8 .335 
2 x 0 . 160 
Sl 97 , 500 psi (Yield point at 285°F = 98 , 500 psi or 
120,000 psi at room temperature .) 
Since the tanks are not actually tested for burst pressure (3750 
psi) at the higher temperature , there is an apprec iable mar gin o f 
safety . 
An investi gation was made of the screen area (the top screen 
is approximately 4 sq in .) . 
Required flow is 0 .14 Ibm / sec maximum or 
° .00258 cu ft/sec 0 .1555 cu ft/min = 1.162 g pm 
or 
0 . 2905 gpm/in .2 
- - ~~- -- -- - - -- -- - --
I 
---~ 
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Tests made at the Martin Marietta Corporation , Denver Division, 
indicate that flow with Aerozine 50 , with the same screen used in 
the fuel tank , shows no appreciable pressure drop (<0.25 psi) at 
the required flo~ rate . It can be assumed that the pressure drop 
with MMH would not be significant . 
b . Oxidizer Tank , LAB 6002514 - 009 
The oxidizer tank wall thickness is the same as the fuel 
tank ; therefore, the same calculation for hoop stress, as shown 
above, would apply . 
The diaphragm does present several possible modes of flex -
ure during expulsion; however , these are entirely random in nature, 
and therefore not subject to an exact stress analysis . At the 
end of expulsion, the diaphragm is bent around the lip of one dia-
phragm retainer. An investigation of this area follows . 
0 . 065 in. ~SS~~-0 . 075 in . 
- 0 . 065 i n . R 
0 . 010 i n . 
Cl C 0 
Co ~ rr x 0 . 130 2 2 
Co 0 .204204 in . 
Cl ~ rr x 0 .150 = 2 2 
Cl 0 .23562 in . 
f::,C Cl - Co ::: 0 . 23 56 - 0 .2042 0 .0314 
then, 
f::,C 0 .0314 
x 100 
Co 0 .2042 
f::,C 15 .38% Co 
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DuPont (Ref B- 2) indicates a 15% strain of FEP at 73 ° F 
results in approximately 2080 psi stress . This is above the y i e ld 
or permanent set point; therefore, it can be assumed tha t even -
tually, continued flexing would result in failure at this point . 
However, this is not antic i pated within the three - cycle limit now 
imposed by the bladder specification limit . 
To the above loading , there would be added the amount o f 
tens i le load caused by the differential pressure (1 psi) at the 
end of expulsion . This amounts to only 490 ps i o n the membr an e , 
and is small compared to the bending load. 
2 . Tolerance Analysis over Natural and I nduced Temper a ture Range 
a . Fuel Tank 
Screen Assembly 
Ti - 6Al -4V --~ rt. of Ri v et s 
3 04L Sta i n l es s Stee l 
I 
1-+-- -1 . 82 i n o+ 50 44 i n . d ia - -
~----------------9 . 075 i n . d ia----- ---
From T o 
5.44 in . x 217 x 5 .8 x 10 - 6 
68.4 x 10 - 4 
0.00684 in . 
5 .44 in . x 217 x 9 . 6 x 10 - 6 
113 .3 x 10 - 4 
f:::,f, SS 0 .01133 in . 
I 
'--- ----
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The above calculation indicates that the center section 
of stainless steel is expanding faster than the titanium ; there -
fore, there would be a buckling of the stainless steel section. 
However, this difference is only a little more than 0 .004 in. over 
the 5.44 in. diameter, and any growth of the tank due to higher 
pressure at the high temperature would tend to decrease this dif -
ference. 
b. Oxidizer Tank 
The oxidizer tank presents no serious problem at the high-
er temperature/pressure range except that it is expected that the 
Teflon bladder may flow into all crevices that are present. To 
overcome this tendency, a thicker section wa s included at the 
bladder apex to prevent extrusion into the " shower head . '1 Also , 
the cylindrical section near the equator is 25% thicker than the 
main portion of the bladder . This will res i st extrus i on into the 
small crevice formed by the radius on the inner section of the 
bladder rim and the connecting radius on the upper tank hemisphere. 
3. Failure Mode Analysis 
a. Fuel Tank 
Failure of screen assembly to provide sufficient fuel for 
engine start under zero - g condition, caused by screen blowout or 
leakage through the screen, reduces the amount of fuel available . 
Cl ogging of screen pores prevents sufficient flow . 
b . Oxidizer Tank 
Failur e to flow ox idi zer under zero - g condit ion , due to 
catastrophic failure of the bladder , i s caused by complete sepa -
ration at the rim or excessively large cracks . 
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F. PRESSURANT TANK 
1 . Stress Analysi s 
Hoop stress at the burst pressure of 6000 psig uses a deriva -
tion of the Lame' formula as used by the Menasco Company, 
t x 2 + t) (Ref B-3) ( ri 
6000 x 6 . 773 2 
= 0 .1 22 x 2(6 . 773 + 0 .122) 
Sl = 164;000 psi 
The minimum ultimate tensile strength specified by Menasco 
is 165, 000 psi. 
2 . Toler an ce Analysis over Natural and Induced Temperature Range 
The tank is made of one material (Ti - 6A£ - 4V), and should of-
fer no prob l ems over the temperature range encountered . 
3. Fai lure Mode Analysis 
Leakage at the fill - drain connecting port . 
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APPENDIX C 
PRESSURANT SIDE TANK OUTLET VOLUME CALCULATION 
MCR-68-119 C-l 
~ote: Calculations of tank 
outlet volume assum-
ing the diaphragm is 
in i ntimate contact 
with the tank wall. 
Va = tank outlet volume , (eu in.) 
Va 
V3 
V4 
Va 
[(0 . 375)2 (1.5) + (0 .9)2 (0 .040) ] 0 .419 cu in. 
II 
4 [(0 . 375) 2 (1.320) + (0.177)2 0 . 75) + (0 . 177) 2 (1.0)] 
0 . 214 eu in. 
Al tube 
-1; 
I.D . (24) = (0 .03 73) (24) = 0 . 89 eu in . 
II [(0 . 177) 2 (1.0)] 0 .0245 eli in . 4 
0 .419 + 0.214 + 0 . 89 + 0 .0245 = 1.548 eli in . 
I-
I 
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APPENDIX D 
PROPELLANT LOADING , LEVEL, AND 
ULLAGE CALCULATION 
MCR~68~119 
Propellant load, 82 . 47 lb of N2 04 ; m 
Vacuum loaded into ~ 2332 cu in . loadable volume at 70 °F; 
Volume increase of tank expansion from 70°F to 275°F. 
where 
V 
V 
V 
tank sphere @ 70°F 
= 8.2Sin . 
561.5 cu in . 
4 
= 3 rr (561 . 5) = 2352 cu in . 
(8 .25)(4 . 22 x 10 -6 ) (2 05 ) 
7 .1 37 X 10 -3 ~ 0.008 
r 275 = 8 .25 + 0 . 008 = 8 .2 58 in . 
3 
r 275 563 .1 5 cu in . 
tank sphere @ 275°F 
4 3 3 rr r275 4 3 rr (563 . 15) 2358.9 
actual tank including backup ring700F 
2335 cu in . 
Vactual tank including backup ring2750F 2335 ( 2358 . 9) 2352 
2342 cu in . 
2 . 5 cu in . 
D ~l 
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Volume increase 70 to 95°F 
(ref duPont teflon expan-
sion da t a ) 
(~~) (1. 36 ) (2 . 5) 0. 0236 
Volume increase 95 to 275°F 
0.000425 
2 . 5 + 0 .0236 + 0 . 0004 ~ 2 . 524 
Vdiap . @ 275°F = 2 . 52 cu in . 
V bl 11 ' ' d k @ 700F = 2335 - 2 . 5 = usa e prope ant lnSl e tan 
= 2332 . 5 cu in . 
V 
usable propellant inside tank @ 275 °F 2342 - 2 . 52 = 
2339 .48 cu in . 
2 04 ~ N02 Equilibrium Data (Ref Allied Product Bulletin ) 
0 . 011 13 cu ft/1b 
89 .85 lb/cll ft 
4 . 712 ell ftllb 
P
N02 
gas @ 70°F = 0 . 212 lb/cll ft 
82 .47 lb loaded into 2332 .5 cu in . (1.349 cu ft ) @ 70°F 
m 
82 . 47 = 61 13 
1. 349 . 
Vol @ 275°F i s 2339 . 5 eu in . (1 .354 ) 
wh ere 
P 
m 
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82.47 = 60 . 91 
1 . 354 
b 
P 
m 
Ie t a+b 1; then , a l - b 
a = 
Pm - PN02 
PN2 04 - PN02 
P 
ITt 
a = vo lume % of N2 04 (sat . ) 
b = volume % of N02 (sat . ) 
Pm( 70 ) - PN02 (70 ) 
PN2 04 ( ) - PN02 (70) 
61 . 13 - 0 . 212 = ~0 . 918 = 0 . 680 
89 . 85 0.212 89 . 638 ' 
1 - a 70 = 1 - 0 . 680 0 . 32 
D- 3 
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Pm275 - PNOz275 
PNZ04275 - PNOz275 
60 . 91 - 9 . 3 
64 . 3 - 9 . 3 
51 . 59 
55 .00 = 0 . 938 
b~75 1 - a275 = 1 - 0 . 938 = 0 .062 
Then , vol ume of vapor @ 70°F and 275 °F 
VP70 = b70 Vloadable 70 = (0 . 32)(1.349) = 0.432 eu ft 
v 32% 
ullage 70 
= b275 Vloadable 275 (0.062) (1. 354 ) 0 .084 eu f t 
v = 6 .2% 
ullage 
The he i ght of the l i quid level below the tank t op is equal 
to the height , H, of the volume of a spherical segment , wh i ch is 
equa l to the ullage volume a t the temperature of interest . 
z 
H 
x 
Fig . D-l Liquid Hei ght 
1 
R 
rr HZ ( - !:!.3 ) V = - 3- (3R -H) = rrHz R 
for a spheric a l se gment as shown 
in Fig . D- l . 
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A plot of the spherical vo lume as a function of the height 
i s presented in Fig . D-2 fro m wh ich the liquid height in the tank 
can be determined . The spherical volume is identical to the pro-
pellant ullage volume . 
The ullage volume at 70°F , V ,is 0 . 45 ft 3 , and the corre -
u 70 
sp~nding liquid he i ght , H70 is approximatel y 6 .4 in . from the 
tank top i and the ullage volume at 270°F , V ,is 0 . 083 ft 3 and 
un5 
the corresponding liquid height, H275 , is approximately 2.5 in . 
from t he tank top as illustrated in Fig . D-2 . 
~ 
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. He i gh t (in . ) 
Fig . D-2 Sphe ri cal Volume vs Height 
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